Summary:
Since 2008, China's national savings rate has shown a fluctuating and declining trend, which should be taken seriously. High savings rates have some negative effects, but lower savings rates are not always better. During the past 40 years of the reform and opening up, a high savings rate has been the cornerstone of China's economic development. Without a certain savings rate, it is difficult to support the growth of bank credit and investment. In addition, a high savings rate serves as a margin of safety should China's overall debt ratio increase. If the savings rate continues to decline, it will inevitably cause a debt repayment burden and increase the vulnerability of the financial system. Although China's savings rate remains high, it is important for the smooth transformation of China's economy to understand the reasons for the decline in the savings rate, especially whether the decline is sustainable, and to propose forward-looking policies. Many studies offer explanations for the increase in China's savings rate before 2008, among which the theory of distributive pattern, the theory of population structure, the theory of an imperfect economic system, the theory of cultural habits, and the theory of income inequality have great influence, but these theories do not explain the decline in China's savings rate after 2008. This paper tries to explain the declining trend of China's national savings rate since 2008 from the perspective of rising labor income. Data from flow of funds statements show that the rise in labor income has significantly affected China's national savings rate since 2008. As a result, we propose the labor income hypothesis to explain the evolution of the national savings rate. We hypothesize that the continued decline in the national savings rate since 2008 is driven by residents' increasing labor income. Specifically, due to the reduction in the surplus labor force and policy factors that are beneficial to workers, the certainty and predictability of rising labor income in China are increasingly strong, which enhances consumption and leads to a decline in the household savings rate. Increasing labor income means greater labor costs for enterprises, which leads to a decrease in their disposable income and a decrease in the corporate savings rate. An increase in labor expenses for enterprises leads to an increase in social welfare and public service expenditures by the government, which forces a decline in disposable income and government savings, thus leading to a decline in the government savings rate. Therefore, the decline in China's national savings rate is caused by the combined declines of the savings rates of residents, enterprises and the government caused by rising labor income, rather than by the sum of the savings rates of certain sectors. To test this hypothesis, we conduct an empirical analysis with the minimum wage standard as the instrumental variable and using provincial panel data from 2008 to 2016. The results show that many variables mentioned in the literature fail to explain the changes in the savings rate since 2008. Some explanatory variables show a significant positive correlation with the savings rate, which is consistent with the expectations of the previously mentioned theories, but this positive correlation is not enough to increase the savings rate. For example, the coefficient of the government investment rate is significant and positive, indicating that the distribution pattern theory has some explanatory power for changes in the savings rate, but it is not sufficient to cause an increase in the government and national savings rates. In contrast, the continued rise in per capita labor income has a significant negative effect on the savings rate. In other words, increasing labor income offsets the positive effects of other factors on the savings rate and dominates the downward trend of the national savings rate, indicating that the labor income hypothesis has quite strong explanatory power for the savings rate. Based on our theoretical hypothesis and empirical evidence, there is room for further decline in China's national savings rate. This has significant implications for the choice of macroeconomic policy. China is still a developing country, so to achieve our many economic and social goals, we need a high rate of economic growth, which objectively requires that a certain rate of investment be maintained. If the national savings rate continues to fall without a corresponding decline in the investment rate, there will be a negative gap between the savings and investment rates. According to the balance of payments, this will lead to a persistent trade deficit, which could lead to serious financial risks. To offset the pressure of economic growth brought by a decline in the savings rate, China's economic growth pattern should be transformed from investment-driven to consumption-driven, and the focus of policies to stabilize growth should be transformed from investment amount to investment efficiency.
杨天宇, 朱光. 劳动报酬上涨与中国国民储蓄率的演变趋势[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 485(11): 21-39.
YANG Tianyu, ZHU Guang. Rising Labor Income and the Evolution of the National Savings Rate in China. Journal of Financial Research, 2020, 485(11): 21-39.
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