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金融研究  2016, Vol. 431 Issue (5): 1-18    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
财政分权框架下的最优税收结构
程宇丹, 龚六堂
中央财经大学统计与数学学院,北京 100081;
北京大学光华管理学院,北京 100871
Optimal Tax Structure in a Dynamic Model with Multiple Levels of Government
CHENG Yudan, GONG Liutang
School of Statistics and Mathematics, Central University of Finance and Economics;
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
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摘要 本文在财政分权的框架下研究中央政府和地方政府的最优税收结构,证明了均衡时地方政府的最优税收是征收消费税;通过数值模拟比较中央政府征收消费税和资本税时所对应的均衡产出和社会福利,发现中央政府的最优税收也是征收消费税。此时由地方政府向中央政府进行转移支付,中央政府的消费税与地方政府的消费税之间存在固定的比例关系。
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程宇丹
龚六堂
关键词:  财政分权  税收结构  政府公共支出    
Abstract:  This paper studies the optimal tax structure of the central government and local governments in the framework of fiscal decentralization. We prove that in equilibrium the optimal taxation of local government is consumption tax. Then we use numerical simulations to compare the output and social welfare in equilibrium when the central government levies consumption tax and capital tax, and find that the optimal taxation of the central government is also consumption tax. At the meantime, the local government gives transfer payments to the central government. And there is a fixed proportional relationship between the central government’s consumption tax and the local government’s consumption tax.
Key words:  Fiscal Decentralization    Tax Structure    Public Expenditure
JEL分类号:  H21   H71   H77  
基金资助: 本文感谢“青年教师发展基金”(QJJ1521)的资助,感谢“数量经济与数理金融教育部重点实验室”(北京大学)。
作者简介:  程宇丹,经济学博士,讲师,中央财经大学统计与数学学院,Email:chengyudan@pku.edu.cn;龚六堂,数学博士,教授,北京大学光华管理学院,Email:ltgong@gsm.pku.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
程宇丹, 龚六堂. 财政分权框架下的最优税收结构[J]. 金融研究, 2016, 431(5): 1-18.
CHENG Yudan, GONG Liutang. Optimal Tax Structure in a Dynamic Model with Multiple Levels of Government. Journal of Financial Research, 2016, 431(5): 1-18.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2016/V431/I5/1
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