Summary:
Information asymmetry and insufficient data remain persistent barriers limiting access to external finance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) worldwide. Unlike large firms, many SMEs operate informally, avoiding the costs associated with formal registration, such as administrative procedures, time, taxes, and regulatory inspections. However, the absence of formal business records prevents SMEs from building credible credit histories, which are essential for securing bank loans. Even when some data exist, financial institutions often face high costs and technical difficulties in collecting and processing the information required to assess SMEs' creditworthiness. Moreover, SMEs frequently lack sufficient physical collateral, further exacerbating their financing constraints. Against this backdrop, market-oriented credit reporting bureaus, as key components of the data factor market, theoretically hold significant potential in mitigating the information asymmetry faced by SMEs. Unlike public credit registries, which primarily focus on maintaining financial stability and have relatively limited data collection scopes, market-oriented bureaus operate under market-based mechanisms and leverage technological innovations to expand the breadth and depth of information acquisition. This facilitates the circulation and utilization of data and information, enabling the development of richer and more multidimensional credit profiles for individuals and enterprises. Such capabilities not only help alleviate the information asymmetry encountered by financial institutions when granting credit to SMEs but also offer new possibilities for reducing the reliance of lending decisions on collateral. Motivated by these considerations, this paper employs the latest World Bank Enterprise Surveys data covering over 70000 enterprises globally and manually matches data on credit reporting institutions across 98 economies to empirically investigate the impact of market-oriented credit reporting bureaus on enterprise financing constraints, providing internationally comparable insight for China's current reforms. Empirical results show that the establishment of market-oriented credit bureaus significantly reduces financing constraints for SMEs, while having no significant effect on large firms. In contrast, public credit registries do not exhibit significant effects on alleviating financing constraints for either SMEs or large enterprises. These findings remain robust across alternative variable definitions, placebo tests, and after addressing potential endogeneity concerns. Further analysis reveals the mechanisms through which market-oriented credit reporting bureaus affect SME financing. These bureaus promote both the collection and accumulation of enterprise-related information, not only expanding the availability of data itself but also encouraging SMEs to register formally and extend their duration of formal operations. Moreover, by integrating multidimensional and diverse data sources, market-oriented credit bureaus are better able to reach underserved and low-tier segments of the market, building more comprehensive credit profiles for SMEs and helping reduce banks' dependence on collateral in credit decisions. These mechanisms collectively explain why market-oriented credit reporting bureaus play a unique role in easing financing constraints for SMEs, whereas public credit registries have been less successful in achieving similar outcomes. This paper contributes new empirical evidence regarding the role of market-oriented credit reporting bureaus in mitigating SMEs financing constraints. Compared to the existing literature, it further explores the specific channels through which market-oriented credit reporting bureaus alleviate challenges unique to SMEs. While prior studies have established that credit reporting systems can reduce information asymmetry and lower firms' financing costs, few studies have directly examined how market-oriented bureaus help address issues such as insufficient collateral or limited credit histories that particularly affect SMEs. This paper investigates these specific pathways, enriching our understanding of how market-oriented credit reporting bureaus influence SME financing outcomes. The findings also carry important policy implications. First, the results provide empirical support for the positive externalities associated with the marketization of data as a production factor. The study finds that globally, government-led public credit registries have not significantly reduced firms' financing constraints, nor does market-oriented credit reporting bureaus increase the financing burden on firms; instead, it is precisely the market-oriented credit reporting bureaus that effectively mitigate these constraints. Second, the paper's analysis of SMEs-specific channels offers practical policy recommendations for addressing SMEs financing difficulties. The analysis in this paper indicates that the development of market-oriented credit reporting bureaus can help reduce banks' collateral requirements for SMEs. Accordingly, one feasible approach to promoting SMEs financing within the data factor market is to enhance the cooperation between these credit reporting bureaus and banks. By leveraging the strengths of market-oriented credit bureaus in credit product development, joint efforts can be made to introduce credit loan products based on large-scale credit data.
熊鹏翀, 纪洋, 朱孟楠. 市场化征信机构与中小企业融资约束——来自世界银行企业调查数据的微观证据[J]. 金融研究, 2025, 541(7): 39-56.
XIONG Pengchong, JI Yang, ZHU Mengnan. Market-oriented Credit Reporting Bureau and SMEs Financing Constraints: Micro Evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys Data. Journal of Financial Research, 2025, 541(7): 39-56.
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