Do Corporate’s Excess Bank Loans Lead to Over-investment?
DENG Lu, LIU Ruiqi, JIANG Ping
School of Economics and Management, Beihang University; School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics
Abstract:
The influence of corporate’s debt on investment has been widely discussed by the academics, but the existing research explores this topic from the perspective of the total amount of debt. Using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2015, this paper discusses the relationship between the excess bank loans and over-investment. Empirical results show that the excess bank loans are significantly positive with over-investment, while the management entrenchment will increase the over-investment caused by excess bank loans. On the contrary, institutional investors will decrease the over-investment of excess bank loans. Besides, the less-frequent institutional investors who focus on firm’s long-term value will discourage the over-investment of excess bank loans more significantly. This article is the first to investigate the influence of excess bank loans on investment behavior, enriching the research field of the capital structure and corporate investment.
邓路, 刘瑞琪, 江萍. 公司超额银行借款会导致过度投资吗？[J]. 金融研究, 2017, 448(10): 115-129.
DENG Lu, LIU Ruiqi, JIANG Ping. Do Corporate’s Excess Bank Loans Lead to Over-investment?. Journal of Financial Research, 2017, 448(10): 115-129.
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