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| Who Can Dominant Chinese Catastrophe Insurance Construction and Development: Government or Market? Based on Dynamic Path Dependence Evolutionary Analysis |
| ZHUO Zhi, DUAN Sheng
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Shandong University of Finance and Economics;
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
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Abstract Based on the assumption, this paper build a dynamic game model to analyze the evolution and development of catastrophe insurance system by information economics evolutionary game path method.The results showed that:in the initial stage, institutional framework and operating rules under the government dominate nation can play a better overall efficiency and can achieve stable equilibrium. But if the government lasting dominated catastrophe insurance system, it will seriously distort the market mechanism and institutional system operating efficiency will also be significantly reduced. Thus suggests, government intervene catastrophe insurance system should be moderate; the main duty for government is cultivate the insurance market players and improve the effectiveness for government incentives.
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Received: 22 February 2016
Published: 01 January 1900
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