School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology; School of Accountancy, Singapore Management University; School of Accountancy, Central University of Finance and Economics
摘要 高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距不仅影响着企业的激励效率与企业价值,还关系到社会的公平与稳定。断裂带是Lau and Murnighan(1998)提出的假想的分割线概念,即可以将团队划分为多个小团体。以2005—2019年中国A股上市公司为样本,本文从董事会断裂带这一视角探索董事会中小团体的差异性对于薪酬差距的影响和后果。本文研究发现:(1)董事会断裂带的存在加剧了企业高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距;(2)分解董事会断裂带的类型后,由深层特征形成的断裂带对于薪酬差距的影响高于由表层特征形成的断裂带;(3)区分行业竞争的程度后,公司所在行业的激烈竞争有助于缓解董事会断裂带造成的薪酬差距扩大;(4)从经济后果来看,董事会断裂带造成的薪酬差距对企业绩效具有显著的负向影响。本文的研究有助于深入理解企业薪酬差距形成的机制及其后果,同时对于完善我国董事会的监督机制也有一定的现实启发。
Summary:
The pay gap between corporate executives and ordinary employees is related to both the company's performance and the fairness and stability of social distribution.Government departments have promulgated a series of policies and regulations to limit the pay gap. However, these salary-limiting policies have mainly been imposed by external regulatory forces, and their implementation has not been uniform; in addition, these policies have had a limited effect on non-state-owned enterprises. In this context, the internal governance perspective suggests that it is necessary to study the issue of executive salaries from the ground up, which is also instructive for understanding the pay gap in different companies. The board of directors is the core of a company's internal governance. Exploring the factors influencing the board's supervisory function will clarify the causes and consequences of the pay gap. Unlike the literature focusing on individual characteristics, our study is based on faultline theory. With the extension of the company's operating time, the board of directors may form different small groups. Small groups have different profit-seeking motives, and differ in management concepts, methods, and awareness, which makes it difficult for the board of directors to perform its supervisory function effectively. The phenomenon of multiple small groups within the board of directors is called “board faultlines”. Such faultlines are common and have a serious impact on its functioning. Accordingly, we explore whether the existence of small groups within the board of directors affects its supervisory function and the firm pay gap. Based on data from a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2019, we examine how board faultlines affect the firm pay gap. Our findings suggest that (1) board faultlines significantly promote the pay gap; (2) board faultlines based on deep-level attributes have stronger and more persistent effects on the pay gap; (3) a high degree of industry competition alleviates this positive relationship;(4) the impact of board faultlines on the pay gap leads to lower firm performance. Our study makes three contributions to the literature. First, we enrich research on pay gap governance from the perspective of board faultlines. We find that the harm to the board's supervisory function caused by board faultlines is a source of executive power. Therefore, attempts to address the pay gap should examine the formation of board faultlines. Our study thus provides a new direction for pay gap governance research and practice. Second, we contribute to research on the measurement and economic consequences of board faultlines. We consider eight director characteristics and optimize the measure, overcoming the limitation of the number of subgroups and making the measure more accurate. In terms of economic consequences, studies typically focus on corporate performance, value, and cross-border mergers and acquisitions.Our study discusses the impact of board faultlines on the board's supervision and the firm pay gap, which constitutes a useful supplement to the literature. Third, our findings have practical significance for improving the company's salary incentive mechanism and board supervision. We find that the pay gap does not have an incentive effect, and even has a negative impact on corporate performance. Therefore, the company should pay attention to the reasonable combination of director characteristics when choosing directors. It is important to prevent the formation of faultlines while achieving diversification of the board of directors, to emphasize the board's overall goal, and to alleviate the harm of identity with a subgroup. These measures will improve board supervision and compensation incentives.
Bezrukova, K., Jehn, K. A., Zanutto, E. L., and Thatcher, S. M., 2009, “Do Workgroup Faultlines Help or Hurt？ A Moderated Model of Faultlines, Team Identification, and Group Performance”, Organization Science, 20 (1): 35～50.
[23]
Crucke, S., and Knockaert, M., 2016, “When Stakeholder Representation Leads to Faultlines. A Study of Board Service Performance in Social Enterprises”, Journal of Management Studies, 53(5): 768～793.
[24]
Finkelstein, S., 1992, “Power in Top Management Teams: Dimensions, Measurement, and Validation”, The Academy of Management Journal, 35(3): 505～538.
[25]
Fracassi, C., and Tate, G., 2012, “External Networking and Internal Firm Governance”, Journal of Finance, 67(1): 153～194.
[26]
Harrison, D. A., and Klein, K. J., 2007, “What's the Difference？ Diversity Constructs as Separation, Variety, or Disparity in Organizations”, Academy of Management Review, 32(4): 1199～1228.
[27]
Hwang, B. H., and Kim, S., 2009, “It Pays to Have Friends”, Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1): 138～158.
[28]
Kaczmarek, S., Kimino, S., and Pye, A., 2012, “Board Task-related Faultlines and Firm Performance: A Decade of Evidence”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(4): 337～351.
[29]
Lau, D. C., and Murnighan, J. K., 1998, “Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The Compositional Dynamics of Organizational Groups”, Academy of Management Review, 23(2): 325～340.
[30]
Lau, D. C., and Murnighan, J. K., 2005, “Interactions within Groups and Subgroups: The Effects of Demographic Faultlines”, Academy of Management Journal, 48(4): 645～659.
[31]
Li, J., and Hambrick, D. C., 2005, “Factional Groups: A New Vantage on Demographic Faultlines, Conflict, and Disintegration in Work Teams”, Academy of Management Journal, 48(5): 794～813.
[32]
Morse, A., Nanda, V., and Seru, A., 2011, “Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs？”, Journal of Finance, 66(5): 1779～1821.
[33]
Schölmerich, F., Schermuly, C. C., and Deller, J., 2016, “How Leaders' Diversity Beliefs Alter the Impact of Faultlines on Team Functioning”, Small Group Research, 47(2): 177～206.
[34]
Spoelma, T. M., and Ellis, A. P. J., 2017, “Fuse or Fracture？ Threat as a Moderator of the Effects of Diversity Faultlines in Teams”, Journal of Applied Psychology, 102(9): 1344～1359.
[35]
Thatcher, S. M., Jehn, K. A., and Zanutto E., 2003, “Cracks in Diversity Research: The Effects of Diversity Faultlines on Conflict and Performance”, Group Decision and Negotiation, 12 (3): 217～241.
[36]
Tuggle, C. S., Schnatterly, K., and Johnson, R. A., 2010, “Attention Patterns in the Boardroom: How Board Composition and Processes Affect Discussion of Entrepreneurial Issues”, Academy of Management Journal, 53(3): 550～571.
[37]
Van Peteghem, M., Bruynseels, L., and Gaeremynck, A., 2018, “Beyond Diversity: A Tale of Faultlines and Frictions in the Board of Directors”, The Accounting Review, 93(2): 339～367.
[38]
Veltrop, D. B., Hermes, N., Postma, T. J. B. M., and Haan, J., 2015, “A Tale of Two Factions: Why and When Factional Demographic Faultlines Hurt Board Performance”, Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23(2): 145～160.
