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金融研究  2023, Vol. 515 Issue (5): 96-114    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
社会信用环境改善降低了企业违规吗?——来自“中国社会信用体系建设”的证据
黄卓, 陶云清, 王帅
北京大学国家发展研究院/数字金融研究中心,北京 100871;
中南财经政法大学金融学院,湖北 武汉 430073
Does Improving the Social Credit Environment Reduce Corporate Fraud? Evidence from the Construction of China's Social Credit System
HUANG Zhuo, TAO Yunqing, WANG Shuai
National School of Development/Institute of Digital Finance, Peking University;
School of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
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摘要 以中国社会信用体系建设为准自然实验,本文采用 2010—2020 年沪深A股上市公司数据,考察了社会信用环境改善是否以及如何影响企业违规行为。实证发现:第一,社会信用环境改善显著抑制了企业违规行为;第二,社会信用环境改善显著降低了企业违规倾向和被稽查的可能性。同时,社会信用环境改善也显著降低了信息披露违规、经营违规和企业管理者违规;第三,这一抑制作用对于非国有企业、公司治理水平较差、内部控制质量较低以及营商环境较差地区的企业更为明显;第四,社会信用环境改善影响企业违规的机制包括降低代理成本、缓解融资约束以及提高信息透明度;第五,社会信用环境改善有效降低了企业经营风险和破产风险。
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黄卓
陶云清
王帅
关键词:  社会信用环境  企业违规  代理成本  融资约束  信息透明度    
Summary:  Although China's economic development achievements are world-renowned, it is undeniable that its formal institutional systems remain imperfect, which hinders high-quality economic development. Therefore, in recent years, the Chinese government has launched a series of institutional reforms, of which the construction of the social credit system is an important component. Undoubtedly, the construction of the social credit system is a key focus for the government, as it will have a comprehensive and far-reaching influence on the micro behaviors of enterprises (Cao et al., 2022). However, the literature pays insufficient attention to the microeconomic effects of constructing the social credit system. Therefore, this study examines the microeconomic effects of constructing the social credit system from the perspective of corporate fraud. In theory, the construction of the social credit system will improve the social credit and market environments through modern technologies, such as the Internet and big data, which will reduce corporate fraud. Overall, the construction of the social credit system results in three profound changes for enterprises: first, it reduces agency costs, second, it eases financing constraints, and third, it improves information transparency. Therefore, this study expects that the construction of the social credit system will mainly affect corporate fraud through the following three mechanisms.
Taking China's social credit system as a natural experiment, this study uses data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2020 to examine empirically whether and how the social credit environment can suppress corporate fraud. The results regarding the effects of improving the social credit environment are as follows. First, this improvement significantly inhibits corporate fraud, a result that continues to hold after a series of robustness tests. Second, it considerably reduces the tendency of fraud and the possibility of being audited. At the same time, the improvement of the social credit environment significantly reduces information disclosure fraud, business fraud, and leadership fraud. Third, the inhibitory effects on fraud are more pronounced for enterprises that are non-state-owned, have poor governance, have poor internal control quality, and those in areas with poor business environments than in other enterprises. Fourth, the mechanisms of reducing corporate agency costs, easing corporate financing constraints, and improving corporate information transparency drive our findings. Finally, the improvement of the social credit environment effectively reduces the operational and bankruptcy risks of enterprises. This study provides considerable support for the government's continued focus on further improving the construction of the social credit system.
This study makes three key contributions to the literature. First, it supplements the relevant literature on the impact of social credit on micro-enterprise behavior, which is of great theoretical importance. In particular, this study directly examines the impact of the policy on corporate fraud, thus elucidating the microeconomic effects of constructing the social credit system. Second, this study complements the literature on the factors affecting corporate fraud. The literature discusses the influencing factors of corporate fraud from both internal and external aspects. This study demonstrates that improving the social credit environment inhibits enterprise violations by reducing agency costs, alleviating financing constraints, and improving information transparency. Thus, it not only reveals the internal mechanism through which the social credit system affects corporate fraud but also expands research on the external factors influencing corporate fraud. Third, this study has clear policy implications in support of upholding and improving the construction of the social credit system to curb corporate fraud. It reinforces the benefits of the “credit cities” policy, showing that they create a good social credit environment, and supporting expansion of the credit cities pilot projects to further reduce corporate fraud.
Keywords:  Social Credit Environment    Corporate Fraud    Agency Costs    Financing Constraints    Information Transparency
JEL分类号:  D21   G38   M14  
基金资助: * 本文感谢国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA010)和国家自然科学基金面上项目(72271010)的资助。感谢匿名审稿人的宝贵意见,文责自负。
通讯作者:  王 帅,硕士研究生,中南财经政法大学金融学院,E-mail:wangshuaizuel@126.com.   
作者简介:  黄 卓,经济学博士,长聘副教授,北京大学国家发展研究院,北京大学数字金融研究中心,E-mail:zhuohuang@nsd.pku.edu.cn.
陶云清,经济学博士,助理研究员,北京大学国家发展研究院,北京大学数字金融研究中心,E-mail:taoyunqingzuel@126.com.
引用本文:    
黄卓, 陶云清, 王帅. 社会信用环境改善降低了企业违规吗?——来自“中国社会信用体系建设”的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2023, 515(5): 96-114.
HUANG Zhuo, TAO Yunqing, WANG Shuai. Does Improving the Social Credit Environment Reduce Corporate Fraud? Evidence from the Construction of China's Social Credit System. Journal of Financial Research, 2023, 515(5): 96-114.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2023/V515/I5/96
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