Macro-control Policy Choices for the Dual Objectives of Steady Growth and Risk Prevention
CHEN Chuanglian, GAO Xirong, LIU Xiaobin
College of Economics and Southern China Institute of Finance, Jinan University; School of Economics and Academy of Financial Research, Zhejiang University
Summary:
High leverage has helped China to pursue economic growth for a long time, but it has begun restricting sustainable development. Therefore, determining how to balance macro leverage and economic growth is extremely important. This article constructs a macro-control model that dynamically balances the dual policy objectives of risk prevention and steady growth and uses a latent threshold-time varying parameter-vector autoregressive (LT-TVP-VAR) model to evaluate the time-varying impulse response function of China's monetary and fiscal policy effects on household, corporate, and government leverage and economic growth in various periods from 1996 to 2019. Then, a counterfactual method is used to evaluate the optimal fiscal and monetary policy combination of steady growth and risk prevention. This article's contributions are mainly the following: First, in theory, risk prevention and steady growth are mutually complementary opposites. Therefore, this article constructs a macro-control theoretical model to measure the dynamic balance between the two. The model can also test the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in achieving the goals of risk prevention and steady growth. Second, the traditional constant coefficient model cannot identify the time-varying relationship between variables, and the TVP-VAR model is limited by the subjectivity of setting time-varying parameters. Therefore, this paper uses the LT-TVP-VAR model. The advantage of this model is that there is only a time-varying relationship between variables when the relationship between the variables exceeds the latent threshold. Otherwise, there is a constant coefficient relationship between the variables, which is more in line with reality. The LT-TVP-VAR model accounts for the time-varying and structural mutations of the economic structure. In addition, the setting of latent thresholds can eliminate the instability between variables and characterize the dynamic and static relationship between the dual goals of macro-control. Third, this study assesses the time-varying effects of macro-control on the dual goals of steady growth and risk prevention by measuring and comparing the effects of fiscal and monetary policy combinations to find the combination with the desired policy effect. The results provide a theoretical basis and useful reference for policy formulation. The results show that, using the 2008 international financial crisis as a demarcation line, there are stage differences in the effects of macroeconomic policies. Before 2008, the steady growth effect of price-based monetary and fiscal policy was obvious, and quantitative monetary policy significantly affected steady growth and risk prevention. Since 2008, the policy orientation has been to dynamically balance the goals of steady growth and risk prevention. Historically, the influence of fiscal policy on leverage in the three sectors has shown an increasing trend, the effect of quantitative monetary policy has stabilized, and the regulatory advantages of price-based monetary policy have gradually emerged. The results of the counterfactual simulation show that without monetary policy coordination, fiscal policy cannot achieve the objectives of steady growth and risk prevention. Moreover, without the influence of fiscal policy, the effect of price-based and quantitative monetary policy on leverage in the three sectors and economic growth is weaker. Therefore, the policy or policy combination that is effective in regulating the economy depends on the policy objectives. For example, a combination of fiscal and monetary policies is effective for deleveraging the three sectors. In terms of stable growth, the effective coordination of fiscal and monetary policies from 1996 to 2007 was conducive to achieving steady growth. However, after the international financial crisis, large-scale fiscal expansion may weaken the effect of monetary policy in maintaining stable economic growth.
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