Summary:
The key for monetary policy to sustain real economic recovery is to improve the mechanism of monetary transmission to enhance liquidity in key areas and for weak links. Thus, allocative efficiency is more important than total supply. Typical symptoms of an inefficient transmission mechanism are the overallocation of resources to a virtual economy that squeezes out investment in the real economy or the coexistence of excess liquidity in the virtual economy and a liquidity shortage in the real economy. In addition, a liquidity imbalance in the real economy results in inefficiency. During the current transition from rapid growth to high-quality development, monetary policy is more targeted, so the heterogeneity of the micro transmission mechanisms of monetary policy are of concern to researchers. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a quantile regression model with interactive effects based on data from Chinese A-share companies, and by conducting quantitative analysis on the effect of monetary policy and the virtual economy on firm financing, including internal and external financing. Empirical evidence suggests that during the 2009-2015 sample period, the economy faced a dilemma of “the richer the firm, the easier it is to get financed. The easier it is to get financed, the richer the firm,” also referred to as the “Matthew effect.” The Matthew effect was prominent in the effects of traditional monetary policy as the support given by releasing liquidity to poor firms did not reach half that of rich firms. At the same time, the virtual economy diverted liquidity in a way that strengthened the Matthew effect. The poorer the firm, the more likely it was to be negatively affected, with poor firms experiencing 3 times the diversion compared with rich firms. During the sample period, the loose monetary policy when the interest rate and reserve ratio were lowered resulted in advantaged firms being more active, whereas disadvantaged firms were irrelevant with regulating intension. Specifically, the interest rate cut for external financing by head enterprises was 2.10 times that for tail enterprises, and the reserve ratio cut on external financing for head enterprises was 2.83 times that for tail enterprises. The traditional untargeted open market operation vehicles benefited head enterprises 6.87 times more than they benefited tail enterprises in terms of external financing. In our study, the diversion to the virtual economy from the real economy was reflected in internal financing. The overheated stock market not only squeezed out business operations but also widened the gap between advantaged and disadvantaged firms. Similarly, firms in worse operating condition were more likely to be squeezed out by the housing boom. The diversion of the stock market on the liquidity of tail enterprises was 2.69 times that of head enterprises, and the diversion of the real estate market on tail enterprises was 2.30 times that of head enterprises. According to the literature on the credit channel, rising housing prices are beneficial for external financing because mortgage values also increase. Our regression results are consistent with this view. However, the Matthew effect and increases in external financing have long been neglected. Our empirical findings suggest that during the 2009-2015 sample period, rising housing prices benefited the external financing of head enterprises 5.01 times more than that of tail enterprises. Therefore, efforts to stimulate the real estate market to fuel economic growth may be effective in the short run, but in the long run, stimulating the real estate market works against sustainable development. Our empirical findings have the following profound implications for economic policy: (1) Rather than adopting strong stimulus policies that have an economy-wide effect, we should continue to move forward with structural reform and inject liquidity into key areas via the flexible manipulation of innovative and targeted instruments to create a proper monetary and financial environment for high-quality development. (2) The study of digital currency is of significant importance to gain more precise control over the currency flow between sectors. Therefore, big data technology is useful for customizing and adjusting dynamic strategies to strengthen areas of weakness. (3) As serving the real economy is the duty and purpose of the financial sector, China should guard against financial bubbles, be cautious of real economy hollowing arising from an overheated virtual economy, and guide liquidity back to the real economy. Benign interaction between the virtual and real economies is the long-term solution for high-quality development.
杨继生, 向镜洁. 货币传导异质性与实体经济流动性配置的“马太效应”[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 485(11): 40-57.
YANG Jisheng, XIANG Jingjie. Monetary Transmission Heterogeneity and the “Matthew Effect” of Liquidity Allocation in the Real Economy. Journal of Financial Research, 2020, 485(11): 40-57.
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