Abstract:
This paper discusses the ethic basis of inclusive finance by analyzing the history of economics and policy, and concludes that inclusion roots from human beings’ consensus on equality and fraternity. And in detail, the ex-ante and ex-post heterogeneity leads to inequality in resource allocation, income distribution and wealth redistribution, and thus, inclusive finance means a kind of correction method. Meanwhile, this thesis also finds that the transfer from advantage side to disadvantage side is unsustainable, and the Club Theory is much more feasible for inclusive finance, because of the cooperation occurring only among those of similar endowments. Above findings give ethic foundations for the reconstruction of China’s inclusive financial system.
王颖, 曾康霖. 论普惠:普惠金融的经济伦理本质与史学简析[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 428(2): 37-54.
WANG Ying, ZENG Kanglin. On the Ethic Basis of Inclusive Finance by Analyzing the History of Economics and Policy. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 428(2): 37-54.
Atkinson, A., and Stiglitz, J., 1980. Lectures on Public Economics, N.Y.: Mc-Graw Hill.
[12]
Barro, R., 1973. “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model”, Public Choice, 14: 19~42.
[13]
Baumol, W., 1952. Welfare Economics and the Theory of State, Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
[14]
Bruce, N., and Waldman, M., 1991. “Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic”, American Economic Review, 81: 1345~51.
[15]
Buchanan, J., and Tullock, G., 1962. The Calculus of Consent, Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
[16]
Coase, R.H., 1992. “The Institutional Structure of Production”, American Economic Review, 82(4):713~19.
[17]
Coate, S., and Morris, S., 1995.“On the Form of Transfers to the Special Interests”, Journal of Political Economy, 103: 1210~35.
[18]
Cornes, R., and Sandler, T., 1986. The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[19]
Dixit, A., and Londregan, J., 1995. “Redistributional Politics and Economic Efficiency”, American Political Science Review, 89: 856~66.
[20]
Dixit, A., and Londregan, J.,1996. “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics”, Journal of Politics, 58: 1132~55.
[21]
Dixit, A., and Londregan, J.,1998. “Ideology, Tactics, and Efficiency in Redistributive Politics”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113: 497~529.
[22]
Drazen, A., 2000. Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton University.
[23]
Grossman, H., 1995. “Robin Hood and the Redistribution of Property Income”, European Journal of Political Economy, 11: 125~39.
[24]
Grossman, H., and Kim, M., 1995. “Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property”, Journal of Political Economy, 103: 1275~88.
[25]
Grossman, H., and Kim, M., 1996a. “Predation and Production”, in Garfinkel, M., and Skaperdas, S., (eds.) The Political Economy of Conflicts and Appropriation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[26]
Grossman, H.,and Kim, M., 1996b. “Predation and Accumulation”, Journal of Economic Growth, 1: 333~51.
[27]
Hardin, R., 1982. Collective Action, Baltimore, M.D.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
[28]
Hirshleifer, J., 1991. “The Paradox of Power”, Economics and Politics, 3: 177~200.
[29]
Lindahl, E., 1919. “Just Taxation: A Positive Solution”, translated and reprinted in Musgrave, R., and Peacock, A., (eds.) Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, N.Y.: St. Martin”s Press, 1967.
[30]
Lindbeck, A., and Weibull, J., 1987. “Balanced Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition”, Public Choice, 52: 272~97.
[31]
Lowi, T., 1964. “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory”, World Politics, 16: 677~715.
[32]
Meltzer, A., and Richard, S., 1981. “A Rational Theory of the Size of Government”, Journal of Political Economy , 89: 914~27.
[33]
Mueller, D., 1989. Public Choice II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[34]
Mueller, D.,1997. “Consititutional Public Choice”, in Mueller, D., ed. Perspectives in Public Choice: A Handbook, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 124~46.
[35]
Olsen, E., 1969. “A Normative Theory of Transfers”, Public Choice, 6: 39~58.
[36]
Olsen, M., 1965. The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press.
[37]
Riker, W., 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
[38]
Roberts, K., 1977. “Voting over Income Tax Schedules”, Journal of Public Economics, 8: 329~40.
[39]
Rogoff, K., and Sibert, A., 1988. “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles”, Review of Economic Studies,55:1~16.
[40]
Romer, T., 1975. “Individual Welfare, Majority Voting, and the Properties of Linear Income Tax”, Journal of Public Economics, 4: 163~85.
[41]
Sandler, T., and Tschirhart, J., 1980. “The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey”, Journal of Economic Literature, 18: 1488~521.
[42]
Shepsle, K., and Weingast, B., 1981. “Political Preferences for Pork Barrel: A Generalization”, American Journal of Political Science, 25: 96~112.
[43]
Shepsle, K., and Weingast, B., 1984. “Political Solutions to Market Problems”, American Political Science Review, 78: 417~34.
[44]
Tullock, G., 1959. “Some Problems of Majority Voting”, Journal of Political Economy, 67: 571~9.
[45]
Weingast, B., Shepsle, K., and Johnsen, C., 1981. “The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 89: 642~64.
[46]
Wilson, J., 1989a. American Government, 4th edition, Lexington, MA: D.C. Health and Company.
[47]
Wilson, J., 1989b. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, NY: Basic Books.
