|
|
|
| The Debt Repayment of the Boxer Indemnity and Its Impacts |
| WANG Xin, ZHANG Yi, WEI Lei
|
Research Bureau, The People's Bank of China;
Yangzhou Central Sub-branch, The People's Bank of China |
|
|
|
Abstract In 1901, the Qing government was forced to sign the “Boxer Protocol” with western countries to pay 450 million “haikwan tael” of silver (the “Boxer Indemnity”). The research on the Boxer Indemnity is quite rich, but there are still some shortcomings. Previous studies are mainly based on traditional data and historical research methods, the application of new historical materials and new methods needs to be extended. Most studies treat the Boxer Indemnity as a separate event and are limited to commenting on the event and its impact, comparisons with other international indemnities of the same era and analysis of its connection with the global economic and financial markets are lacking.
This paper studies the Boxer Indemnity and its impact from the perspective of debt. Based on previous research results and related materials, this paper compiles a flow chart of the Boxer Indemnity payment, and concisely explains the payment process of the Boxer Indemnity. Furthermore, from the perspectives of currency purchasing power and international comparison, it analyzes the equivalence of the Boxer Indemnity to the proportion of economic aggregate and government fiscal revenue, the value of the Boxer Indemnity and its historical influence in public finance, banking, currency and other aspects.
The research findings of this paper include the following. First, the principal of the Boxer Indemnity is equivalent to 4.33 times of the Qing government's fiscal revenue in 1903. However, through the arrangement of debt repayment, the actual amount of the indemnity paid each year gradually decreased in its percentage to the fiscal revenue, avoiding the direct bankruptcy of the Qing government. Second, converted to the 1900 International dollar (Geary-Khamis Dollar) by the purchasing power parity, the Boxer Indemnity accounted for about 2.1% of China's GDP in 1900. In addition, due to the global depreciation of silver in the second half of the 19th century, the proportion of the Boxer Indemnity to the total indemnities in modern China is significantly lower when converted to the purchasing power of rice than in its silver amount. Third, compared with the domestic and foreign debt interest rates of the Chinese government at that time and the long-term sovereign debt interest rates of major countries around 1900, the 4% interest rate of the Boxer Indemnity is at a moderate level. Fourth, compared with Germany's war indemnity after World War I, the principal of the Boxer Indemnity is far lower in its proportion to the total national economic volume. However, China's actual payment each year is higher in its proportion to the fiscal revenue than that of the German indemnity. Unlike the German indemnity, the repayment of which produced unprecedented hyperinflation and exerted a great impact on the German history thereafter, the Boxer Indemnity did not bring hyperinflation to China. The main reason is that China did not have a real central bank and government credit paper money at the time, and the government could not relieve the fiscal pressure by issuing paper money indiscriminately, but the impact of the indemnity on China's financial system was more long-term. At last, the Boxer Indemnity had profound impact on China's finance, banking and currency. In terms of fiscal taxation, the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, which was managed by foreigners, took advantage of the Boxer Indemnity to expand its power, monopolized China's most important source of tax revenue and became “the second fiscal authority” independent from the Chinese government. In the financial market, foreign banks further strengthened their financial privileges and market advantages by handling the Boxer Indemnity business, and established their status as “recessive central banks” in China. In particular, the power expansion of the HSBC and the Citibank is the most obvious. In terms of currency, the Boxer Indemnity did not change the “old system” of China's chaotic currency system, but gave birth to a “new cycle” and “new crisis” in currency circulation, which became an important fuse for the Shanghai “rubber wave” (financial crisis) in 1910.
Based on the above findings, this paper shows that the debt settlement of war reparations in modern history was not only dominated by political and diplomatic situations, but was also closely related to the transnational operations of financial institutions, especially banks. The economic impacts of war reparations depend not only on the total repayment amount, but also on the ability to govern the economy and the fiscal and financial systems.
|
|
Received: 15 March 2020
Published: 04 March 2021
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] |
(德国)科佩尔·平森,1987,《德国近现代史》,商务印书馆,第597页。
|
| [2] |
(美国)费正清(编),中国社会科学院历史研究所编译室译,2006年,《剑桥中国晚清史(下卷)》,中国社会科学出版社,第9页。
|
| [3] |
(美国)霍默等,2010,《利率史(第四版)》,中信出版社。
|
| [4] |
(日本)滨下武志,朱荫贵、欧阳菲译,1999年,《近代中国的国际契机:朝贡贸易体系与近代亚洲经济圈》,中国社会科学出版社。
|
| [5] |
(英国)安格斯·麦迪森,2003,《世界经济千年史》,北京大学出版社。
|
| [6] |
(英国)安格斯·麦迪森,2011,《中国经济的长期表现:960-2030年》,北京大学出版社,第157页。
|
| [7] |
戴建兵,2012,《中国近代的白银核心型货币体系1890-1935》,《中国社会科学》,第9期,189～205页。
|
| [8] |
戴建兵,2007,《隐性中央银行:甲午战争前后的外商银行》,《安徽师范大学学报(人文社会科学版)》,第3期,第277～285页。
|
| [9] |
邓绍辉,1997,《晚清赋税结构的演变》,《四川师范大学学报社会科学版》第10期,第104～112页。
|
| [10] |
顾维钧,1983,《顾维钧回忆录》,第1分册,中华书局,第284、第306页。
|
| [11] |
海关总署研究室编译,1983,《中国海关与庚子赔款》,中华书局。
|
| [12] |
洪葭管,1964,《从汇丰银行看帝国主义对旧中国的金融统治》,《学术月刊》第4期, 第35～47页。
|
| [13] |
洪葭管,2003,《上海金融志》,上海社会科学院出版社。
|
| [14] |
侯中军,2014,《庚子赔款筹议方式比较研究》,《清史研究》第2期,第102～110 页。
|
| [15] |
姜建清和蒋立场,2016,《近代中国外商银行史》,中信出版社。
|
| [16] |
金星晔、管汉晖、李稻葵和BROADBERRY Stephen, 2019,《中国在世界经济中相对地位的演变(公元1000-2017年):对麦迪森估算的修正》,《经济研究》第7期,第14～29页。
|
| [17] |
金源云和李国强,2017,《鸦片战争赔款实付银两数额再研究》,《河北大学学报》第1期,第86～91页。
|
| [18] |
蒋立场和王丽,2008,《试论清末十年金融市场之嬗变》,《中国矿业大学学报(社会科学版)》,第3期,第108～111页。
|
| [19] |
李稻葵,金星晔和管汉晖, 2017,《中国历史GDP核算及国际比较:文献综述》,《经济学报》,第4卷第2期,第14～36页。
|
| [20] |
刘逖,2010,《前近代中国总量经济研究(1600-1840)》,上海世纪出版集团,第224～225页。
|
| [21] |
梁义群,1992,《庚子赔款与晚清财政的崩溃》,《社会科学辑刊》第3期,第106～110页。
|
| [22] |
毛里斯·柯立斯,1979,《汇丰银行百年史》,中华书局。
|
| [23] |
宓汝成,1997,《庚子赔款的债务化及其清偿、“退还”和总清算》,《近代史研究》第5期,第41～77页。
|
| [24] |
宓汝成,1999,《庚款“退款”及其管理和利用》,《近代史研究》第6期,第64~100页。
|
| [25] |
彭信威,1988,《中国货币史》,上海人民出版社。
|
| [26] |
戚其章,1998,《甲午战争赔款问题考实》,《历史研究》第3期,第65～78页。
|
| [27] |
寿充一和寿乐英,1996,《外商银行在中国》,中国文史出版社,第16页。
|
| [28] |
申学锋,2002,清代财政收入规模与结构变化述论,《北京社会科学》第1期,第84-90页。
|
| [29] |
孙涛,2017,《1890至1912年日本军费政策研究》,渤海大学硕士论文,第27~28页。
|
| [30] |
陶思曾,《藏輶随记》, 吴丰培,《川藏游踪汇编 》,1985, 四川民族出版社,第365页。
|
| [31] |
王铁崖,1957,《中外旧约章汇编(第一卷)》,三联书店。
|
| [32] |
王玉茹、燕红忠和付红,2009,《近代中国新式银行业的发展与实力变化》,《金融研究》第9期,第175～191页。
|
| [33] |
王树槐,1984,《庚子赔款》,台北“中央研究院”近代史研究所。
|
| [34] |
巫宝三,1947,《中国国民所得1933修正》,《社会科学杂志》第9 卷 2 期。
|
| [35] |
徐义生编,1962,《中国近代外债史统计资料.1853-1927》,中华书局。
|
| [36] |
许道夫,1983,《中国近代农业生产及贸易统计资料》,上海人民出版社,第89页。
|
| [37] |
薛鹏志,1998,《中国海关与庚子赔款谈判》,《近代史研究》第1期,第171～185页。
|
| [38] |
杨荫溥,1985,《民国财政史》,中国财政经济出版社。
|
| [39] |
袁成毅,1999,《中国对日庚子赔款述略》,《抗日战争研究》第4期,第41～55页。
|
| [40] |
张国辉,1986,《二十世纪初期的中国钱庄和票号》,《中国经济史研究》第1期,第127～146页。
|
| [41] |
朱懋铎,1990,《第一次世界大战后的德国赔款问题》,《山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》第10期,第19～47页。
|
| [42] |
周育民,1990,《试论息借商款和昭信股票》,《上海师范大学学报(社科版)》第1期,第70～74页。
|
| [43] |
中国人民银行参事室编,1991,《中国清代外债史资料(1853-1911)》,中国金融出版社。
|
| [44] |
中国人民银行金融研究所,1990,《美国花旗银行在华史料》,中国金融出版社,第47页。
|
| [45] |
中国人民银行上海市分行,1960,《上海钱庄史料》,上海人民出版社,第188页。
|
| [46] |
Bureau of Economic Analysis,2009,The Annual Consumer Price Index for the United States, 1774-2008, Measuring Worth.
|
| [47] |
King, F. H.2006, The Boxer Indemnity: Nothing but Bad,Modern Asian Studies,Vol.40,No.3,(7),pp663～689.
|
| [48] |
Gavin,M.1991,“Inter Temporal Dimensions of International Economic Adjustment: Evidence from the Franco－Prussian War Indemnity”.American Economic Review,Vole.82(2),pp.174~179.
|
| [49] |
Rawski,T.G,1989,“Economic Growth in Prewar China”,University of California Press, Berkeley Los Angeles, Oxford,p.394.
|
| [50] |
Eugene, W.N.2001,Making the French Pay: The Costs and Consequences of the Napoleonic Reparations, European Review of Economic History,5,pp351.
|
|
|
|
