摘要 劳动者的工资议价能力是决定工资的重要因素。本文将De Loecker and Warzynski(2012)对不完全竞争的测算拓展到劳动力市场,构建指标测算了企业层面劳动者的工资议价能力,在此基础上运用1999-2007年工业企业数据库,考察了国有企业改制对劳动者工资议价能力的影响,进而探讨对我国劳动收入占比的作用。实证结果表明:国有企业转制降低了劳动者的工资议价能力,并且国有企业改制的影响具有行业差异:在差异化产品、劳动密集型和高竞争程度行业,国有企业改制会较大程度地降低劳动者的工资议价能力,而在同质性产品、资本密集型和垄断行业,其影响并不明显。本文的研究对于我国建立和谐的劳资关系,改善劳动收入占比不断下降和收入差距持续扩大的局面具有重要的政策参考价值。
Abstract:
Bargaining Power is an important factor in wage determination. This paper extends De Loecker and Warzynski's(2012) method of calculating firm level markup to the labor market, and construct a measure to capture the workers’ bargaining power at the firm level. Then we use the 1999-2007 NBS firm level data, and examine the impact of privatization of SOEs on labor's bargaining power. The empirical results show that, the privatization of SOEs significantly reduces the labor's bargaining power. Further, the effect is more pronounced in the differentiated, labor intensive and highly competitive sectors. This paper has important policy implications for improving the capital-labor relationship as well as increasing the labor's income share.
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