Summary:
Expectation guidance plays an important role in the monetary policy framework.Pessimistic expectations can exacerbate economic fluctuations and financial risks, making macroeconomic regulation and control challenging. Effective tools for guiding market expectations are essential to prevent systemic financial risks, and the entire process of expectation management should consider market feedback mechanisms. Several key questions require further exploration. First, can central bank expectation guidance policies effectively reduce systemic financial risk？ Second, can deviations in the market's interpretation of central bank expectation guidance policies affect financial stability？ Third, what specific mechanisms underlie the impact of deviations in market interpretations on the systemic financial risk of banks？ To answer these questions, this paper constructs a text sentiment index for the period from 2001 to 2021; specifically, based on China's monetary policy reports and corresponding market reports, this paper constructs a market sentiment index that reflects the central bank's expected sentiment. This index serves to assess changes in the effectiveness of central bank expectation guidance policies over time. In addition, systemic risk indicators are derived from the balance sheet data of 420 commercial banks for the period from 2007 to 2020. Empirical tests are conducted to evaluate whether central bank expectation guidance policies reduce systemic risk, with a focus on channels such as bank credit and interbank activities. Potential endogeneity issues are addressed using dynamic panel models, and robustness tests are conducted by varying the measurement indices, text types, selected texts, and factors such as bank ownership, listing status, and macroeconomic fluctuations. The empirical findings are as follows. First, central bank expectation guidance policies are closely related to the macroeconomic environment. Second, the emotional interpretation of monetary policy reports, the market sentiment index, and the index reflecting the market reception of the central bank's expected sentiment can effectively reduce systemic financial risk, albeit with diminishing returns, particularly during periods of economic policy uncertainty. Third, the central bank's expected sentiment-market reception reduces systemic risk in banks by mitigating the impact on bank credit and interbank activities. Finally, prospective text-based expected sentiment in the monetary policy report has a more pronounced influence on systemic financial risk than the retrospective text. Based on the above conclusions, the following policy recommendations can be made. First, the central bank should continue to implement expectation guidance policies, as outlined in the monetary policy implementation reports. These policies should play a role in adjusting and fine-tuning the risk asset allocation and other behaviors of financial institutions. Furthermore, an expectation regulation system that is tailored to the characteristics of economic development should be established to reduce systemic risk levels in banks. Second, in the process of expectation management, the central bank must consider the impact of information receivers on policy implementation. This entails fully understanding the formation mechanism and the factors influencing public expectations and market feedback on expectation guidance policies. Timely responses to negative market feedback should be provided to mitigate the negative impact of information distortion. Third, the expectation guidance policy should comprehensively consider its impact on small and medium-sized institutions and unlisted institutions. Supplementary interpretations of relevant policy documents or policy tools may be required to accompany the release of expectation guidance reports, such as monetary policy implementation reports. This will help the market to accurately interpret the central bank's policy intentions and reduce communication costs. Fourth, during periods of macroeconomic fluctuations and increasing extreme risk incidents, the central bank should enhance its management effectiveness. It should utilize its role as a stabilizing force in times of crisis to maintain market confidence and financial stability. This can be achieved by using more positive language to convey a positive mood, thereby boosting market confidence and achieving the desired effect of policy stability. Incorporating these recommendations into the central bank's practices will contribute to improving the anticipation-based regulatory mechanism, strengthening the anticipation-based regulatory system, and safeguarding against systemic risks.
王辉, 朱家雲, 胡诣聪. 央行预期引导可以降低银行系统性金融风险吗？——基于市场解读偏离的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2023, 519(9): 1-19.
WANG Hui, ZHU Jiayun, HU Yicong. Can Expectation Guidance by a Central Bank Reduce Banks' Systemic Financial Risk？ A Perspective Based on Deviations in Market Interpretations. Journal of Financial Research, 2023, 519(9): 1-19.
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