Judicial Protection of Property Rights and Mixed Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises
MA Xinxiao, TANG Taijie, WANG Hongjian
Management College/China Business Working Capital Management Research Center, Ocean University of China; School of Business,Nanjing University; School of Finance/Laboratory of Financial Data Science, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Summary:
Comprehensively implementing the rule of law is an essential requirement and an important guarantee for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The construction of a high-level rule of law not only contributes to the normal operations of micro-enterprises and the healthy development of the macroeconomy but also plays an irreplaceable role in the realization of social fairness and justice, and the achievement of happiness in people's lives. Therefore, in the context of the new era, how to ensure that the rule of law assists in achieving a comprehensive deepening of reforms and high-quality economic and social development is a topic of concern in high-level decision-making, academic research, and social practice. The judiciary is the last line of defense in maintaining social fairness and justice, and it has become a bridge across which to coordinate static law and dynamic social development. Specific to the impact of judicial activities on micro-enterprise behavior, studies by Chinese and international scholars find that judicial justice has positive impacts on enterprises' innovative activities, irregularities, financing characteristics, and market value. However, studies neglect the important role of the judiciary in the protection of the property rights in which economic entities invest, and specifically do not pay attention to the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. In fact, state-owned enterprises are highly important as the material and political foundation of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the new era, these enterprises are faced with the issues of how to become stronger, better, and bigger, and how to achieve economic, political, and social goals. The mixed ownership reform in the new era is expected to solve these problems. Through fair and effective judicial activities, the lawful rights and interests of private investors in property rights can be effectively protected during the specific implementation and subsequent operation of the mixed ownership reform, and thus can have a positive impact on the mixed ownership process. In this context, this paper uses a sample of Chinese state-owned listed companies to study the impact of the judicial protection of property rights on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises by constructing a judicial protection index of property rights at the city level. It finds that when mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises distinguishes between the ownership structure and high-level governance, the judicial protection of property rights can improve the information quality of state-owned enterprises and reduce the degree of resource transfers. Thereby, it can enhance the degree to which the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is manifested in terms of increases in the shareholding ratio and the proportion of directors appointed by non-state shareholders. Furthermore, our research indicates that these effects are more obvious after the implementation of the case-filing registration system reform in 2015, the core of which was that “a case must be filed, a lawsuit must be justified, and the parties' right must be protected,” and are particularly prominent in local state-owned enterprises. Finally, judicial protection of property rights can promote the continuous and dynamic optimization of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. This paper makes the following three contributions. First, it measures the degree of judicial protection of property rights at the city level in China for the first time, explores its influence on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, and thus expands theoretical research on the economic consequences of judicial protection of property rights. Second, on the basis of clearly establishing the relationship between shareholders, this paper divides the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises into the two dimensions of shareholding structure and high-level governance and then explores the influence of judicial protection of property rights on the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. In doing so, it enhances academic research on the factors influencing the reform. Third, the conclusion of this paper shows that the legal protection of economic entities' investment property rights can better promote the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises, thus providing strong support for the important theoretical assertions of “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law.” This paper puts forward the following suggestions to promote the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises with the construction of the rule of law in the new era. First, national leaders need to better protect the legitimate rights and interests of potential investors and non-state shareholders to further deepen the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises. Second, all regions in China should effectively implement “Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law”; improve the level of judicial protection of property rights, including the investment property rights of economic entities; and ensure that the rule of law promotes reform and the healthy development of the local economy and society.
马新啸, 汤泰劼, 王红建. 产权司法保护与国有企业混合所有制改革[J]. 金融研究, 2023, 519(9): 112-130.
MA Xinxiao, TANG Taijie, WANG Hongjian. Judicial Protection of Property Rights and Mixed Ownership Reform of State-Owned Enterprises. Journal of Financial Research, 2023, 519(9): 112-130.
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