Summary:
Building a science and technology finance system aligned with innovation-driven development is pivotal to achieving high-level technological self-reliance. Despite policy efforts, structural deficiencies persist in China's science and technology finance landscape, notably insufficient bank lending to technology firms, limited equity market depth, and the nascent development of high-yield bonds. These gaps leave asset-light and high-risk firms facing severe financing frictions. In response, the bond market launched pilot programs for science and technology innovation bonds (sci-tech bonds) in March 2021, culminating in the establishment of a dedicated “sci-tech board” in May 2025. While prior research has extensively documented the direct benefits for issuing entities, it has largely neglected whether such policies generate positive externalities that spur collaborative innovation among non-sci-tech firms. Employing a sample of exchange-traded public corp orate bonds from 2020 to 2023, this study utilizes a multi-period staggered difference-in-differences framework to examine the intra-industry spillover effects of sci-tech bond issuance, the underlying mechanisms, and the boundary conditions. Our findings offer empirical support for optimizing the provision of technology finance and refining the institutional design of the bond market's sci-tech board. First, we document significant positive intra-industry spillovers. A one-standard-deviation increase in the monthly ratio of Sci-Tech Bonds to total industry issuances reduces the yield spreads of non-Sci-Tech Bonds by approximately 5.15 basis points, equivalent to a 4% decline relative to the sample mean. This result proves robust to a battery of tests, including instrumental variable estimation, matched sample analysis, and parallel trend validation, effectively mitigating selection bias concerns. Second, the spillover operates through two distinct channels: (1) R&D Learning. Sci-tech bond issuance disseminates credible technological roadmaps, prompting peer firms to upgrade R&D intensity and technical staff. By reducing R&D uncertainty, the expected mean cash flow effect of innovation outweighs the variance effect, thereby lowering the risk premium required by creditors. (2) Information Asymmetry Mitigation. Stringent disclosure mandates and heightened market scrutiny increase the aggregate supply of industry-specific R&D information. Via peer effects, non-sci-tech firms are incentivized to enhance the quality of R&D disclosures in prospectuses and rating reports, which narrows the primary-secondary market pricing gap and improves price efficiency. Third, heterogeneity analysis reveals that the spillover is more pronounced in settings characterized by higher default risk, stronger banking supervision, bottlenecks, direct project funding, lower credit ratings, longer maturities, and the absence of R&D manipulation. This study contributes to the literature by pioneering the analysis ofsci-tech bonds from a spillover perspective, balancing the existing focus on green bonds, and providing micro-level evidence on industry linkage mechanisms in innovation incentives. We suggest improving the sci-tech board framework, offering targeted incentives for long-term issuance in bottleneck sectors, and enforcing rigorous oversight of fund usage and R&D authenticity to curb manipulative behaviors.
刘颖斐, 李豪飞, 林晚发, 祝小全. 科创债发行的行业溢出效应——来自债券发行定价的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2026, 553(7): 77-94.
LIU Yingfei, LI Haofei, LIN Wanfa, ZHU Xiaoquan. The Industry Spillover Effects of Science and Technology Innovation Bond Issuance: Evidence from Bond Pricing. Journal of Financial Research, 2026, 553(7): 77-94.
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