Please wait a minute...
金融研究  2020, Vol. 476 Issue (2): 34-50    
  本期目录 | 过刊浏览 | 高级检索 |
中央银行沟通的金融市场响应──基于股票市场的事件研究
邹文理, 王曦, 谢小平
广州大学经济与统计学院, 广东广州 510006;
中山大学岭南学院, 广东广州 510275
Financial Market Response to Central Bank Communication: Event Study on Stock Market
ZOU Wenli, WANG Xi, XIE Xiaoping
School of Economics and Statistics,Guangzhou University;
Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University
下载:  PDF (665KB) 
输出:  BibTeX | EndNote (RIS)      
摘要 本文使用事件研究法分析我国中央银行沟通行为对股票价格走势的影响。研究发现,影响确实存在且影响方向和力度与央行沟通方式以及股票市场背景有关。具体而言:(1)书面沟通影响显著,口头沟通则无明显作用;(2)宽松性政策信息沟通产生了正向影响,紧缩性信息沟通影响为负;(3)沟通事件的影响主要体现为一种短期作用,并伴随着即时效应、预知效应和滞后效应;(4)在熊市或牛市的不同市场背景下,央行沟通对股价的影响存在非对称性。结果表明,央行的沟通手段对金融市场有重要影响。
服务
把本文推荐给朋友
加入引用管理器
E-mail Alert
RSS
作者相关文章
邹文理
王曦
谢小平
关键词:  中央银行沟通  股票市场  事件研究法    
Summary:  Central bank communication occurs when a monetary authority releases information about future policy to the public to change economic agents' policy expectations. These explanations of future policy can even affect the psychology and behavior of economic agents more than the actual operation of the policy itself (Hansen and McMahon, 2016), and central bank communication has become an important tool for implementing monetary policy (Blinder et al., 2008).
   The literature on central bank communication research in China mainly uses the China Monetary Policy Report (hereafter referred to as the Report) as research material, neglecting the communication information in the minutes of the quarterly meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (hereafter referred to as the Minutes), which is more timely and forward-looking. In addition, existing researches mainly use the GARCH model, which is more suitable for the analysis of high-frequency data, but the data from Minutes and Report are quarterly. To resolve these shortcomings, we use both the Minutes and Report to identify written central bank communication, and we use Internet search materials to identify oral central bank communication. The event study method is then used to analyze how central bank communication affects stock prices in a relatively short time window.
   Our study produced the following conclusions based on theoretical analysis. First, different types of central bank communication have different impacts on stock prices. Written communication has a significant impact on stock prices, but oral communication has no obvious effect. The reason may be that written communication is more formal and authoritative than oral communication, and its frequency of publication is more regular, so it more strongly affects economic agents' expectations and actions.
   Second, written communication has the following effects. (1) Loose information communication increases stock prices, and tight information communication decreases stock prices. (2) Written communication shows strong short-term effects, clearly demonstrating the sensitivity of the Chinese stock market to information.
   Third, communication based on the Report has three types of effects on stock prices: immediate effect, predictive effect, and lag effect. However, communication based on the Minutes only shows a predictive effect. The reason for this difference is that information based on the Report is more unambiguous, and agents pay more attention to the Report.
   Fourth, written communication has asymmetric effects on stock prices against different market backgrounds. (1) The magnitude of the positive role of loose information communication in a bear market is less than that of tight information communication's negative role, while the magnitude of the positive role of loose information communication in a bull market is greater than that of tight information communication's negative role. (2) The magnitude of the negative role of tight information communication on stock prices is greater than that in a bull market; the magnitude of the positive role of loose information communication in a bear market is less than that in a bull market in a short period of time, while the magnitude of the positive role of loose information communication in a bear market is greater than that in a bull market in a longer period of time.
   The policy implications of this study are as follows. (1) Written communication is an effective method of guiding the behaviors of participants in the stock market. (2) The central bank should be aware of the different functions of the Report and Minutes, to ensure the flexible dissemination of information.
Keywords:  Central Bank Communication, Stock Market, Event Study Method
JEL分类号:  E44   E52   E61  
基金资助: * 本文感谢广东省自然科学基金项目“中国经济新常态背景下创新型货币政策操作的政策效应研究”(2018A0303130174)、国家社科基金青年项目“中央银行沟通行为量化及其对我国金融市场的影响研究”(14CJY068)资助
通讯作者:  谢小平,经济学博士,副教授,广州大学经济与统计学院,E-mail:xiexp@gzhu.edu.cn.   
作者简介:  邹文理,经济学博士,副教授,广州大学经济与统计学院,E-mail:chbuzwl@163.com.王 曦,经济学博士,教授,中山大学岭南学院,E-mail:lnswx@mail.sysu.edu.cn.
引用本文:    
邹文理, 王曦, 谢小平. 中央银行沟通的金融市场响应──基于股票市场的事件研究[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 34-50.
ZOU Wenli, WANG Xi, XIE Xiaoping. Financial Market Response to Central Bank Communication: Event Study on Stock Market. Journal of Financial Research, 2020, 476(2): 34-50.
链接本文:  
http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/  或          http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/Y2020/V476/I2/34
[1] 卞志村和张义,2012,《央行信息披露、实际干预与通胀预期管理》,《经济研究》第2期,第15~28页。
[2] 郭豫媚和周璇,2018,《央行沟通、适应性学习和货币政策有效性》,《经济研究》第4期,第77~91页。
[3] 李云峰,2012,《中央银行沟通、实际干预与通货膨胀稳定》,《国际金融研究》第4期,第15~23页。
[4] 李云峰和李仲飞,2011,《中央银行沟通、宏观经济信息与货币政策有效性》,《财贸经济》第1期,第56~63页。
[5] 李云峰和王彦卿,2016,《中央银行沟通在我国货币政策预期管理中的策略研究》,《宏观经济研究》第10期,第88~100页。
[6] 林建浩和赵文庆,2015,《中国央行沟通指数的测度与谱分析》,《统计研究》第1期,第52~58页。
[7] 刘剑文、郭雪萌和姚远,2016,《中央银行沟通设计与社会福利——基于PVAR模型的实证研究》,《南开经济研究》第3期,第3~20页。
[8] 卢新生和孙欣欣,2017,《中央银行政策沟通的市场效应:基于人民币汇率的实证研究》,《金融研究》第1期,第22~34页。
[9] 冀志斌和周先平,2011,《中央银行沟通可以作为货币政策工具吗——基于中国数据的分析》,《国际金融研究》第2期,第25~34页。
[10] 王博和刘翀,2016,《央行沟通的金融市场效应——来自中国的证据》,《经济学动态》第11期,第22~32页。
[11] 王曦、王茜和陈中飞,2016,《货币政策预期与通货膨胀管理——基于消息冲击的DSGE分析》,《经济研究》第2期,第16~29页。
[12] 吴国培和潘再见,2014,《中央银行沟通对金融资产价格的影响——基于中国的实证研究》,《金融研究》第5期,第34~47页。
[13] 徐亚平,2009,《公众学习、预期引导与货币政策的有效性》,《金融研究》第1期,第50~65页。
[14] 曾刚和万志宏,2014,《中央银行沟通与货币政策:最新实践与启示》,《国际金融研究》第2期,第11~18页。
[15] 张强和胡荣尚,2014,《中央银行沟通对利率期限结构的影响研究》,《国际金融研究》第6期,第10~20页。
[16] 朱宁、许艺煊和邱光辉,2016,《中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的影响》,《金融研究》第11期,第32~46页。
[17] 邹文理和王曦,2018,《中央银行沟通行为量化指标构建——兼论中央银行沟通的政策效果》,《当代财经》第10期,第58~67页。
[18] Ashley J. W. 1962. “Stock Prices and Changes in Earnings and Dividends”, Journal of Political Economy, 70(1): 82~85.
[19] Ball, R.and P. Brown. 1968. “An Empirical Analysis of Accounting Income Numbers”, Journal of Accounting Research, 6(2): 159~178.
[20] Beck, M. K., B. Hayo, and M. Neuenkirch. 2013. “Central Bank Communication and Correlation between Financial Markets: Canada and the United States”, International Economics and Economic Policy, 10(2): 277~296.
[21] Belke, A.and J. Beckmann. 2015. “Monetary Policy and Stock Prices-Cross-country Evidence from Cointegrated VAR Models”, Journal of Banking and Finance, May: 254~265.
[22] Bjørnland, H. C.and K. Leitemo. 2009. “Identifying the Interdependence between US Monetary Policy and the Stock Market”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(2): 275~282.
[23] Blinder, A. S., M. Ehrmann, M. Fratzscher, J. De Haan, and D. J. Jansen. 2008. “Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence”, Journal of Economic Literature, 46(6): 910~945.
[24] Born, B., M. Ehrmann, and M. Fratzscher. 2014. “Central Bank Communication on Financial Stability”, The Economic Journal, 124(577): 701~734.
[25] Campbell, J. Y.and A. C. Mackinlay. 1997. The Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton University Press.
[26] Dolley, J. C. 1933. “Characteristics and Procedure of Common Stock Split-Ups”, Harvard Business Review, 11(3): 316~326.
[27] Fama, E. F., L. Fisher, C. Jensen, and R. Roll. 1969. “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information”, International Economic Review, 10(1): 1~21.
[28] Guthrie, G.and J. Wright. 2000. “Open Mouth Operations”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 46(2): 489-516.
[29] Hansen, S.and M. Mcmahon. 2016. “Shocking Language: Understanding the Macroeconomic Effects of Central Bank Communication”, NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics: 114~133.
[30] Hayo, B. and M. Neuenkirch. 2015. “Central Bank Communication in the Financial Crisis: Evidence from a Survey of Financial Market Participants”, Journal of International Money and Finance, December: 166~181.
[31] Hayo, B., A. M. Kutan, and M. Neuenkirch. 2011. “Communication Matters: U.S. Monetary Policy and Commodity Price Volatility”, Economics Letters, 117(1): 247~249.
[32] Hayo, B., A. M. Kutan, and M. Neuenkirch. 2012. “Federal Reserve Communications and Emerging Equity Markets”, Southern Economic Association, 78(3): 1041~1056.
[33] Hayo, B., A. M. Kutan, and M. Neuenkirch. 2010. “The Impact of U.S. Central Bank Communication on European and Pacific Equity Markets”, Economics Letters, 108(2): 172~174.
[34] Kohn, D. L.and B. Sack. 2004. “Central Bank Talk: Does it Matter and Why?” In Macroeconomics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Stability, eds. by Bank of Canada: 175~206.
[35] Lucca, O. D.and T. Francesco. 2011. “Measuring Central Bank Communication: An Automated Approach with Application to FOMC”, NBER Working Paper No. 15367.
[36] Myers, J. H.and A. J. Bakay. 1948. “Influence of Stock Split-ups on Market Price”, Harvard Business Review, 26(2): 251~265.
[37] Reeves, R.and M. Sawicki. 2007. “Do Financial Markets React to Bank of England Communication?” European Journal of Political Economy, 23(1): 207~227.
[38] Romer, C. D.and D. H. Romer. 1989. “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz”, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 4(4): 121~184.
[39] Rosa, C. 2011. “Words That Shake Traders: The Stock Market's Reaction to Central Bank Communication in Real Time”, Journal of Empirical Finance, 18(5): 915~934.
[40] Rosa, C. 2016. “Fedspeak: Who Moves U.S. Asset Prices?” International Journal of Central Banking, December: 223~261.
[41] Sharpe, W. 1964. “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk”, The Journal of Finance, 19(3): 425~442.
[42] Thorbecke, W. 1997. “On Stock Market Returns and Monetary Policy”, The Journal of Finance, 52(2): 635~654.
[1] 马骏, 何晓贝. 货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 474(12): 58-69.
[2] 马勇. “双支柱”调控框架的理论与经验基础[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 474(12): 18-37.
[3] 黄益平, 曹裕静, 陶坤玉, 余昌华. 货币政策与宏观审慎政策共同支持宏观经济稳定[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 474(12): 70-91.
[4] 司登奎, 葛新宇, 曾涛, 李小林. 房价波动、金融稳定与最优宏观审慎政策[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 473(11): 38-56.
[5] 郭品, 沈悦. 互联网金融、存款竞争与银行风险承担[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 470(8): 58-76.
[6] 贾盾, 孙溪, 郭瑞. 货币政策公告、政策不确定性及股票市场的预公告溢价效应——来自中国市场的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 469(7): 76-95.
[7] 杨筝, 王红建, 戴静, 许传华. 放松利率管制、利润率均等化与实体企业“脱实向虚”[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 468(6): 20-38.
[8] 姜富伟, 郭鹏, 郭豫媚. 美联储货币政策对我国资产价格的影响[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 467(5): 37-55.
[9] 李文喆. 中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 465(3): 53-73.
[10] 杨国超, 盘宇章. 信任被定价了吗? ——来自债券市场的证据[J]. 金融研究, 2019, 463(1): 35-53.
[11] 易行健, 周利. 数字普惠金融发展是否显著影响了居民消费——来自中国家庭的微观证据[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 461(11): 47-67.
[12] 温信祥, 苏乃芳. 大资管、影子银行与货币政策传导[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 460(10): 38-54.
[13] 汪天都, 孙谦. 传统监管措施能够限制金融市场的波动吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 459(9): 177-191.
[14] 林滨, 王弟海, 陈诗一. 企业效率异质性、金融摩擦的资源再分配机制与经济波动[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 458(8): 17-32.
[15] 刘京军. 货币市场基金的市场集中度影响了其风险承担吗?[J]. 金融研究, 2018, 457(7): 90-107.
[1] 周小川. 养老金改革考验我们经济学的功底和智慧[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 475(1): 1 -8 .
[2] 卢冰, 王雅琦, 洪圣杰. 人民币预期汇率变动与虚假贸易——基于套汇视角的分析[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 475(1): 9 -27 .
[3] 陈雨露. 当前全球中央银行研究的若干重点问题[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 1 -14 .
[4] 张礼卿, 钟茜. 全球金融周期、美国货币政策与“三元悖论”[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 15 -33 .
[5] 戴静, 杨筝, 刘贯春, 许传华. 银行业竞争、创新资源配置和企业创新产出——基于中国工业企业的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 51 -70 .
[6] 戴魁早, 刘友金. 市场化改革能推进产业技术进步吗?——中国高技术产业的经验证据[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 71 -90 .
[7] 程新生, 武琼, 刘孟晖, 程昱. 企业集团现金分布、管理层激励与资本配置效率[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 91 -108 .
[8] 顾雷雷, 郭建鸾, 王鸿宇. 企业社会责任、融资约束与企业金融化[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 109 -127 .
[9] 姜军, 江轩宇, 伊志宏. 企业创新效率研究——来自股权质押的影响[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 128 -146 .
[10] 武佳薇, 汪昌云, 陈紫琳, Jie Michael Guo. 中国个人投资者处置效应研究——一个非理性信念的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2020, 476(2): 147 -166 .
Viewed
Full text


Abstract

Cited

  Shared   
  Discussed   
版权所有 © 《金融研究》编辑部
本系统由北京玛格泰克科技发展有限公司设计开发 技术支持:support@magtech.com.cn
京ICP备11029882号-1