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金融研究  2024, Vol. 528 Issue (6): 132-150    
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银行竞争、卖空机制与企业融资约束
徐枫, 吕纤, 郑耀东
中国社会科学院金融研究所,北京 100710;
中南民族大学管理学院,湖北武汉 430074;
中国行政管理学会,北京 100017
Bank Competition, Short Selling and Firms' Financial Constraints
XU Feng, LV Qian, ZHENG Yaodong
Institute of Finance and Banking, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences;
School of Management, South-central MinZu University;
Chinese Public Administration Society
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摘要 以中国资本市场卖空制度渐进式改革为背景,本文利用2008—2020年A股上市公司为研究样本,采用多时点的双重差分法实证检验银行竞争、卖空机制和企业融资约束的关系。研究发现,银行竞争和卖空机制均能缓解企业融资约束,放松卖空限制后银行竞争缓解企业融资约束的作用明显减弱。机制检验表明,引入卖空机制后银企之间信息不对称减少、贷款企业财务风险降低,这是卖空机制减弱银行业竞争与企业融资约束相关性的重要渠道。异质性分析发现,卖空机制对银行竞争与企业融资约束关系的影响,主要存在于外部融资依赖度较高的行业、国有企业,以及国有大型银行和城市商业银行之中。进一步研究发现,卖空机制和银行竞争的交互关系还体现在对企业债务融资规模及债务违约风险的影响上。本文从资本市场制度建设角度,为缓解企业间接融资约束提供了新的政策思路,也为完善银行结构和卖空制度改革缓解企业融资约束提供了经验证据。
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徐枫
吕纤
郑耀东
关键词:  卖空机制  银行竞争  融资约束  信息不对称  财务风险    
Summary:  The financial constraint is both the major research issue of corporate finance and the focus of government policies. Recent reports on the work of the government have emphasized the importance of alleviating difficulties and high costs faced by firms in accessing financing. The regulatory authorities have implemented a series of measures to alleviate firms' financial constraints. When discussing the firms' financial constraint issue, most existing literature, based on China's bank-dominated financial system, focuses on the aspect of credit supply. Especially, with the rapid reform of the banking industry, there is a new trend to research firms' financial constraints in the aspect of bank competition. However, the interactions between banks and the capital market are ignored in most literature. This paper discusses the interactive effects of short selling on bank competition and corporate financial constraints in the context of the possibility for banks to gather information on firm value from capital markets.
Theoretically, information asymmetry exists between banks and firms in an imperfect credit market. The increased competition impels banks to gather and uncover firms' information, which lowers the information asymmetry, and thus alleviates firms' financial constraints. Meanwhile, short selling improves firms' information disclosure and reduces their financial risks. There are distinguished necessities for banks to mine firms' information under different short selling constraints. In other words, short selling is not only a key factor of firms' financial constraints, but also the institutional background that affects the relationship of bank competition and firms' financial constraints.
Based on the gradual reform of the short selling system in China's capital market, this paper adopts a sample of listed companies from 2008 to 2020 and implements a time-varying DID method to examine how bank competition and short selling affect the enterprises' financial constraints. Our results show that the short selling mechanism attenuates the impact of bank competition on corporate finance constraints. The short selling is proved to relieve the information asymmetry between banks and firms, and alleviate firms' financial risks, which results in such diminishment. The heterogeneity analysis shows that the interactive effects of short selling on bank competition and corporate financial constraints are pronounced mainly in industries with higher external financial dependency, state-owned firms, large state-owned banks, and city commercial banks. Further analysis shows that the interaction between short selling and bank competition also acts on the amount of firms' debt financing and the risk of debt default, but the effect on the cost of debt financing is insignificant.
Compared with relevant literature, the three main contributions of our paper are as follows. First, while the existing studies suppose bank competition and the short selling mechanism have separate impacts on firms' financial constraints, this paper combines bank competition and short selling to explore the problem of corporate financing constraints, linking the relationships between banks and firms through the channels of information asymmetry and financial risks. Second, most of the literature focuses on the scope of bank-firm relations from the perspectives of firm characteristics, industry characteristics, bank structure and the degree of bank competition, and fails to discuss the bank credit issues in the context of the impact of institutional changes in the capital market. This paper, in the context of the reality that competition in the banking industry is comparatively sufficient, examines the relationship between bank competition, the short selling mechanism and corporate financing constraints. We then identify the conditions of industry, enterprise and bank characteristics for the short-selling mechanism to weaken bank competition and alleviate corporate financing constraints, revealing the important theoretical and policy value of capital market institutional construction in alleviating the constraints of corporate indirect financing. Third, the short selling mechanism as an important policy event in the progressive reform of the capital market provides new ideas for many classical problems. This paper extends the policy effect test of the short selling system reform to the field of bank-firm relations from the perspective of comparative institutional.
Keywords:  Short Selling    Bank Competition    Financial Constraints    Information Asymmetry    Financial Risk
JEL分类号:  G18   G21   G32  
基金资助: * 感谢国家社会科学基金(21BGL084)和中国社会科学院学科建设“登峰战略”资助计划优势学科“金融与发展”(DF2023YS28)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
通讯作者:  吕 纤,经济学博士,讲师,中南民族大学管理学院/高校风险预警防控研究中心,E-mail:fengyushenshan@163.com.   
作者简介:  徐 枫,金融工程博士,副研究员,中国社会科学院金融研究所,E-mail:xufeng830103@126.com.
郑耀东,经济学博士,高级经济师,中国行政管理学会,E-mail:mayzhong@tom.com.
引用本文:    
徐枫, 吕纤, 郑耀东. 银行竞争、卖空机制与企业融资约束[J]. 金融研究, 2024, 528(6): 132-150.
XU Feng, LV Qian, ZHENG Yaodong. Bank Competition, Short Selling and Firms' Financial Constraints. Journal of Financial Research, 2024, 528(6): 132-150.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2024/V528/I6/132
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