Summary:
Driven by global economic integration and the wave of technological innovation, scientific and technological innovation has become the core driving force behind national economic growth and social progress. As the primary vehicle for deeply integrating financial resources with scientific and technological innovation, sci-tech innovation bonds (STIBs) play a crucial role in resolving the financing challenges of technology-based small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enhancing the supportive role of patient capital in investing early-stage, small-scale and hard-technology ventures, and establishing a modern science and technology financial system commensurate with scientific and technological innovation. In traditional bond issuance, underwriters perform the functions of information intermediation, quality assurance and price discovery. By conducting due diligence on issuer information, leveraging their own market reputation to provide quality assurance for issuers, and utilizing mechanisms such as roadshows and book-building, they mitigate information asymmetry and achieve optimal bond pricing that balances the financing needs of issuers with the interests of investors. As an important financial instrument supporting the national innovation-driven development strategy, the issuance process of STIBs shares common characteristics with that of traditional bonds. However, due to the unique risk profiles of science and technology innovation enterprises, namely, their asset-light attribute, high R&D expenditure and high growth potential, underwriters are required to possess professional capabilities that go beyond the traditional intermediary role. Compared to underwriting ordinary bonds, the additional costs incurred by underwriters when underwriting STIBs include: (1) costs associated with building a specialized team; (2) procedural costs; (3) investor education costs. Against this backdrop, examining the impact of underwriting STIBs on underwriters' own development holds significant theoretical and practical importance for revealing the micro-mechanisms through which financial intermediaries serve national strategies and for optimizing the allocation of financial resources. This paper analyses the spillover effects of underwriting STIBs on future business expansion, as well as the underlying mechanisms, from the perspective of underwriters. The study uses STIBs issued in the interbank and exchange markets between 2021 and 2024 as the research sample. The results indicate that: First, underwriting STIBs increases underwriters' market share in the underwriting of non-STIBs; this effect is more pronounced in scenarios involving sole underwriting, large-scale issues, and fundraising for hard technology applications. Second, the underwriting of STIBs generates spillover effects by signaling the underwriter's business capabilities and reinforcing its market image as a supporter of technological innovation. Third, underwriting STIBs not only helps underwriters expand their client base but also improves bond pricing efficiency. This paper makes the following contributions: First, by focusing on STIBs, it systematically examines the role of the bond market in supporting scientific and technological innovation. It highlights the significant value of these bonds in promoting the deep integration of finance and technology and in serving the innovative development of the real economy, thereby enriching research in the field of technology finance. Second, based on data on the issuance and underwriting of STIBs, this paper systematically examines, for the first time, the pricing efficiency of STIBs and the spillover effects of their underwriting behavior, providing new insights into the impact of STIBs on underwriters' differentiated competitive strategies and market operating mechanisms. Third, this study not only refines the analytical framework for financial intermediation functions, providing theoretical support for understanding the micro-level mechanisms through which the bond market supports technological innovation, but also offers important empirical evidence for regulatory authorities to improve the development of the STIB market and for underwriters to optimize their business strategies. It thus holds positive practical significance for promoting the deep integration of finance and technology. This paper puts forward the following policy recommendations. First, vigorously develop STIBs, broaden the scope of issuers, improve risk-sharing mechanisms, and encourage long-term capital such as insurance funds and pension funds to invest in these bonds, thereby providing a stable source of funding for science and technology innovation enterprises. Second, promote the professionalization of bond underwriting and guide underwriters to build differentiated competitive advantages. Refine the specialized evaluation system for the underwriting of STIBs, incorporate the underwriting of such bonds into the assessment of financial institutions' sci-tech finance services, and enhance underwriters' willingness to underwrite science and technology innovation projects. Strengthen the intermediary responsibilities of underwriters in the identification of science and technology innovation attributes, information disclosure, and post-issuance management. Third, improve the regulatory incentive and coordination mechanism. Provide positive incentives in areas such as regulatory ratings and business approvals to institutions that demonstrate outstanding performance in the underwriting of STIBs, while increasing regulatory accountability for institutions that fail to conduct adequate due diligence during the bond's life cycle. By applying both incentives and constraints, the enthusiasm of financial institutions to serve scientific and technological innovation will be mobilized.
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