Abstract:
Monetary policy and financial regulation are consistent, the central bank’s monetary policy focusing on maintaining price stability can achieve screed volatility of financial asset prices, and the financial supervision can prevent systemic risk of financial objectives. DSGE model viewed systemic risk as endogenous in this paper, and the unexpected tightening of monetary policy will not necessarily reduce systemic risk,and it tends to have a large impact on the bank especially when financial sector is weak. Financial intermediaries’ risky behavior is influenced by monetary policy and financial regulatory policy’s synergistic response. The systematic monetary policy built on simple policy rules can improve welfare relying on leverage; While the macroprudential policy similar to the counter-cyclical capital requirements is more robust, and can get higher welfare benefits taking into account inflation and output objectives and requirements.
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