Summary:
The 2008 global financial crisis showed that financial stability has a crucial impact on economic stability, which gives birth to macroprudential policy. Additionally, the European debt crisis has demonstrated that fiscal imbalance contributes to financial and economic instability, which ultimately leads to systemic financial and economic risks. It is necessary to enhance the coordination of monetary, fiscal, and macroprudential policies from a theoretical and practical perspective. This necessity stems from the highly endogenous relationships among the banking sector, public finance, and the real economy under the modern economic system, and the endogeneity of policy targets indicates the need for policy coordination and consolidation. The implementation of policy coordination, although straightforward from a theoretical perspective, is challenging in practice. For example, problems that present an extreme challenge to the China include (1) how policy rules should be set in the case of policy coordination, (2) whether the coordination mode should be changed when facing different shocks and fluctuations, and (3) under what circumstances policy conflicts or overlaps may arise and how these can be resolved. As the Chinese economy enters the “new normal,” the country's economic and financial systems face a transitionary period of structural reform, and there is an urgent need to consider how to better coordinate monetary, macroprudential, and fiscal policies. Therefore, this paper builds a DSGE model incorporating multiple sectors and multiple policies from a theoretical perspective and conducts a preliminary analysis of the optimal rules and coordination of monetary, fiscal, and macroprudential policies, which clarifies some basic theoretical problems and provides ideas for further research. The results show the following: (1) To achieve welfare maximization, monetary policy should target output growth and the inflation gap, government expenditure policy and tax policy should aim for output stability and government debt stability, respectively, and macroprudential policy should focus on key financial variables such as credit spread and social financing; (2) the appropriate combination of monetary, fiscal, and macroprudential policies has a more positive effect on economic and financial stability than any one of these three policies, and policy discordance weakens policy effectiveness and exacerbates economic and financial volatility, resulting in significant welfare loss; (3) through the mechanism of policy coordination leading to policy synergy, fiscal policy enhances the stability of output, inflation, employment, and government debt, which contributes to the positive effects of monetary policy (with government expenditure policy being more effective than tax policy), whereas macroprudential policy promotes financial stability and reduces financial risk, which strengthens the effects of monetary policy. The policy implications of this paper are that it is necessary to further strengthen the coordination of fiscal policy and the “two pillars” framework of monetary policy and macroprudential policy, and that a prerequisite of this strengthening is policy synergy that enhances the coordination and cooperation among multiple policy departments based on policy rules that are in line with China's conditions in the case of the coexistence of multiple economic and financial policies. Meanwhile, in the context of policy combination, due to the endogenous effects and interactions between different policies, policymakers should pay attention to the overlap between policy objectives. They should also focus on the conflict between policy objectives and policy tools when using a combination of multiple policy tools, which requires continuous in-depth follow-up investigation of the transmission mechanism and path in the context of multiple policies in practice. Furthermore, with economic development and financial deepening, various exogenous shocks have occurred in China and differences have appeared between the cooperative effects under different exogenous shocks. As a result, we should clarify the source and nature of shocks that trigger economic and financial fluctuations under a certain policy combination so that cooperative modes and policy rules can be targeted to achieve policy coordination.
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