Abstract:
We use extended Lotka-Volterra model to analyze the interactive board-level relationship quantitively based on different periods. We find that firstly, the multilevel structure makes the security market more inclusive for all kinds of enterprises, improves the security market’s stability and strengthens its ability to resist negative impacts. Secondly, we find that the competition between Shanghai and Shenzhen Security Exchange plays a key role in determining the construction of the multilevel capital market system in China. Thirdly, the administrative suspension of IPO brings about negative impacts on the interactive relationship among different boards. After the restart of IPO, main board in Shenzhen Exchange tends to be in a better position and the firms on it tend to be similar to those on Growth Enterprises Market (GEM) board, which causes internal competition. Finally, we give some suggestions on how to build a harmonious multilevel capital market.
李建勇, 彭维瀚, 刘天晖. 我国多层次场内股票市场板块互动关系研究——基于种间关系的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 431(5): 82-96.
LI Jianyong, PENG Weihan, LIU Tianhui. The Interactive Board-Level Relationship of Stock Exchange Market in China:Based on the Perspective of Interspecific Relationship. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 431(5): 82-96.
