Abstract:
Based on external change of the standard of quota taxation wage, this paper extends the range of “Non-Debt-Related Tax Shields” and explores the relationship between “Wage-Related Tax Shields” and capital structure. The empirical results suggest that when the standard of quota taxation wages increases, compared with firms not nearly tax exhaustion status, firms nearly tax exhaustion status reduce interest-bearing debt significantly, supporting both the “Substitution Effect” and “Tax Exhaustion” hypothesis. Further results suggest that the difference in the change of debt between firms not nearly and nearly tax exhaustion status is mainly reflected on long-term debt rather than short-term debt, and the difference is more pronounced in non-state-owned firms than state-owned firms. In addition, compared with firms located in districts with lower tax enforcement level, the difference is more significant in firms located in districts with higher tax enforcement level. Our results not only provide new evidence on the non-debt-related tax shields, but also find that both the ownership nature and tax enforcement level affects the relationship between non-debt-related tax shields and capital structure.
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