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金融研究  2021, Vol. 492 Issue (6): 59-75    
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产业政策、创新行为与企业加成率——基于战略性新兴产业政策的研究
诸竹君, 宋学印, 张胜利, 陈丽芳
浙江工商大学经济学院,浙江杭州 310018;
浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州 310058;
厦门国家会计学院,福建厦门 361005
Industrial Policy, Innovation Behavior and Firms' Markups: Research on the Policy of Strategic Emerging Industries
ZHU Zhujun, SONG Xueyin, ZHANG Shengli, CHEN Lifang
School of Economics,Zhejiang Gongshang University;
School of Economics,Zhejiang University;
Xiamen National Accounting Institute
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摘要 本文基于1998-2013年中国工业企业数据和专利数据,采用双重差分方法评估战略性新兴产业政策对企业加成率的影响程度、作用机制和有效实施空间。研究发现:(1)对生产率和研发水平较高的行业实施战略性新兴产业政策,总体上显著增加了企业专利申请量,有效激发了创新主体活力。(2)由于影响企业生产率的成本效应大于影响产品质量的价格效应,导致战略性新兴产业政策一定程度上降低了企业加成率。(3)行业技术差距对战略性新兴产业政策的加成率效应具有显著负向调节作用,随着行业技术水平接近前沿,战略性新兴产业政策实施效果呈渐进式优化。(4)由于企业主体异质性,战略性新兴产业政策具有的“选择性”特征会引致“重数量轻质量”创新陷阱,这是造成企业加成率下降的重要原因。本文有助于更好理解产业政策对制造业高质量发展的推动作用,对产业政策实施效果的进一步优化具有一定参考价值。
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诸竹君
宋学印
张胜利
陈丽芳
关键词:  产业政策  加成率  产业生命周期  创新行为    
Summary:  During the 14th Five-Year Plan period, China has set forth new requirements for the development of strategic emerging industries and new goals of “characteristic development, complementary advantages and reasonable structure.” Industrial development should focus on seizing opportunities for future industrial development and cultivating leading and pillar industries. However, it remains unclear how to develop strategic emerging industries and transform industrial policy support from quantity-oriented to quality-and efficiency-oriented.
This paper studies the mechanism and effective support space of industrial policy on firms' markups. The results show that first, the strategic emerging industry policy has significant positive effect ,because firm's productivity and R&D are relatively high in this industry.Second, in terms of the mechanism, strategic emerging industry policies affect firms' markups through the cost and price channels. Currently(1998-2013), the negative cost effect is greater than the positive price effect, resulting in an overall negative effect. Third, in terms of heterogeneity, the industrial technology gap has a significant negative moderating effect on firms' markups, and a positive trend is observed between this effect and the technological convergence level. Fourth, further analysis shows that the innovation trap of focusing on quantity but neglecting quality, a consequence of support, is the main cause of decreasing overall markups.
This paper presents innovations in several areas. Theoretically, it explores the mechanism by which industrial policy affects firms' markups in the context of China's efforts to catch up with more developed economies. It amends industrial policy support theory and considers the technology gap in its conceptualization of the support space. Empirically, this paper reveals the effect of the strategic emerging industries policy on firm markups. Previous studies have obvious sample selection bias and fail to observe dynamic changes in markups (Lu et al., 2014; Liu, 2016). This paper uses industrial firm database records from 1998 to 2013 to study the effect of the strategic emerging industries policy, and it uses patent data with complete citation information to estimate patent quality. The innovation incentive of emphasizing quantity but neglecting quality, a consequence of the strategic emerging industry policy, is identified as the main cause of the negative markup effect. In terms of policy, this paper provides empirical evidence for the optimal implementation space of industrial policy. From the perspective of the technology gap, this paper provides an effective approach to optimizing the policy implementation space and to promoting the dynamic evolution of government support from pioneering to enabling. This transition can enhance the effectiveness of industrial policy and promote the development of high-quality innovations.
This paper also has several policy implications. First, the levels of industrial development, quality and efficiency should be considered crucial targets of industrial policy support. Policymakers should consider relaxing the assessment of the total number of patents and number of patents per capita, not setting binding indicators, reducing selective subsidies, strengthening the dynamic tracking of patent implementation and rewarding patent achievements with a good industrialization effect and high degree of marketization at a later time. Also, the combination of industrial policy implementation and the industrial technology gap should be maintained. Second, optimization of the market environment and government functions is a crucial strategy to improve the quality of strategic emerging industries. In the early stage, industrial development mainly depends on a high-quality business environment and competitive neutral market environment, and the government effectively handles market competition as a regulator. When the technology gap is relatively small, the government should effectively manage market competition and drive innovation as an enabler. Third, the deep integration of strategic emerging industries and various industries should be targeted for the optimization of industrial policy. A reliance on high-quality innovations by strategic emerging industries should expand the number of important products and key core technologies in the industrial supply chain, focus on upstream core links and enhance the ability of the chain owner to lead and drive the industrial supply chain. Key departments should be created to effectively link the innovation and industrial chains and enhance modernization of the industrial and supply chains.
Keywords:  Industrial Policy    Firms' Markups    Industrial Life Cycle    Innovation Behavior
JEL分类号:  D21   O38  
基金资助: * 本文感谢国家自然科学基金青年项目(71903173)、教育部人文社科青年项目(19YJC790209)、浙江省自然科学基金一般项目(LY21G030006、LY19G030028)、教育部人文社科重点研究基地项目(2020SMYJ06ZC、2019SMYJ02ZC)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
作者简介:  诸竹君,经济学博士,副教授,浙江工商大学经济学院、浙商研究院,E-mail:hehaizzj@163.com.
宋学印,经济学博士,副研究员,浙江大学经济学院,E-mail:songxueyn@sohu.com.
张胜利,经济学博士研究生,浙江大学经济学院,E-mail:11601034@zju.edu.cn.
陈丽芳,经济学博士,讲师,厦门国家会计学院,E-mail:chenlifang@xnai.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
诸竹君, 宋学印, 张胜利, 陈丽芳. 产业政策、创新行为与企业加成率——基于战略性新兴产业政策的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2021, 492(6): 59-75.
ZHU Zhujun, SONG Xueyin, ZHANG Shengli, CHEN Lifang. Industrial Policy, Innovation Behavior and Firms' Markups: Research on the Policy of Strategic Emerging Industries. Journal of Financial Research, 2021, 492(6): 59-75.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2021/V492/I6/59
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