Summary:
Long-standing “execution difficulties” have posed a significant obstacle to achieving judicial protection for creditors. The third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee emphasized the need to “deepen the reforms to separate adjudicatory and enforcement powers, and improve the national system for law enforcement.” Addressing execution challenges through judicial reforms is not only an intrinsic requirement for fostering a favorable trade credit environment, but also critical for strengthening the credit and rule-of-law foundation of the socialist market economy. The issue of execution difficulties is closely related to the integrated operational model of trial and execution under the current system, where judges are responsible for both adjudicating cases and overseeing executions. This arrangement increases the workload of enforcement personnel, exacerbates case-to-staff imbalances, and blurs responsibility divisions, leading to inefficiencies and potential corruption or irregularities in compulsory execution. Such issues often result in the transfer or loss of execution assets, intensifying problems of debtors lacking executable property, ultimately undermining creditors' rights. To address these challenges, reform of separation of trial and execution is essential for establishing a well-defined, professional, and efficient enforcement team and operational framework. Since 2014, when the fourth plenary session of the 18th Central Committee proposed to “improve judicial systems and pilot reforms to ensure the fair exercise of adjudicative and execution power,” progress has been made in implementing these reforms. Initial pilots began in certain regions in early 2015, followed by broader implementation after the Supreme People's Court issued its work guidelines in 2016. However, existing studies on separation of trial and execution primarily focus on theoretical discussions rather than empirical analyses of its impact on resolving execution difficulties and creditor protection using micro-level data. This study examines the effects of this reform on trade credit using a difference-in-differences approach with Chinese listed firm data from 2010 to 2021. The main findings of this paper are as follows: First, separation of trial and execution significantly improves firms' ability to access trade credit, particularly in upstream-supplier and downstream-customer relationships. Second, its impact is most pronounced on accounts payable financing, with greater effects observed for private, low-margin, high-credit-constrained firms, and those operating in areas with weaker credit environments or underdeveloped economies. Third, the separation of trial and execution has enhanced the execution level of accounts receivable disputes, reduced the degree of supply chain debt disputes and the provisions for suppliers' accounts receivable, improved the expected supply of commercial credit, and lowered the credit financing costs for customer enterprises. The main contributions of this study are as follows: First, based on China's reforms, it enriches the existing literature on the judicial protection system of creditor rights and financial development from the perspective of judicial execution, providing a useful supplement to the literature that overlooks the execution process. Second, it expands the research on the determinants of judicial execution efficiency and its role in the development of the financial market from the perspective of the judicial execution system. Third, it enriches the understanding of the economic effects of China's judicial system reform since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Fourth, it provides references for deepening the reform of separation of trial and execution and improving the national enforcement system. The relevant policy implications are as follows: First, we should unswervingly advance the reform of separation of trial and enforcement, and effectively enhance the efficiency of legal protection for creditors' rights through judicial specialization. Second, strengthen enforcement mechanisms to improve corporate credit and support high-quality development of industrial and supply chains. Third, synchronize creditor protection legal reforms with local judicial system improvements, emphasizing systemic reform coordination for a rule-of-law business environment. These findings underscore the importance of advancing judicial reforms in fostering trade credit and promoting sustainable economic growth.
赵仁杰, 程旭翀, 杜诚. 司法专业化、债权保护与商业信用发展——来自审执分离改革的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2026, 552(6): 113-130.
ZHAO Renjie, CHENG Xuchong, DU Cheng. Judicial Specialization, Creditor Protection and the Development of Trade Credit: Evidence from the Reform of Separation of Trial and Execution. Journal of Financial Research, 2026, 552(6): 113-130.
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