Summary:
With the sustained growth of China's economy and its increasing openness, the renminbi (RMB) has been rising in importance in the international monetary system. The RMB is increasingly becoming the “anchor currency” for the exchange rates of other countries. However, there is no systematic analysis of the RMB as an anchor currency, especially from the perspective of the international monetary system, comparing the differences and influencing factors of the RMB versus other international currencies as an anchor. In a recent paper, Ilzetzki et al. (2019) evaluate the anchoring role of the US dollar, but they do not propose a theory of endogenous anchor currency choices nor quantitatively assess the anchoring effect of the RMB. Therefore, given this gap in the literature, it is of considerable importance to study the anchoring effect of the RMB from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The report of the 20th CPC National Congress emphasizes accelerating the establishment of a new development pattern, with domestic circulation as the main force and mutual promotion of domestic and international dual circulation. Under this new development pattern, RMB internationalization plays a crucial role in connecting domestic and international dual circulation. The Central Financial Work Conference of 2023 proposes the goal of building up China’s financial strength, emphasizing the need to expand high-level financial openness and steadily promote the internationalization of the RMB. In this context, studying the impact of factors such as the size of the economy, trade costs, and financial openness policies on the anchoring effect of the RMB can provide policy insights for the subsequent steady and prudent promotion of RMB internationalization in China. Based on both theoretical modeling and empirical analysis, this paper systematically investigates the endogenous selection process and factors that influence how a country's currency becomes the anchor currency for the exchange rates of other countries. The theoretical framework builds on optimal currency area theory and innovatively constructs a three-country model for the endogenous selection of the optimal anchor currency, analyzing how a country weighs the choices between two anchor currencies. By comparing the characteristics of anchor currency issuing countries, we explore the mechanisms behind the selection of anchor currencies by non-anchor currency issuing countries, the decision-making process for the optimal anchoring degree, and key influencing factors. We find that the larger the economic size and the lower the bilateral trade costs of the anchor currency issuing country, the greater the degree of anchoring to that currency. As a special case of the model, non-anchor currency issuing countries can choose to anchor 100% to that currency, adopting a currency board regime. In the empirical analysis, we use the augmented Frankel-Wei model to measure the degree of anchoring of the five major international currencies, including the RMB. In addition, we employ static and dynamic gravity models to investigate the impact of economic size and trade costs on anchoring effects. We find that the larger the economic size of a country, the greater the degree to which the non-anchor currency issuing countries choose to anchor to that country's currency. Furthermore, we find that a significant reduction in trade costs markedly enhances anchoring effects. Further analysis indicates that the influence of the economic size and trade costs of anchor currency issuing countries is more pronounced for non-anchor currency issuing countries with higher trade openness, more open capital accounts, and smaller economies than for countries without these characteristics. Quantitative analysis demonstrates that relying solely on economic growth and trade liberalization is insufficient to elevate the anchoring effect of the RMB to the level of the US dollar. However, financial policies represented by RMB bilateral currency swap agreements can considerably promote the anchoring effect by increasing the size of the economy and reducing trade, thus enhancing the robustness of the anchoring effect for the RMB. We offer the following policy implications. First, it is crucial to establish a new development pattern focused on domestic circulation to enable the economy to increase in size and thus to enhance the attractiveness of the RMB to other economies. Second, optimizing external circulation involves measures such as reducing tariffs, improving trade infrastructure, and advancing the establishment of free trade pilot zones to reduce trade costs. This will further enhance the anchoring effect of the RMB. Third, the government should promote the RMB as the anchor currency for neighboring countries and then expand the anchoring role of the RMB worldwide. Finally, a high level of financial openness plays a key role in fully unleashing the potential of the RMB as an anchor currency. For instance, bilateral currency swaps can significantly enhance the potential anchoring effect of the RMB.
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