Summary:
Deficiencies in bank governance are considered to be one of the key factors behind the financial crisis of 2008. Since then, such deficiencies have attracted increasing attention in many countries around the world. China has emphasized the need to improve bank governance, clarify ownership relationships, and attach greater importance to proactively controlling and dissolving systemic risks. It has become increasingly common for institutional investors (especially insurance companies) to hold listed bank shares through financial products. Therefore, the impact of this practice on the systemic risk of listed banks cannot be ignored. Additionally, with the further relaxation of the insurance capital shareholdings of Chinese listed banks, the proportion of listed bank shares held by insurance companies has risen sharply since 2010. High shareholding ratios of financial products may induce self-interested behavior in institutional investors, leading to changes in the relationship between financial product shareholding and bank systemic risk. The phenomenon of institutional investors holding a disproportionate number of a bank's shares through financial products has drawn the attention of supervisory authorities. To standardize the management of banks' equity, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) issued Interim Measures for Equity Management of Commercial Banks (henceforth “the Equity Management Measures”) in January 2018. This publication indicates that financial products can be used to invest in the shares of listed banks but the total number of shares of the same bank held by a single investor through financial products should not exceed 5%. Therefore, it is worthwhile to investigate how the Equity Management Measures affect the behavior of institutional investors. This question is of great importance to improve banks' equity management and control and dissolve bank systemic risk in China and promote the high-quality development of the Chinese economy. To address the above issues, this paper studies the influence of financial product shareholding on bank systemic risk and its heterogeneity using GMM and synthetic control methods and panel data from 16 listed banks in China during 2011-2019. We further discuss the policy effects of the restriction of institutional investors' shareholding of financial products of a listed bank imposed by the Equity Management Measures. The results show the following: (1) A higher total shareholding ratio of financial product shareholders helps to reduce bank systemic risk as the shareholders' professional advantages allow them to better supervise the bank if the shareholding ratio of a single institutional investor is less than 5%; (2) when the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder of financial products is over 5%, the shareholder will use their power for personal gain, which will increase bank systemic risk and weaken the reducing effect of the shareholding of financial products on bank systemic risk; (3) as insurance product holdings dominate the total shareholding of financial products, the impact of such holdings on bank systemic risk is similar to the total impact of financial product holdings; (4) the total shareholding ratio of financial products other than insurance products can reduce bank systemic risk; and (5) the Equity Management Measures help to constrain the excessive risk-taking behavior of institutional investors whose shareholding ratio exceeds 5%, thereby reducing the systemic risk of the corresponding banks. This research has important policy implications for improving banks' equity structures. First, it indicates that financial regulatory authorities should encourage institutional investors to invest in listed banks to better supervise bank behavior and improve the diversification of banks' equity structures. However, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors must be controlled as a high shareholding ratio may induce self-interested behavior and weaken their role in reducing bank systemic risk. Second, regulatory authorities should strengthen bank equity management. These authorities should strictly enforce shareholder admittance standards, strengthen shareholder qualification reviews, regulate shareholder behavior, and clarify shareholder responsibilities, thus preventing “shareholder chaos.” This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it focuses on recent changes to the equity structures of Chinese listed banks. It is increasingly common for insurance companies and other financial institutions to increase their shareholdings in listed banks through financial products. This paper analyzes the impact of the structure of financial product shareholdings on bank systemic risk. Second, as the shareholding ratio of financial products has increased significantly in China since 2013, we further discuss the impact of the heterogeneity of major financial product shareholders on bank systemic risk. As a high shareholding ratio of financial products may lead institutional investors to engage in self-interested behavior, it may change their relationship. Third, we use synthetic control methods to estimate the impact of the Equity Management Measures on bank systemic risk as they have diverse effects on listed banks with different shareholding ratios of financial products.
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