Please wait a minute...
金融研究  2016, Vol. 429 Issue (3): 107-123    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
房价波动、抵押资产价值与企业风险承担
刘行, 建蕾, 梁娟
东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连 116025;
中央财经大学会计学院,北京 100081
House Prices, Collateral Value and Corporate Risk-taking
LIU Hang, JIAN Lei, LIANG Juan
School of Accountancy / China Internal Control Research Center, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;
School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics
下载:  PDF (1497KB) 
输出:  BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
摘要 本文将房价波动作为外生事件,探讨了由房价波动所带来的抵押资产价值变化对企业风险承担水平的影响。房价上涨所带来的抵押资产价值上升会增强企业的融资能力,此时,理论上,一方面,管理层为了规避风险,会将抵押资产价值增加所带来的资源配置到那些风险较小但短期内可以获得高额利润的行业(如:房地产行业),从而会降低企业的风险承担水平;另一方面,因为企业融资能力的增强,管理层将有更充裕的资金投入到那些高风险且收益为正的项目,从而会提高企业的风险承担水平。实证结论支持第一种理论机制。进一步的实证检验支持非房地产企业大量进行房地产投资是上述结论形成的主要路径。在克服内生性问题和度量误差的可能影响之后,本文结论依然存在。
服务
把本文推荐给朋友
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章
刘行
建蕾
梁娟
关键词:  房价波动  抵押资产  风险承担    
Abstract:  We investigate the effect of collateral value on firms’ risk-taking by using the exogenous variation in the market value of a firm’s real estate assets caused by fluctuations of the local real estate prices. The rise of house price can increase corporate collateral value. Theoretically, on one hand, managers would allocate the resources resulting from the increasing of collateral value into projects of bubble industries (e.g. the real estate industry) that can make high profit in the short run. This could ultimately decrease corporate risk-taking. On the other hand, the increasing of collateral value can relax firms’ financial constraints. This could in turn lead to more investment in projects with high risks as well as positive profit, and ultimately result in higher corporate risk-taking. Our empirical findings lend support to the first hypothesis. Further analysis indicates that firms put resources into real estate industry is the reason of above conclusion. Our results still hold after a series of robustness checks.
Key words:  House Prices    Collateral    Risk-taking
JEL分类号:  G21   G31   R31  
基金资助: 本文感谢国家自然科学基金(批准号:71402017)和辽宁省高等学校优秀人才支持计划(项目编号:WJQ2014035)的资助
作者简介:  刘 行,会计学博士,副教授,东北财经大学会计学院/中国内部控制研究中心,Email:liuhangruc@gmail.com.建 蕾,会计学博士生,中央财经大学会计学院,Email:jianlei31@126.com.梁 娟,会计学博士生,中央财经大学会计学院,Email:liangjuancufe@126.com.
引用本文:    
刘行, 建蕾, 梁娟. 房价波动、抵押资产价值与企业风险承担[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 429(3): 107-123.
LIU Hang, JIAN Lei, LIANG Juan. House Prices, Collateral Value and Corporate Risk-taking. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 429(3): 107-123.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V429/I3/107
[1] 侯成琪和龚六堂,2014,《货币政策应该对住房价格波动作出反应吗——基于两部门动态随机一般均衡模型的分析》,《金融研究》第10期,第15~33页。<br />
[2] 李文贵和余明桂,2012,《所有权性质、市场化进程与企业风险承担》,《中国工业经济》第12期,第115~127页。<br />
[3] 李小荣和张瑞君,2014,《股权激励影响风险承担:代理成本还是风险规避》,《会计研究》第1期,第57~63页。<br />
[4] 罗知和张川川,2015,《信贷扩张、房地产投资与制造业部门的资源配置效率》,《金融研究》第7期,第60~75页。<br />
[5] 吕江林,2010,《我国城市住房市场泡沫水平的度量》,《经济研究》第6期,第28~41页。<br />
[6] 王文春和荣昭,2014,《房价上涨对工业企业创新的抑制影响研究》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期,第465~490页。<br />
[7] 颜色和朱国钟,2013,《“房奴效应”还是“财富效应”?房价上涨对国民消费影响的一个理论分析》,《管理世界》第3期,第34~47页。<br />
[8] 余明桂、李文贵和潘红波,2013a,《管理者过度自信与企业风险承担》,《金融研究》第1期,第149~163页。<br />
[9] 余明桂、李文贵和潘红波,2013b,《民营化、产权保护与企业风险承担》,《经济研究》第9期,第112~124页。<br />
[10] 曾海舰,2012,《房产价值与公司投融资变动》,《管理世界》第5期,第125~136页。<br />
[11] Acemoglu, D., and F., Zilibotti. 1997. “Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification, and Growth”,<i> Journal of Political Economy, 105(4): 709~751.</i><br />
[12] Acharya, V. V., Y., Amihud, and L., Litov. 2011. “Creditor Rights and Corporate Risk-taking”,<i> Journal of Financial Economics, 102(1): 150~166.</i><br />
[13] Adelino, M., A., Schoar, and F., Severino. 2015. “House prices, Collateral, and Self-employment”,<i> Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.</i><br />
[14] Bargeron, L. L., K. M., Lehn, and C. J., Zutter. 2010. “Sarbanes-Oxley and Corporate Risk-taking”, <i>Journal of Accounting and Economics, 49(1-2): 34~52.</i><br />
[15] Bernanke, B., and M., Gertler. 1989. “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business Fluctuations”,<i> The American Economic Review, 79(1): 14~31.</i><br />
[16] Bertrand, M., and S., Mullainathan. 2003. “Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial Preferences”,<i> Journal of Political Economy, 111(5): 1043~1075.</i><br />
[17] Chaney, T., D. A., Sraer, and D., Thesmar. 2012. “The Collateral Channel:How Real Estate Shocks Affect Corporate Investment”,<i> American Economic Review, 102(6): 2381~2409.</i><br />
[18] Chen, T., J., Harford, and C., Lin. 2014. “Financial Flexibility and Corporate Cash Policy”, Working Paper.<br />
[19] Chen, T., L. X., Liu, and L. A., Zhou. 2015. “The Crowding-out Effects of Real Estate Shocks - Evidence from China”, Working Paper.<br />
[20] Coles, J. L., N. D., Daniel, and L., Naveen. 2006. “Managerial Incentives and Risk-taking”,<i> Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2): 431~468.</i><br />
[21] Cvijanovic, D. 2014. “Real Estate Prices and Firm Capital Structure”,<i> Review of Financial Studies,27(9):2690~2735. </i><br />
[22] Faccio, M., M. T., Marchica, and R., Mura. 2011. “Large Shareholder Diversification and Corporate Risk-taking”,<i> Review of Financial Studies, 24(11): 3601~3641.</i><br />
[23] Faccio, M., M. T., Marchica, and R., Mura. 2015. “CEO Gender, Corporate Risk-taking, and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation”, Working Paper.<br />
[24] Fogel, K., R., Morck, and B., Yeung. 2008. “Big Business Stability and Economic Growth: Is What's Good for General Motors Good for America”,<i> Journal of Financial Economics, 89(1): 83~108.</i><br />
[25] John, K., L., Litov, and B., Yeung. 2008. “Corporate Governance and Risk-taking”,<i> Journal of Finance, 63(4): 1679~1728.</i><br />
[26] Kini, O., and R., Williams. 2012. “Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies”,<i> Journal of Financial Economics, 103(2): 350~376.</i><br />
[27] Kiyotaki, N., and J., Moore. 1997. “Credit Cycles”,<i> Journal of Political Economy, 105(2): 211~248.</i><br />
[28] Lin, L. 2015. “Collateral and the Choice between Bank Debt and Public Debt”,<i> Management Science, </i>forthcoming.<br />
[29] Miao, J., and P., Wang. 2012. “Sectoral Bubbles and Endogenous Growth”, Working Paper.<br />
[30] Staiger, D., and J.H., Stock. 1997. “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments”,<i> Econometrica, 65(3): 557~586.</i><br />
[31] Stock, J. H., J. H., Wright, and M., Yogo. 2002. “A Survey of Weak Instruments and Weak Identification in Generalized Method of Moments”,<i> Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 20(4): 518~529.</i><br />
[32] Wang, S., S. H., Chan, and B., Xu. 2012. “The estimation and determinants of the price elasticity of housing supply: Evidence from China”,<i> Journal of Real Estate Research, 34(3): 311~344.</i><br />
[33] Wang, S., Z., Yang, and H., Liu. 2011. “Impact of Urban Economic Openness on Real Estate Prices: Evidence from Thirty-five Cities in China”,<i> China Economic Review, 22(1): 42~54.</i><br />
[34] Zheng, S., Y., Fu, and H., Liu. 2009. “Demand for Urban Quality of Living in China: Evolution in Compensating Land-rent and Wage-rate Differentials”,<i> Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 38(3): 194~213.</i>
[1] 郭品, 沈悦. 互联网金融、存款竞争与银行风险承担[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 470(8): 58-76.
[2] 刘京军. 货币市场基金的市场集中度影响了其风险承担吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 457(7): 90-107.
[3] 邱晗, 黄益平, 纪洋. 金融科技对传统银行行为的影响——基于互联网理财的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 461(11): 17-30.
[4] 魏玮, 陈杰. 加杠杆是否一定会成为房价上涨的助推器?——来自省际面板门槛模型的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 450(12): 48-63.
[5] 况伟大, 王琪琳. 房价波动、房贷规模与银行资本充足率[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 34-48.
[6] 项后军, 闫玉. 理财产品发展、利率市场化与银行风险承担问题研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 448(10): 99-114.
[7] 谭政勋, 李丽芳. 中国商业银行的风险承担与效率——货币政策视角[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 432(6): 112-126.
[8] 胡利琴, 陈锐, 班若愚. 货币政策、影子银行发展与风险承担渠道的非对称效应分析[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 428(2): 154-162.
[9] 潘敏, 魏海瑞. 提升监管强度具有风险抑制效应吗?——来自中国银行业的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 426(12): 64-80.
[10] 张浩, 李仲飞, 邓柏峻. 政策不确定、宏观冲击与房价波动——基于LSTVAR模型的实证分析[J]. 金融研究, 2015, 424(10): 32-47.
[1] 王曦, 朱立挺, 王凯立. 我国货币政策是否关注资产价格?——基于马尔科夫区制转换BEKK多元GARCH模型[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 1 -17 .
[2] 刘勇政, 李岩. 中国的高速铁路建设与城市经济增长[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 18 -33 .
[3] 况伟大, 王琪琳. 房价波动、房贷规模与银行资本充足率[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 34 -48 .
[4] 祝树金, 赵玉龙. 资源错配与企业的出口行为——基于中国工业企业数据的经验研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 49 -64 .
[5] 陈德球, 陈运森, 董志勇. 政策不确定性、市场竞争与资本配置[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 65 -80 .
[6] 牟敦果, 王沛英. 中国能源价格内生性研究及货币政策选择分析[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 81 -95 .
[7] 高铭, 江嘉骏, 陈佳, 刘玉珍. 谁说女子不如儿郎?——P2P投资行为与过度自信[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 96 -111 .
[8] 吕若思, 刘青, 黄灿, 胡海燕, 卢进勇. 外资在华并购是否改善目标企业经营绩效?——基于企业层面的实证研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 112 -127 .
[9] 姜军, 申丹琳, 江轩宇, 伊志宏. 债权人保护与企业创新[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 128 -142 .
[10] 刘莎莎, 孔高文. 信息搜寻、个人投资者交易与股价联动异象——基于股票送转的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 449(11): 143 -157 .
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
版权所有 © 《金融研究》编辑部
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发 技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn
京ICP备11029882号-1