Summary:
As China pursues high-quality economic development driven by innovation, the financing constraints faced by asset-light innovation-oriented enterprises have become increasingly prominent. International experience highlights the emergence of “cash flow-based financing models,” where corporate's operating profits serve as the foundation for debt, proving more effective in supporting enterprise innovation and economic structural transformation. While China's financial structure remains predominantly indirect-finance-oriented, domestic banks have recently shifted their mindset by promoting various innovative instruments such as intellectual property pledges, equity-debt hybrid financing, and operating revenue-linked loans. Consequently, the loan approval rates for technology-intensive enterprises have shown significant improvement. Nevertheless, whether this bank-dominated financing framework can effectively foster the growth of innovative enterprises constitutes a critical practical issue that demands thorough academic investigation. The theoretical framework of this study centers on the role of information asymmetry and risk levels in determining financing models. We posit that both collateral and cash flow can mitigate information asymmetry and agency problems, thereby enhancing firms' financing accessibility. However, the relative importance of these two factors varies with firm-specific characteristics. Smaller, riskier, and less profitable firms typically face more severe information asymmetry and higher default risk, making them more reliant on collateral-based financing. Conversely, larger, lower-risk, and more profitable firms generally possess more stable cash flows and stronger operational sustainability, which may reduce their dependence on collateral and increase the sensitivity of financing decisions to cash flow. Furthermore, external judicial framworks and targeted policy support for high-tech firms can amplify the role of cash flow-based financing by either reducing information asymmetry or mitigating risk exposure. Using micro-level data from A-share non-financial listed firms in China between 2007 and 2022 (33,799 firm-year observations), this paper proceeds in three stages. First, we construct a baseline model to examine the impact of collateral assets and cash flow on firm financing. Second, we investigate heterogeneity in financing models across firms from the internal aspects (size, risk, and profitability of firms) and external aspects (bankruptcy reorganization legal systems). Third, we focus specifically on innovative enterprises, identified through both market-based criteria (strategic emerging industries and future industries) and policy-based criteria (specialized, refined, innovative enterprises), and employ PSM-DID methods to analyze the impact of supportive policies on these firms' financing models. Our empirical findings yield several important insights. First, Chinese listed companies' financing constraints exhibit diversified characteristics, with both collateral and cash flow significantly facilitating loan acquisition. Second, firms' reliance on collateral has somewhat weakened over time, while the impact of cash flow has significantly strengthened, particularly after the implementation of bankruptcy reorganization systems in 2018. Third, the financing model varies significantly across firms with different financial characteristics: smaller, higher-risk, and less profitable firms are more sensitive to collateral, while larger, lower-risk, and more profitable firms are more sensitive to cash flow. Fourth, innovative enterprises, particularly those in strategic emerging industries, predominantly rely on cash flow rather than collateral for financing, which aligns with their generally favorable financial conditions. Fifth, legal system improvements and policy support have significantly enhanced the role of cash flow in corporate financing. Specifically, both credit support policies for strategic emerging industries and certification policies for specialized, refined, innovative enterprises significantly strengthen the sensitivity of financing to cash flow, reducing dependence on collateral. Based on these findings, we propose several policy recommendations: (1) Improve the institutional infrastructure and risk control mechanisms for cash flow-based financing, including enhancing bankruptcy reorganization systems, promoting digital financial technologies, and improving accounting standards and information disclosure systems; (2) Expand the categories of acceptable collateral types and develop digital valuation systems for intangible assets; (3) Innovate financial service models, such as investment-loan linkage mechanisms and specialized banking services for innovative enterprises; (4) Establish differentiated policy support systems for innovative enterprises at different development stages; and (5) Strengthen the social credit system to reduce moral hazard in cash flow-based financing. Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides systematic empirical evidence on the diversity and evolution of corporate financing models in China, addressing the overemphasis on collateral dependence in existing research. Second, it offers micro-level evidence on how indirect financing supports innovative enterprises from both internal firm characteristics and external environmental perspectives. Third, it empirically verifies the role of institutions and policies in promoting the development of cash flow-based financing models, providing theoretical basis and policy references for improving innovative enterprise certification standards and related infrastructure. Future research could broaden this work by incorporating more unlisted innovative enterprises in the sample, developing more refined measures of innovation capability, examining the combined effects of direct and indirect financing, and further exploring the role of digital finance and financial technology in alleviating financing constraints for innovative enterprises.
万晓莉, 叶芸绮, 方芳. 从抵押物到现金流:间接融资如何支持创新型企业？[J]. 金融研究, 2025, 537(3): 58-75.
WAN Xiaoli, YE Yunqi, FANG Fang. From Collateral to Cash Flow: How Can Indirect Financing Support Innovative Enterprises?. Journal of Financial Research, 2025, 537(3): 58-75.
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