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金融研究  2022, Vol. 503 Issue (5): 1-19    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
杠杆率变动、固定资产投资与研发活动——兼论金融赋能高质量发展
马思超, 沈吉, 彭俞超
首都经济贸易大学金融学院,北京 100070;
北京大学光华管理学院,北京 100871;
中央财经大学金融学院,北京 102206
Leverage Ratio, Fixed Assets Investment, and R&D Activities: Implications for How Finance Enables High-quality Development
MA Sichao, SHEN Ji, PENG Yuchao
School of Finance, Capital University of Economics and Business;
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University;
School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics
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摘要 本文通过构建一个包含企业固定资产投资与研发投资的理论模型,分析得出企业杠杆率变动与投资行为的非线性关系。实证结果表明,低杠杆下,杠杆率的增大会使企业增加固定资产和研发投资的规模。对于财务柔性更强、发展前景更好的企业,杠杆率的提升能够增大此类企业的研发投入占比,即企业开展更多能够提升技术水平的研发活动。进一步研究发现,短期杠杆与商业信用杠杆的提升有助于财务柔性较好的企业提高研发投资占比,而对于发展前景不佳的僵尸企业,长期杠杆和银行杠杆的提升反而会使其扩大固定资产投资,加剧产能过剩问题。本文的政策含义在于,要在保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定的前提下,引导金融资源更多投入到创新型经济上,给予优质及前景较好的企业一定杠杆率调整空间和自由度,使其能够更好地利用社会资金,激励其开展研发活动,促进金融更好地服务实体经济,赋能高质量发展。
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马思超
沈吉
彭俞超
关键词:  企业投资  研发活动  杠杆率  高质量发展    
Summary:  The literature mainly explores the independent effects of corporate leverage change on fixed asset investment and R&D investment. In reality, a firm will take an integrated perspective when allocating its limited resources to either of these investment types, as their risks and returns differ. Fixed asset investments generally indicate low risk and relatively certain returns, but the firm's level of technology will not increase. Conversely, the final outcomes of R&D activities are uncertain, which increases volatility in terms of market profitability and raises financing costs. Successful R&D investment leads to an increase in total factor productivity (TFP), and the firm can earn profit more efficiently. The core research questions raised in this study are: how does a firm's change in leverage affect its decision regarding allocating resources to these two types of investment? What characteristics lead firms to invest more in R&D activities?
We aim to address these questions through a unified framework, so we first construct a three-period corporate investment model to identify the nonlinear relationship between changes in corporate leverage and investment behavior. At the beginning of the first period, a firm's original fixed asset investment consists of internal and external capital. It also holds cash and cash equivalent in hand to deal with potential adverse shocks in the future. In the intermediate period, the firm may remain in two possible states. If the probability is that a bad state will occur, the firm experiences a liquidity shock. It must then resort to its cash reserve to ensure liquidity; otherwise, the firm is forced into bankruptcy and liquidation. If a good state occurs, the firm does not encounter a liquidity shock and therefore invests its cash reserve to increase its fixed asset level or to conduct R&D. The optimal investment can then be determined. When the leverage is low along with the original fixed investment level, the firm uses up all of its cash reserve to increase its fixed investment and does not invest in R&D. As the leverage increases, the firm will make the two types of investment simultaneously so that the expected marginal benefits are the same. When the leverage increases beyond a cutoff point, the benefit of innovating exceeds the benefit of increasing the fixed assets, so the firm invests all of its cash reserve in innovation.
Our model offers three main implications that can be empirically tested. First, the level of leverage can determine the investment behavior of the firm. An increase in leverage from a low level leads to an increase in a firm's fixed asset investment or R&D activities. However, with an increase in leverage from a high level, a firm will not increase its investment because the negative effect of leverage on firm value is dominant. Second, a firm's financial flexibility may affect its investment behavior. Such flexibility is captured in the model by a firm's cash reserve in the first period. Holding more cash in hand in advance offers two advantages. If the firm suffers from a liquidity shock, more cash enables it to hedge against the adverse effect over a wider range. When the firm is free of such a shock, more cash can be input to increase its fixed asset investment or engage in more innovation, both of which increase firm value. Our model shows that when a firm is more financially flexible, it allocates more cash to R&D. Third, a firm with better future prospects is likely to more intensively engage in innovation.
We obtain annual data from the financial reports of Chinese listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2017. We first find that an increase in leverage from a low level can increase a firm's investment. As the leverage increases, this effect diminishes and eventually vanishes. This finding is consistent with our first hypothesis. Second, an increase in short-term leverage is likely to lead to more R&D investment, while an increase in long-term leverage is mainly transformed into more fixed asset investment. Third, the empirical evidence concerning corporate financial flexibility and prospects confirms our model predictions.
This study has important policy implications. A structural view of corporate leverage change can inform the debate. Commercial credit can lead to a leverage increase, which improves business activities because more external funds are available. This can be referred to as “good leverage.” In contrast, increases in long-term leverage and bank leverage lead to an increase in the fixed assets of investment firms with overly high leverage and poor prospects, and particularly for “zombie” firms, which exacerbates the overcapacity problem. We provide clear policy recommendations on how to enable finance to better serve the real economy and promote high-quality development. Measures should be taken to allocate more financial resources to innovative firms and grant high-quality and promising firms more room and freedom to adjust their leverage ratios.
Keywords:  Corporate Investment    R&D    Leverage Ratio    High-quality Development
JEL分类号:  G20   G31   G32  
基金资助: * 本文感谢首都经济贸易大学北京市属高校基本科研业务费专项资金(XRZ2021070)、首都经济贸易大学科研创新团队项目(QNTD202104)、国家自然科学基金(71903208)的资助。本论文入选“中国金融论坛·第十一届《金融研究》论坛”,感谢点评人和匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
通讯作者:  沈吉,金融学博士,助理教授,北京大学光华管理学院,E-mail:jishen@gsm.pku.edu.cn.   
作者简介:  马思超,经济学博士,讲师,首都经济贸易大学金融学院,E-mail:masichao@cueb.edu.cn.
彭俞超,经济学博士,副教授,中央财经大学金融学院,E-mail:yuchao.peng@cufe.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
马思超, 沈吉, 彭俞超. 杠杆率变动、固定资产投资与研发活动——兼论金融赋能高质量发展[J]. 金融研究, 2022, 503(5): 1-19.
MA Sichao, SHEN Ji, PENG Yuchao. Leverage Ratio, Fixed Assets Investment, and R&D Activities: Implications for How Finance Enables High-quality Development. Journal of Financial Research, 2022, 503(5): 1-19.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2022/V503/I5/1
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