Summary:
China has been making substantial efforts to prevent and mitigate financial risks in key fields in recent years. As a critical part of these efforts, the reform and risk reduction of small and medium-sized financial institutions have achieved significant milestones. However, potential risks remain pronounced among China's local small and medium-sized banks (SMBs), particularly urban and rural commercial banks. The bankruptcy of Baoshang Bank Limited serves as a stark reminder in this regard. To better address the potential crises of local SMBs and formulate targeted policy measures, it is essential to first clarify the underlying mechanisms. Existing studies generally suggest that the external causes of the crises of local SMBs in China is that they have been forced to concentrate credit on long-cycle, low-return investment projects because of the fiscal pressure and debt expansion of the local government. The internal causes lie in governance issues, such as insider control and a lack of checks and balances among major shareholders. There are two debatable assumptions in existing literature: the local industrial structure is static, and the investments by local governments including state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are always economically inefficient. In reality, China's vertical industrial structure, differentiated by the capital intensity of local SOEs and private-owned enterprises (POEs), is in a dynamic adjustment process. Moreover, China's local governments have played a proactive role in promoting industrial upgrading through SOEs in capital-intensive sectors, which is a positive role that should be considered. However, this also implies that local governments need a specific financial institutional arrangement to allocate local credit resources: the proportion of credit available to SOEs versus POEs. Financial Decentralization (FD) has proven to be a feasible arrangement, which delineates and allocates control over financial resources between the government and the market entities (primarily POEs). From the perspective of FD, the crisis of local SMBs results from an unreasonable arrangement of control over financial resources, which in turn induces credit misallocation across different industries. Local governments utilize the FD system to allocate credit from local SMBs, supporting SOEs in achieving industrial upgrading and increasing intermediate goods output. Subsequently, this process supports POEs in rapidly completing capital accumulation, thereby jointly driving local industrial advancement and economic growth. If both POEs and SOEs operate in industries where they hold comparative advantages, and the actual efficiency of POEs is relatively higher, FD helps improve credit allocation and reduces the potential for crisis in local SMBs. In this context, FD is directly reflected in the relative weight of control over local financial resource allocation between local governments and POEs. However, this capital investment-driven industrial upgrading is prone to imbalances. This includes SOEs over-upgrading into new industries or delaying exit from industries where they lack competitive advantages, thereby crowding out credit resources of POEs. Consequently, POEs become confined to the lower-output-level industries. In such cases, FD can easily lead credit to move towards less efficient sectors, which is credit misallocation across industries, breeding significant non-performing assets and increasing the potential crisis in local SMBs. This paper may have two potential contributions. First, we introduce an industrial upgrading mechanism involving both SOEs and POEs into a bank run model, clarifying the theoretical mechanism through which the implicit institution of FD affects local SMB crises via credit misallocation. This macro-level perspective differs notably from the existing literature focusing on corporate governance and local government debt expansion. Second, while existing studies have empirically tested the impact of FD on the risks of urban commercial banks through channels such as financial competition and credit expansion, this paper further empirically examines the mechanism linking financial decentralization to local SMB crises through credit misallocation. This study finds that FD determines the extent to which credit resources are allocated to private enterprises. When private firms are sufficiently efficient, FD helps alleviate credit misallocation, thereby reducing the probability of banking crises. Otherwise, its effect becomes insignificant. Local fiscal pressures partially offset the risk-mitigating role of FD. The findings of this study can help local governments adjust the control structure of financial resources according to their local conditions, thereby mitigating the risks of local SMBs while maintaining a dynamic balance between economic growth and local financial security.
肖锐, 艾思静, 洪正. 金融分权、信贷错配与地方中小银行风险[J]. 金融研究, 2026, 550(4): 37-54.
XIAO Rui, AI Sijing, HONG Zheng. Financial Decentralization, Credit Misallocation, and Local Small and Medium-sized Banks' Risks. Journal of Financial Research, 2026, 550(4): 37-54.
[1] 白俊、宫晓云和赵向芳,2022,《信贷错配与非金融企业的影子银行活动——来自委托贷款的证据》,《会计研究》第2期,第46~55页。 [2] 曹春方、马连福和沈小秀,2014,《财政压力、晋升压力、官员任期与地方国企过度投资》,《经济学(季刊)》第4期,第1415~1436页。 [3] 曹啸和卜俊飞,2021,《市场利率、零售存款和银行风险承担:理论和中国的证据》,《财贸经济》第8期,第81~96页。 [4] 杜群阳、周方兴和战明华,2022,《信息不对称、资源配置效率与经济周期波动》,《中国工业经济》第4期,第61~79页。 [5] 洪正、何美玲、张琳和包健,2019,《民营资本入股降低了城市商业银行的不良贷款率吗?》,《当代经济科学》第4期,第88~99页。 [6] 洪正、肖锐和张琳,2020,《金融分权、国有企业与产业升级——金融分权地区差异的一个经验解释》,《当代财经》第7期,第50~62页。 [7] 洪正、张琳和肖锐,2021,《产业跃升、金融结构与中国经济增长》,《管理世界》第8期,第58~88页。 [8] 洪正、张琳和肖锐,2023,《中国经济赶超发展中的最优金融分权》,《经济学(季刊)》第5期,第1810~1827页。 [9] 洪正和胡勇锋,2017,《中国式金融分权》,《经济学(季刊)》第2期,第545~576页。 [10] 纪淼和李宏瑾,2019,《当前我国中小银行风险成因及政策建议》,《金融理论与实践》第12期,第48~54页。 [11] 江曙霞、罗杰和黄君慈,2006,《信贷集中与扩张、软预算约束竞争和银行系统性风险》,《金融研究》第4期,第40~48页。 [12] 李双建和田国强,2022,《地方政府债务扩张与银行风险承担:理论模拟与经验证据》,《经济研究》第5期,第34~50页。 [13] 刘晓蕾、吕元稹和余凡,2021,《地方政府隐性债务与城投债定价》,《金融研究》第12期,第170~ 188页。 [14] 毛锐、刘楠楠和刘蓉,2018,《地方政府债务扩张与系统性金融风险的触发机制》,《中国工业经济》第4期,第19~38页。 [15] 苗文龙,2018,《金融分权、股权结构与银行贷款风险》,《金融监管研究》第8期,第21~41页。 [16] 宋敏、周鹏和司海涛,2021,《金融科技与企业全要素生产率——“赋能”和信贷配给的视角》,《中国工业经济》第4期,第138~155页。 [17] 孙希芳和王晨晨,2020,《地方财政压力、信贷错配与信贷过度扩张》,《经济科学》第6期,第34~47页。 [18] 谭语嫣、谭之博、黄益平和胡永泰,2017,《僵尸企业的投资挤出效应:基于中国工业企业的证据》,《经济研究》第5期,第175~188页。 [19] 王小鲁、胡李鹏和樊纲,2021,《中国分省份市场化指数报告: 2021》,北京:社会科学文献出版社。 [20] 王义中、郑博文和邬介然,2023,《不确定性冲击、信贷资源错配与货币财政政策效果》,《世界经济》第2期,第3~30页。 [21] 肖兴志、彭宜钟和李少林,2013,《中国最优产业结构:理论模型与定量测算》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期,第135~162页。 [22] 熊琛和金昊,2021,《地方政府债务的宏观经济效应——基于信贷错配视角的研究》,《经济学(季刊)》第5期,第1545~1570页。 [23] 杨坚,2011,《地方政府竞争下的产业结构调整——基于金融发展视角》,《经济问题》第12期,第18~21页。 [24] 张杰、郑文平和新夫,2017,《中国的银行管制放松、结构性竞争和企业创新》,《中国工业经济》第10期,第118~136页。 [25] 张甜和曹廷求,2022,《地方财政风险金融化:来自城商行的证据》,《财贸经济》第4期,第21~35页。 [26] 祝继高、岳衡和饶品贵,2020,《地方政府财政压力与银行信贷资源配置效率——基于我国城市商业银行的研究证据》,《金融研究》第1期,第88~109页。 [27] Acharya, V. V., L. Borchert, M. Jager, and S. Steffen, 2021, “Kicking the Can Down the Road: Government Interventions in the European Banking Sector”, The Review of Financial Studies,34(9), pp. 4090~4131. [28] Allen, F., E. Carletti, I. Goldstein, and A. Leonello, 2018, “Government Guarantees and Financial Stability”, Journal of Economic Theory, 177, pp. 518~557. [29] Betz, F., S. Oprică, T. A. Peltonen and P. Sarlin, 2014, “Predicting Distress in European Banks”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 45, pp. 225~241. [30] Bryant, J., 1980, “A Model of Reserves, Bank Runs, and Deposit Insurance”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 4(4), pp. 335~344. [31] Diamond, D. W. and P. H. Dybvig, 1983, “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity”, Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), pp. 401~419. [32] Goldstein, I. and A. Pauzner, 2005, “Demand–Deposit Contracts and the Probability of Bank Runs”, The Journal of Finance, 60(3), pp. 1293~1327. [33] Gorton, G. and A. Metrick, 2012, “Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-Reader's Guide”, Journal of Economic Literature, 50(1), pp. 128~150. [34] Gorton, G., 1985, “Bank Suspension of Convertibility”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 15(2), pp. 177~193. [35] Guiso, L., P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales, 2004, “The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development,” American Economic Review, 94(3), pp. 526~556. [36] Metrick, A. and P. Schmelzing, 2021, “Banking-Crisis Interventions Across Time and Space”, National Bureau of Economic Research, No. w29281. [37] Romasco, A. U. and C. P. Kindleberger, 1978, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, New York: Published by Basic Books. [38] Zhang, D., J. Cai, D. G. Dickinson, and A. M. Kutan, 2016, “Non-Performing Loans, Moral Hazard and Regulation of the Chinese Commercial Banking System”, Journal of Banking & Finance, 63, pp. 48~60.
