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金融研究  2025, Vol. 542 Issue (8): 113-131    
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政府投资基金的产业带动效应——来自企业进入的经验证据
谢贞发, 朱东霞
厦门大学经济学院,福建厦门 361005
The Industrial Driving Effect of Government Investment Funds: Empirical Evidence from Firm Entry
XIE Zhenfa, ZHU Dongxia
School of Economics, Xiamen University
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摘要 国际国内环境的复杂多变以及新一轮科技和产业变革的冲击,对构建科学高效的政府投资基金发展格局提出了新的要求。本文立足于政府投资基金对地区、行业产生的系统性影响,探讨其如何影响微观企业进入。研究发现,政府投资基金显著提高了新企业进入数量,这种正面效应在市场化水平和社会信用程度较高时有所减弱。机制分析表明,政府投资基金的产业链建设作用和资源整合能力催化了产业集聚效应,“政府引导”和“市场运作”的有机结合提升了资本配置效率,两者共同构成政府投资基金促进企业进入的核心机制。进一步分析发现,随着各地加速开展政府投资基金投资,其对新企业进入的促进作用有所下降。此外,政府投资基金投资还促进了低创新力在位企业的退出。本文为进一步优化政府投资基金政策、推动我国经济高质量发展提供了经验证据。
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谢贞发
朱东霞
关键词:  政府投资基金  新企业进入  产业链本地化  产业集聚  资本配置    
Summary:  Currently, the increasingly complex domestic and international environment, coupled with the impact of a new wave of technological revolution and industrial transformation, imposes new requirements for establishing a scientifically sound and efficient development framework for Government Investment Funds.Government Investment Funds have emerged as a distinctive policy instrument that combines “government guidance” with “market operations,” leveraging fiscal resources to mobilize large-scale private capital. These funds enable targeted investment in critical segments of industrial and supply chains, especially in key, high-innovation firms. Beyond supporting individual investee firms, they can have systemic spillover effects: Revitalizing local markets, enhancing industry competitiveness, and reshaping regional economic dynamics. Based on the new context and the redefined role of Government Investment Funds, exploring how such funds influence the regional and sectoral innovation and entrepreneurship environment through targeted investments in specific firms, and how this, in turn, affects micro-level firm entry decisions, is of great significance. Answering these questions can deepen the understanding of government investment funds, optimize their institutional design and implementation pathways, and promote high-quality economic development in China.
This study investigates the broader systemic impact of Government Investment Funds at the regional and industry level, particularly focusing on how such investment activities affect firms' expected entry returns and costs, and thereby shape firm entry decisions. Using enterprise registration data from the China National Business Registry Database and investment data from the Zero2IPO database, the study aggregates the data at the year-city-industry level and employs a negative binomial regression (NBRM) model for empirical analysis. The results demonstrate that Government Investment Funds significantly promote new firm entry in local industry sectors. Mechanism analysis suggests two main channels: industrial agglomeration effects, driven by targeted investments in key, high-innovation firms that strengthen local industry chain development; and capital allocation effects, whereby policy signaling and government credit support help attract financial resources to strategic sectors and partially correct local capital misallocation. The organic coordination of “government guidance” and “market operations” plays a vital role in stimulating local market vitality and optimizing resource allocation. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that this positive impact is weaker in regions with higher levels of marketization and stronger social credit systems, suggesting diminishing returns where private investment mechanisms already function effectively. Additional analyses indicate two further findings: first, as the overall intensity of Government Investment Fund investment rises nationwide, the marginal impact on new firm entry declines; and second, these investments can generate competitive pressures that encourage the exit of inefficient incumbent firms, thereby raising regional innovation capacity. Based on these findings, the paper offers two policy recommendations: (1) adopt regionally differentiated strategies to implement Government Investment Fund policies, accounting for local variation in market conditions; (2) improve coordination among local governments to balance differentiated industry targets with the need for broader policy coherence.
This paper contributes to the literature in two key ways. First, while prior research has shown how Government Investment Funds affect the strategic behavior of investee firms as an important source of venture capital and private equity, their broader systemic impacts at the regional and industry levels have received less attention. This study fills that gap by analyzing how such investments shape firm entry dynamics through industrial agglomeration and capital allocation effects. Second, existing literature often treats government intervention and market efficiency as separate or opposing forces in explaining firm entry. The dual nature of Government Investment Funds, as both a government policy tool and a market-based mechanism, provides a unique context to examine their coordinated effects on resource allocation efficiency and entrepreneurial dynamics, thereby offering new insights into industrial policy and regional development strategies.
Keywords:  Government Investment Funds    Firm Entry    Industrial Chain Localization    Industrial Agglomeration    Capital Allocation
JEL分类号:  G24   H32   L52  
基金资助: * 本文感谢国家自然科学基金面上项目(72573139)、福建省自然科学基金项目(2024J01032)和中央高校基本科研业务费项目(20720241063)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
通讯作者:  朱东霞,博士研究生,厦门大学经济学院,E-mail:zhudongxia0205@163.com.   
作者简介:  谢贞发,财政学博士,教授,厦门大学经济学院,E-mail:xzf@xmu.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
谢贞发, 朱东霞. 政府投资基金的产业带动效应——来自企业进入的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2025, 542(8): 113-131.
XIE Zhenfa, ZHU Dongxia. The Industrial Driving Effect of Government Investment Funds: Empirical Evidence from Firm Entry. Journal of Financial Research, 2025, 542(8): 113-131.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2025/V542/I8/113
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