Summary:
China is actively exploring new paths, fields, and models for the deep integration of “digital technology and justice”, which is an important measure in building a rule-of-law business environment in the new era, significantly accelerating social justice. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the rapid development of emerging digital technologies has provided an excellent opportunity for China's judicial digitalization reform. Judicial auction, an important method for disposing involved properties in legal cases, is crucial in protecting the rights of all parties involved and relates to the goal of “thoroughly resolving the ‘last kilometer’ of difficulties in execution”. It serves economic functions such as resolving breach of contract debts and maintaining financial system stability. Promoting online judicial auctions nationwide is one of the most significant reforms of “digital technology and justice”. However, both academic and practical circles lack necessary attention and discussion on the economic role of online judicial auction. Online judicial auction is a legal execution process where courts at all levels dispose of properties through internet auction platforms and online electronic bidding. Compared to traditional consignment auction, online judicial auction has obvious advantages: it simplify procedures, break geographical boundaries, significantly expand buyer reach, thus enhancing judicial execution efficiency and rapid asset realization. Additionally, introducing third-party online platforms ensures transparency, promoting fairness in judicial execution. Broad market participation maximizes transaction prices through competitive bidding, safeguarding “creditors' rights”. In China, cases involving judicial auctions often relate to credit-debt disputes. With the promotion of online judicial auctions, banks, as representatives of creditors, become primary beneficiaries. It's generally believed that increased value and faster debt recovery positively affects banks' lending. Online judicial auction effectively improves the efficiency and fairness of judicial execution compared to traditional judicial auctions, promotes the better recovery of bank debt, and then stimulates the willingness of banks to provide credit resource. To verify the aforesaid hypothesis, this paper uses samples from urban and rural commercial banks from 2007 to 2020, based on the phased implementation of online judicial auction by courts nationwide. It examines the reform's impact on local bank credit supply. Results show that online judicial auction significantly enhances the credit supply of local commercial banks. The mechanism works by protecting bank rights through improved judicial execution efficiency and fairness, thereby increasing their willingness to supply credit. The effect is more pronounced when the local area has a higher proportion of real estate auctions, poor traditional auction conditions, and greater market demand for judicial auctions. Furthermore, the increased credit supply from online judicial auction significantly alleviates financing constraints for SMEs, especially private enterprises, indicating that digital justice reforms benefit financial services for the real economy. This paper contributes in the following ways: firstly, it deepens the research content of the digital economy. The digital economy is an important driving force in China's modernization process, but existing literature mainly focuses on corporate digital transformation, with insufficient attention to judicial digitalization reforms. This paper is the first empirical study on the substantial impact of the integration of “digital technology and judiciary execution”. Secondly, it enriches economic literature related to China's judicial reforms, an important practice in building a rule-of-law business environment and vital for a healthy financial system. The paper explores the impact of implementing online judicial auction on financial services for the real economy, providing a comprehensive insight into the economic significance of judicial auction reforms and filling the gap in related economic studies. Lastly, it expands academic understanding of factors influencing credit resource supply. Credit resource supply has always been a focus for policymakers and scholars. Literature from a rule-of-law perspective primarily uses cross-country data or explores from the overall rule of law environment, with few studies from a judicial perspective focusing on litigation. This paper shows that judicial auction reforms alleviate difficulties in China's judicial system and optimize credit resource supply, offering significant policy reference for constructing a “rule-of-law system, financial system and real economy” coordinated development pattern, thereby advancing China's modernization.
[1]百晓锋,2017,《中国民事执行年度观察报告(2016)》,《当代法学》第3期,第145～160页。 [2]邓伟、宋敏和刘敏,2021,《借贷便利创新工具有效影响了商业银行贷款利率吗？》,《金融研究》第11期,第60～78页。 [3]胡晶飚,2015,《关于司法拍卖改革之网络拍卖的探讨(上)》,《产权导刊》第2期,第54～57页。 [4]黄群慧、余泳泽和张松林,2019,《互联网发展与制造业生产率提升:内在机制与中国经验》,《中国工业经济》第8期,第5～23页。 [5]黄忠顺,2015,《司法强制拍卖改革的深度透析》,《当代法学》第1期,第49～58页。 [6]黄忠顺,2022,《破产财产网络拍卖的深度透析》,《法治研究》第2期,第82～93页。 [7]李广子,2014,《跨区经营与中小银行绩效》,《世界经济》第11期,第119～145页。 [8]刘萍,2009,《论〈物权法〉对担保制度的完善及对银行信贷业务的影响》,《金融研究》第12期,第188～200页。 [9]宁博、潘越、陈秋平和肖金利,2020,《信用风险传染与企业盈余管理:基于信用债违约的视角》,《会计研究》第3期,第66～77页。 [10]潘越、谢玉湘、宁博和梁师赫,2022,《数智赋能、法治化营商环境建设与商业信用融资——来自“智慧法院”视角的经验证据》,《管理世界》第9期,第194～208页。 [11]戚聿东、杜博和温馨,2021,《国有企业数字化战略变革:使命嵌入与模式选择——基于3家中央企业数字化典型实践的案例研究》,《管理世界》第11期,第137～158+10页。 [12]钱先航、曹廷求和李维安,2011,《晋升压力、官员任期与城市商业银行的贷款行为》,《经济研究》第12期,第72～85页。 [13]汤维建,2012,《论中国特色的司法拍卖制度》,《中国审判》第3期,第20～24页。 [14]田国强和李双建,2020,《经济政策不确定性与银行流动性创造:来自中国的经验证据》,《经济研究》第11期,第19～35页。 [15]田强和崔析宗,2016,《“成本节约型”网络司法拍卖模式之探索》,《法律适用》第12期,第52～56页。 [16]王振,2020,《人民法院网络司法拍卖研究》,《法制与社会》第17期,第101～102页。 [17]熊其万和李海霞,2019,《我国网络司法拍卖制度的探析与展望》,《法制博览》第36期,第41～43页。 [18]张健华和王鹏,2012,《银行风险、贷款规模与法律保护水平》,《经济研究》第5期,第18～30+70页。 [19]张元华,2020,《论网络司法拍卖的制度优势与未来选择》,《法律适用》第3期,第59～70页。 [20]祝继高、岳衡和饶品贵,2020,《地方政府财政压力与银行信贷资源配置效率——基于我国城市商业银行的研究证据》,《金融研究》第1期,第88～109页。 [21]Benmelech, E. and N. K. Bergman, 2009, “Collateral Pricing”, Journal of Financial Economics, 91(3), pp.339～360. [22]Borusyak, K., X. Jaravel and J. Spiess, 2021, “Revisiting Event Study Eesigns: Robust and Efficient Estimation”, ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:2108.12419. [23]Callaway, B. and P. H.C. Sant’Anna, 2021, “Difference-in-differences with Multiple Time Periods”, Journal of Econometrics, 225 (2), pp.200～230. [24]Calomiris, C. W., M. Larrain, J. Liberti and J. Sturgess, 2017, “How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity”, Journal of Financial Economics, 123(1), pp.163～188. [25]Djankov, S., O. Hart, C. McLiesh and A. Shleifer, 2008, “Debt Enforcement around the World”, Journal of Political Economy, 116(6), pp.1105～1149. [26]Houston J. F., C. Lin, P. Lin and Y. Ma,2010, “Creditor Rights,Information Sharing, and Bank Risk Taking”, Journal of Financial Economics, 96(3), pp.485～512. [27]Iverson B., 2018, “Get in Line: Chapter 11 Restructuring in Crowded Bankruptcy Courts”, Management Science, 64(11), pp.5370～5394. [28]Jiang, L., R. Levine and C. Lin, 2019, “Competition and Bank Liquidity Creation”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 54(2), pp.513～538. [29]Laeven, L. and G. Majnoni, 2005, “Does Judicial Efficiency Lower the Cost of Credit？”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(7), pp.1791～1812. [30]Levine, R., 1999, “Law, Finance, and Economic Growth”, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8(1-2), pp.8～35. [31]Qian, J and P. E. Strahan, 2007, “How Laws and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans”, The Journal of Finance, 62(6), pp.2803～2834. [32]Rodano, G., N. Serrano-Velarde and E. Tarantino, 2016, “Bankruptcy Law and Bank Financing”, Journal of Financial Economics, 120(2), pp.363～382. [33]Schiantarelli, F., M. Stacchini and P. E. Strahan, 2020, “Bank Quality, Judicial Efficiency, and Loan Repayment Delays in Italy”, The Journal of Finance, 75(4), pp.2139～2178.
