Design of Intertemporal Compensation Contracts in Banks and Risk Management of Entity Enterprise: From the Perspective of Investment and Financing Maturity Matching
GUI Hefa, WEN Jie, WANG Hongjian
Intelligent Finance Innovation Lab/School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Summary:
As the basic unit of the macroeconomy, the effectiveness of risk management of real enterprises serves as the micro foundation for the prevention of macro financial risks and is directly related to the stability and health of the entire economic and financial system. Among them, ensuring that the maturity of funding sources matches that of funding needs is one of the important strategies for risk management of real enterprises. However, events such as the international financial crisis in 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 have made the mismatch of investment and financing maturity for enterprises a prominent issue. This mismatch will not only cause an imbalance in the term structure at the macro level, but also bring serious consequences at the micro level. Therefore, how to effectively reduce the intertemporal credit risk caused by the maturity mismatch of investment and financing has become a key issue that needs to be urgently addressed in order to improve bank supervision and prevent financial risks. Against this backdrop, the “Guidelines for the Prudent Compensation Supervision of Commercial Banks” (hereinafter referred to as the “Guidelines”) in 2010 required the deferred payment of compensation for bank executives and employees in key risk positions, which provided an important opportunity to address the above-mentioned issues. This paper, based on the implementation of the “Guidelines” in 2010 and the data on bank-enterprise loan relationships on a transaction-by-transaction basis, constructs a multi-period difference-in-differences model at the “enterprise-bank” pairing level to investigate the impact and mechanism of intertemporal compensation contract design on the risk management of real enterprises. Research has found that the design of intertemporal compensation contracts by banks can significantly alleviate the borrowing enterprises' maturity mismatch of investment and financing and promote the risk management of real enterprises. Moreover, this effect is mainly observed in enterprises with a high risk appetite, high growth potential, and weak internal control. Mechanism identification reveals that the design of intertemporal compensation contracts by banks, through the intertemporal credit risk matching mechanism, determines the lending term structure based on the investment term structure of the demand side, thereby enhancing the degree of maturity matching of investment and financing. Economic consequence analysis indicates that by enhancing the degree of maturity matching of investment and financing, the design of intertemporal compensation contracts helps enterprises prevent both short-term and long-term risks. Based on the research conclusions of this paper, the following policy implications can be obtained. First, regulatory authorities may consider improving the guidelines for bank compensation supervision, such as setting a compensation deferral ratio linked to the loan duration, and mandating that the cross-period matching performance of credit risks be included in the performance assessment of senior executives and the compensation deferral payment mechanism. Second, regulatory authorities should guide banks to customize credit term plans based on the characteristics of enterprises, thereby curbing the accumulation of credit risks from the source. For instance, increase the proportion of medium-and long-term loans to high-risk enterprises; encourage banks to adopt a lending strategy of “financing term covering project payback period” for high-growth enterprises. For enterprises with weak internal control, the adjustment of the loan term structure can be bound to the risk control improvement plan. Third, regulatory authorities can pay attention to the matching degree of enterprise investment and financing maturity and incorporate it into the financial risk monitoring system, so as to transform micro risk governance into the defense line of macro financial risk. The academic contributions of this article are mainly reflected in three aspects. First, this paper focuses on the inhibitory effect of salary deferral on the maturity mismatch of investment and financing in real enterprises, reveals its micro-effect on the transmission to the real economy, and makes up for the deficiency of literature that mainly focuses on credit supply shock and unexpected effects, thereby expanding the research dimension of bank salary supervision. Second, this paper, by introducing and verifying the credit risk intertemporal matching mechanism, clarifies the logic of the intertemporal compensation contract design driving banks to match the credit and enterprise investment terms, and deepens the understanding of the role of compensation delay in affecting the risk management of real enterprises. Third, previous studies have focused on the governance role of financial regulation in current credit risks. However, the conclusion of this paper emphasizes that future regulatory reforms need to pay attention to the intertemporal mismatch of credit risks and promote the intertemporal dynamic balance of credit risks. This provides important inspiration for improving the regulatory framework and preventing financial risks.
桂荷发, 文杰, 王红建. 银行跨期薪酬契约设计与企业风险管理——基于投融资期限匹配的视角[J]. 金融研究, 2025, 543(9): 96-114.
GUI Hefa, WEN Jie, WANG Hongjian. Design of Intertemporal Compensation Contracts in Banks and Risk Management of Entity Enterprise: From the Perspective of Investment and Financing Maturity Matching. Journal of Financial Research, 2025, 543(9): 96-114.
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