银行贷款决策中的私人效用攫取——基于业务招待费的实证研究

doi:10.12094/1002-7246(2017)04-0112-16

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摘要当贷款供不应求时,资金需求者需要支付名义利息之外的代价——隐性资本成本,来竞争银行贷款,而这部分成本可能会被资金供给者的代理人侵占为私人利益。本文采用业务招待费作为观察手段,实证检验发现:(1)企业通过更多的业务招待费支出,获取了更多的银行贷款;(2)对此行为,银行会更多地提供短期贷款,以降低风险;(3)宏观信贷环境和微观企业特征都会对业务招待费支出与银行贷款取得的关系产生影响。在信贷需求竞争激烈时以及经营风险较高的企业中,业务招待费的贷款取得作用较低;而在国有企业以及规模较大的企业中,单位业务招待费可以取得更多的银行贷款。本文的结论表明,市场管制的存在阻碍了交易以显性契约的有效方式达成,从而促使了租值耗散式的隐性交易发生,因此管制的放松具有一定的必要性。

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	梁上坤
	陈冬华

关键词: 隐性资本成本私人利益业务招待费银行贷款信贷环境

Abstract: Under the regulation of interest rate, when regulated interest rate is lower than market interest rate, companies need to pay additional implicit capital costs to get the bank loan. We then analyze the determinations and consequences of this phenomenon theoretically and empirically. Using entertainment expenses of companies as the proxy of implicit costs, we find that: (1) Companies who pay more implicit cost of capital can get more bank loan; (2) Banks prefer to offer short-term loan to companies in order to reduce the credit risk in above behavior; (3) The macro environments and companies’ characters could affect the relationship between entertainment expenses and bank loan. The effect of entertainment expenses will be lower under serve credit environment and in high risk companies, but be higher in SOEs and big companies. Our findings are helpful to understand the role and consequences of regulation in financial markets of transitional and emerging economies.

Key words: Implicit Capital Costs Private Benefits Entertainment Expenses Bank Loan Credit Environment

JEL分类号:

F65

G14

G32

基金资助: 国家自然科学基金课题(71372032、71402198、71502183)、北京市社会科学基金课题(15JGC176)、中央财经大学青年英才培育计划(QYP1608)成果,北京市教育委员会共建项目、北京市会计类专业群建设项目、中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金、中央财经大学科研创新团队计划

作者简介: 梁上坤(通讯作者),会计学博士,副教授,中央财经大学会计学院,Email:Liang_sk@126.com.陈冬华,会计学博士,教授,南京大学商学院,Email:dhchen@nju.edu.cn.

引用本文:

梁上坤, 陈冬华. 银行贷款决策中的私人效用攫取——基于业务招待费的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 442(4): 112-127.
LINAG Shangkun, CHEN Donghua. The Private Benefit Expropriations during Bank Loan Decisions:An Empirical Study on Entertainment Expenses. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 442(4): 112-127.

链接本文:

http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/10.12094/1002-7246(2017)04-0112-16 或 http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2017/V442/I4/112

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