Summary:
Skill-biased technological change (SBTC) is the basic driver for developing an innovative economy and plays an important role in promoting technological innovation and economic transformation in developed countries. As China is presently in the process of transforming its development mode and growth momentum, the adoption of SBTC is urgently needed to transform its economy from high-speed growth to high-quality development. Utilizing the advantages of late development to acquire core technologies through outward foreign direct investment, (OFDI) has become the best choice for domestic enterprises. However, a significant phenomenon since local enterprises began going out is that every major transaction is accompanied by fierce controversy within the host country, especially in developed countries. The recent memorandum signed by President Trump restricting China's investment in the U.S. based on the “301 Survey” has once again propelled the home country's OFDI to the forefront of world attention. Thus, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of China's going out policy from the perspective of SBTC. Does China's OFDI really lead to technological spillover from the high-tech sector in developed countries？ Is it reasonable to criticize and restrict overseas investment by local enterprises without a systematic assessment？ If not, we need to consider why large-scale OFDI has not significantly promoted the home country's SBTC and which conditions have limited the reverse technology spillover. Is it due to the foreign core technology blockade or to insufficient capacity for technology absorption and conversion in China？ The above questions form the focus of this paper. We first analyze potential factors that may affect the reverse technology spillover effect of China's OFDI on domestic SBTC, and then propose hypotheses for testing. Second, we use the method proposed by Coe and Helpman (1995) to measure the intensity of the reverse technology spillover from OFDI in 30 provinces in China. Finally, the effect of the reverse technology spillover on SBTC and the theoretical hypotheses are tested using the fixed effect model and the panel threshold model, respectively. The empirical results show that the reverse technology spillover effect of OFDI on SBTC in China is not positive, but that independent innovation significantly promotes the development of SBTC. The reasons include not only domestic overcapacity and insufficient capacity for technological absorption, but also the low-end lock in the GVC and the technology blockade from developed countries. This paper is novel in three respects. First, we find that OFDI's reverse technology spillover from developed countries is mainly low-skill biased. The SBTC that contributes to long-term structural adjustment and improved competitiveness is not substantially obtained from foreign high-tech fields, despite US allegations that China's overseas investments have stolen technology and intellectual property in the high-tech sector. Second, based on the reverse technology spillover channel under the open economy, we place both OFDI and SBTC in a unified analytical framework to clearly reveal the mechanism of OFDI's impact on SBTC, which enriches and improves the literature on globalization and technological innovation. Third, empirical tests show that OFDI's reverse technology spillover effect on SBTC is not only related to a willingness to create a technical blockade and the international division of labor, but also to domestic overcapacity and limited capacity for technological absorption, which provides unique and important empirical evidence for promoting SBTC. These findings have important implications for the policy of promoting SBTC in China. First, there is a need to increase R&D investment and improve the innovative capability of local enterprises. This is not only key to coping with the technological blockade by multinational firms and breaking the “low-end lock” of the GVC, but is also necessary to enhance the capacity of local enterprises to digest and absorb the changes. The second is to deepen supply-side structural reform and vigorously resolve excess capacity, which should involve not only the upgrading of industrial structures through supply structure optimization and resource reconfiguration, but also bringing resources to the field of innovation. The third is to increase the cultivation of human capital. With the development of skill-biased technological change, the demand for highly skilled labor will increase. To reduce the negative effects of a human capital shortage on the technological bias, the construction of a multi-level training system for those with technological talent must be speeded up.
沈春苗, 郑江淮. 中国企业“走出去” 获得发达国家“核心技术”了吗？ ——基于技能偏向性技术进步视角的分析[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 463(1): 111-127.
SHEN Chunmiao, ZHENG Jianghuai. Do China's “Going-out” Enterprises Obtain Core Technology from Developed Countries？ An Analysis from the Viewpoint of Skill-biased Technical Change. Journal of Financial Research, 2019, 463(1): 111-127.
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