Summary:
The banking concentration in China has gradually decreased in recent years. According to the Global Financial Development data released by the World Bank, as of 2021, the banking concentration in China is gradually approaching that in the United States, which is far lower than that in Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. This indicates that the Chinese banking concentration is already at a relatively low level. However, a low concentration of the banking industry may affect the stability of the financial industry. Compared with developed Western countries, the Chinese banking market remains in a stage of continuous development, and there are substantial differences in the operating statuses of different types of commercial banks. Therefore, to deeply explore the development paths of local banks, this article aims to analyze the impact of local banking concentration on local banks' loan allocations, which could provide a theoretical basis for further improving the effectiveness of regulatory policies, as well as the allocation efficiency of local financial resources. Using manually collected data from local banks and data from financial license holders published by the National Financial Regulatory Administration, this article studies the effect of the local banking concentration on local banks' loan allocation efficiency. We find that the higher the local banking concentration, the higher the loan interest rates of urban and rural commercial banks, and this impact is more significant in urban and rural commercial banks subject to stronger rather than weaker market forces. Mechanism tests show that local banks increase loan interest rates because when the local banking concentration is high, local banks have loan customers with high risks. Therefore, raising loan interest rates is a manifestation of local banks' reasonable pricing. Further analysis reveals that when the local banking concentration is high, local bank loans can suppress firms' overinvestment because they tend to increase the loan interest rates for high-risk firms to compensate for the high risk. When the local banking concentration is low, local bank loans can better alleviate insufficient investment by firms. These findings indicate that local banks can reasonably price loans based on the characteristics of loan customers and improve loan allocation efficiency in different banking structure environments. Therefore, the development level of local banking cannot be judged solely by the local banking concentration; promoting the establishment of local banks' effective credit management system is a real necessary condition for improving resource allocation efficiency. The contributions of this article are mainly reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, this article studies the impact of changes in the banking industry on banks' loan allocations from the perspective of banks. Studies mainly explore the impact of the banking industry structure on credit costs from the perspective of firms, but no consistent research conclusions are obtained. This may be due to considerable differences in loan interest rates among different commercial banks. It can better reflect the interest rate differences between small and medium-sized banks and large banks from the perspective of banks. Secondly, this article takes local banks as the research sample and distinguishes the operational efficiency of local banks under different market structures. Most studies find that after the local banking concentration increases, the loan interest rates of large commercial banks with higher market power are higher than before, but no research is conducted on the loan interest rates of small and medium-sized banks in a monopolistic environment. Thirdly, in recent years, small and medium-sized banks have developed rapidly. This article takes urban and rural commercial banks as research samples to strengthen the understanding of the development path of Chinese small and medium-sized banks and provides policy recommendations to prevent systemic banking risks and promote supply-side structural reforms in the financial industry. The conclusion of this article indicates that the local banking concentration can affect local banks' loan behavior. Overall, local banks can allocate loans in a reasonable manner and improve loan allocation efficiency at different levels of banking concentration. Compared with developed Western countries, the Chinese banking concentration is relatively low, which may trigger financial risks. Therefore, to improve resource allocation efficiency, central regulatory agencies and local governments should not only consider the development status of the local banking industry based on the concentration or competition level of the banking industry but also further guide healthy competition among commercial banks, encourage local banks to serve the local economy, establish an effective credit evaluation management system, and alleviate the adverse effects of credit discrimination and credit rationing on resource allocation efficiency.
李天时, 祝继高. 地方银行业集中度对地方性商业银行贷款配置效率的影响研究[J]. 金融研究, 2023, 519(9): 76-93.
LI Tianshi, ZHU Jigao. Research on the Effect of Local Banking Concentration on Local Banks' Loan Allocation Efficiency. Journal of Financial Research, 2023, 519(9): 76-93.
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