Summary:
A reasonable net interest margin (NIM) is a crucial guarantee for the stable operation of commercial banks, especially for rural financial institutions (RFIs). However, data show that the NIM of RFIs has narrowed to a historical low level, with the NIM of some rural commercial banks even falling below 1%, increasingly exposing potential risks to their safety. Furthermore, RFIs face limited channels for capital replenishment. Their core business consists of rural deposit and loan services, and are prohibited from cross-regional operations, making the deposit-loan spread their primary and single source of profit. Therefore, NIM compression may impact the operations of RFIs more significantly. Based on this background, this paper first compares the typical differences in NIM compression between RFIs and large and medium-Sized banks (LMBs), discussing whether and through what inherent mechanisms NIM compression affects the risk of RFIs compared to LMBs. Secondly, it verifies effective pathways for RFIs to cope with the risks arising from NIM compression. This paper provides empirical evidence for the necessity of maintaining reasonable NIM to prevent financial risks in commercial banks and offers insights for preventing risks in RFIs. The conclusions of this paper are as follows: NIM compression significantly increases the risk of RFIs. The mechanism lies in the fact that NIM compression increases pressure on the asset side and restricts the equity side, leading to a decline in the risk disposal capacity and risk resilience of RFIs. Further analysis finds that promoting diversified operations to increase non-interest income and controlling operational management costs are effective pathways for RFIs to alleviate the impact of NIM compression. Adjusting the loan structure based on customers does not help them effectively cope with the risk; instead, it may squeeze out personal loans and undermine their core mission of serving small entities. The contributions of this paper are mainly reflected in the following aspects: First, it examines the risks of RFIs based on the typical fact of NIM compression, providing an important supplement to the existing literature on commercial bank risks. RFIs have distinct particularities, yet previous research has focused more on LMBs. Investigating the impact of NIM compression on the risk of RFIs adds an important perspective to current financial risk research. Second, it analyzes the inherent mechanism through which NIM compression increases the risk of RFIs from the perspectives of asset-side pressure, equity-side constraints, and liability-side adaptation. This paper argues that NIM compression leaves RFIs without sufficient provision coverage and loss reserves to guard against bad debt impacts, and also restricts their internal capital replenishment, significantly reducing their risk resilience. However, NIM compression does not drive RFIs to pursue high-risk investment returns. Third, it provides references for the operational strategies and pathways of RFIs in responding to NIM compression risks. This paper finds that diversified operations and reducing operational and management costs are effective pathways for RFIs to cope with NIM compression risks. However, adjusting the loan structure based on customers does not effectively address NIM compression; instead, it causes RFIs to deviate from their positioning of supporting small entities. Based on the above empirical conclusions, to mitigate the risks associated with NIM compression in RFIs, this paper provides the following implications: First, guide and assist RFIs in maintaining reasonable NIM through structural monetary policy tools. The guiding role of structural monetary policy can be strengthened by flexibly using tools such as relending programs supporting agriculture and small businesses, and rediscounting to precisely reduce the liability costs of RFIs. Second, implement differentiated measures for preventing and resolving risks from NIM compression. RFIs can be appropriately encouraged to replenish capital through market-based methods in multiple channels, such as supporting the issuance of secondary capital bonds and special bonds, or conducting compliant mergers, acquisitions, and equity investments in accordance with the law. Third, strengthen business capacity and prevent RFIs from deviating from their focus on agriculture and small entities through enhanced supervision. Prudently guide RFIs to adjust their loan businesses and explore business growth points among long-tail customers; accelerate the transformation of intermediary businesses to broaden non-interest income channels.
[1]丁宁和吴晓,2023,《存贷比监管改革与银行风险承担——来自中国商业银行的准自然实验》,《金融研究》第2期,第96～114页。 [2]丁志国、张洋和高启然,2014,《基于区域经济差异的影响农村经济发展的农村金融因素识别》,《中国农村经济》第3期,第4～13+26页。 [3]顾海峰和杨立翔,2018,《互联网金融与银行风险承担:基于中国银行业的证据》,《世界经济》第10期,第75～100页。 [4]顾海峰和周祉晴,2024,《货币政策不确定性、风险承担与银行信贷期限》,《财经理论与实践》第5期,第2～9页。 [5]蒋海、张小林、唐绅峰和陈创练,2021,《货币政策、流动性与银行风险承担》,《经济研究》第8期,第56～73页。 [6]刘波、王修华和李明贤,2021,《气候变化冲击下的涉农信用风险——基于2010—2019年256家农村金融机构的实证研究》,《金融研究》第12期,第96～115页。 [7]刘莉亚、李明辉、孙莎和杨金强,2014,《中国银行业净息差与非利息收入的关系研究》,《经济研究》第7期,第110～124页。 [8]刘贯春、陈肖雄、黄雪松和张军,2024,《银行负债结构与货币政策风险承担渠道》,《管理世界》第7期,第84～108页。 [9]吕勇斌、李志生和郭懿晨,2024,《逆风前行:台风灾害与银行风险行为》,《金融研究》第1期,第19～37页。 [10]马勇和姚驰,2021,《双支柱下的货币政策与宏观审慎政策效应——基于银行风险承担的视角》,《管理世界》第6期,第51～69页。 [11]彭继增和吴玮,2014,《资本监管与银行贷款结构——基于我国商业银行的经验研究》,《金融研究》第3期,第123～137页。 [12]彭俞超、马思超、王南萱和郑航行,2023,《影子银行监管与银行风险防范》,《经济研究》第8期,第83～99页。 [13]亓浩、吴本健和马九杰,2022,《贷款利率市场化与农村金融机构回归本源》,《世界经济》第11期,第77～100页。 [14]钱崇秀、宋光辉和许林,2018,《超额贷款、不良率与商业银行流动性——流动性螺旋还是流动性权衡》,《财贸经济》第7期,第81～95页。 [15]宋科、李振和杨家文,2023,《金融科技与银行行为——基于流动性创造视角》,《金融研究》第2期,第60～77页。 [16]谭小芬、耿亚莹和苟琴,2024,《跨境资本流动、信贷配置风险与银行体系稳定》,《经济研究》第1期,第129～147页。 [17]田雅群和何广文,2022,《互联网金融、市场竞争对农村商业银行风险的影响研究》,《农业技术经济》第3期,第73～83页。 [18]王擎和田娇,2014,《多元化战略、贷款质量与银行绩效——基于信息协同的角度》,《金融研究》第5期,第110～125页。 [19]王修华和赵亚雄,2023,《县域银行业竞争与农户共同富裕——绝对收入和相对收入的双重视角》,《经济研究》第9期,第98～115页。 [20]项后军和张清俊,2020,《存款保险制度是否降低了银行风险:来自中国的经验证据》,《世界经济》第3期,第117～141页。 [21]谢绚丽和王诗卉,2022,《中国商业银行数字化转型:测度、进程及影响》,《经济学(季刊)》第6期,第1937～1956页。 [22]熊启跃和王书朦,2020,《负利率对银行净息差影响机制研究——基于欧洲主要上市银行的经验证据》,《金融研究》第1期,第110～129页。 [23]张羽和李黎,2010,《非利息收入有利于降低银行风险吗？——基于中国银行业的数据》,《南开经济研究》第4期,第69～91页。 [24]中国人民银行,2023,《2023年第二季度中国货币政策执行报告》。 [25]周月书和彭媛媛,2017,《双重目标如何影响了农村商业银行的风险？》,《中国农村观察》第4期,第102～115页。 [26]Acharya, V. and N. Mora, 2015, “A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers”, The Journal of finance, 70(1), pp.1～43. [27]Angeloni, I., E. Faia and M. Lo Duca, 2015, “Monetary Policy and Risk Taking”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 52, pp.285～307. [28]Borio, C. and H. Zhu, 2012, “Capital Regulation, Risk-taking and Monetary Policy: A Missing Link in the Transmission Mechanism？”, Journal of Financial Stability, 8(4), pp.236～251. [29]Bushman, R. M. and C. D. Williams, 2012, “Accounting Discretion, Loan Loss Provisioning, and Discipline of Banks' Risk-taking”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 54(1), pp.1～18. [30]Chami, R., D. Hakura, T. F. Cosimano and A. Barajas, 2010, “US Bank Behavior in the Wake of the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis”, IMF Working Papers, 1(30). [31]Delis, M. D., I. Hasan and N. Mylonidis, 2017, “The Risk-taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the U.S.: Evidence from Corporate Loan Data”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 49(1), pp.187～213. [32]Dell' Ariccia, G., L. U. C. Laeven and G. A. Suarez, 2017, “Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-taking Channel: Evidence from the United States”, Journal of Finance, 72(2), pp.613～654. [33]Dinger, V. and D. M. te Kaat, 2020, “Cross-border Capital Flows and Bank Risk-taking”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 117, p.105842. [34]Freixas, X., A. Martin, and D. Skeie, 2011, “Bank Liquidity, Interbank Markets and Monetary Policy”, Review of Financial Studies, 24(8), pp.2656～2692. [35]Gaggl, P. and M. Valderrama, 2010, “Does a Low Interest Rate Environment Affect Risk Taking in Austria？”, Monetary Policy & the Economy, 4, pp.32～48. [36]Ho, T. and A. Saunders, 1981, “The Determinants of Bank Interest Margins: Theory and Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16(4), pp.581～600. [37]Nguyen, J., 2012, “The Relationship Between Net Interest Margin and Noninterest Income Using a System Estimation Approach”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36(9), pp.2429～2437. [38]Pierre-Richard, A. and K. E. Aynaoui, 2010, “Excess Liquidity, Bank Pricing Rules, and Monetary Policy”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 34(5), pp.923～933. [39]Wooldridge, J. M., 2015, “Control Function Methods in Applied Econometrics”, Journal of Human Resources, 50(2), pp.420～445.
