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金融研究  2018, Vol. 453 Issue (3): 105-120    
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银行业竞争与市场风险偏好选择——竞争政策的金融风险效应分析
徐璐, 叶光亮
清华大学五道口金融学院,北京 100083;
中国人民大学汉青经济与金融高级研究院,北京 100872
Banking Competition and Risk: the Impact of Competition Policy on Financial Stability
XU Lu, YE Guangliang
PBC School of Finance,Tsinghua University;
HanQing Advanced Institute of Economics and Finance, Renmin University of China
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摘要 本文探讨银行业竞争政策与金融风险的关系。基于空间竞争模型,文章探讨银行贷款市场的竞争博弈和企业家的风险选择行为,由此分析市场均衡的贷款利率以及企业家风险偏好水平。研究表明:强化竞争政策可以降低市场整体风险,竞争上升会降低单家银行垄断势力,促使均衡贷款利率下降,减弱企业家的风险偏好行为,使得银行经营风险下降、稳健性增强;从社会福利角度分析,虽然竞争可能损害银行业的经营利润,但会通过大幅提升存款者收益以及企业家盈利使得社会总福利提高。同时,竞争对市场风险的作用受到市场结构的影响,市场集中度增强将削弱竞争政策的实施效果。文章进一步讨论银行成本不对称对均衡的影响。总之,强化竞争政策与加强竞争性金融监管可以有效降低银行经营风险,提升社会福利,实现效率和稳定的双赢。
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徐璐
叶光亮
关键词:  银行业竞争  金融风险  竞争政策  社会福利    
Abstract:  This paper explores the relationship between banking competition and financial stability. Based on a Spatial Competition Model, we investigate entrepreneurs' risk-taking behaviors in a game with banking competition. It shows that banking competition decreases the equilibrium loan interest rate, reduces entrepreneurs' risk-taking choices, and thus enhances financial stability. From the perspective of social welfare, banking competition may hurt banks' profitability, but it significantly increases depositors' and entrepreneurs' expected payoffs, and thus enhances social welfare. In consequence, an effective competition policy discourages the risk-taking behaviors of banks, and thus increases financial stability as well as market efficiency, resulting in a higher social welfare. The case with cost asymmetry is also addressed.
Key words:  Banking Competition    Financial Risk    Competition Policy    Social Welfare
JEL分类号:  G14   G21   G28  
基金资助: 本文感谢国家自然科学基金(71773129/71273270)、国家“万人计划”青年拔尖人才支持计划(W02070290)、青年长江学者奖励计划 (Q2016037)、霍英东教育基金(141082)及中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助,14XNI006)资助。
作者简介:  徐璐,经济学博士,清华大学五道口金融学院,Email:xul.14@pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn.
叶光亮(通讯作者),经济学博士,教授,中国人民大学汉青经济与金融高级研究院、国家发展与战略研究院、反垄断与竞争政策研究所,Email:gye@ruc.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
徐璐, 叶光亮. 银行业竞争与市场风险偏好选择——竞争政策的金融风险效应分析[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 453(3): 105-120.
XU Lu, YE Guangliang. Banking Competition and Risk: the Impact of Competition Policy on Financial Stability. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 453(3): 105-120.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2018/V453/I3/105
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