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| Negative Media Coverage and Bank Lending: A Dual Perspective of Information Intermediary and External Monitoring |
| SUN Sha, GONG Qian, PAN Qi, FAN Jing
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| International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies University; School of Finance, Central University of Finance and Economics |
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Abstract The steady growth of the real economy relies on the support of the financial system. As the core business of the banking industry, bank lending plays a pivotal role in boosting the development of the real economy. Therefore, exploring the factors that influence bank lending is of great practical significance. Media coverage, as a vital information intermediary, plays a key role in market discipline. Existing studies mainly focus on the role of media in the external governance of non-financial enterprises, or examine how media coverage affects bank risks and stock prices, while the impact of media coverage on bank lending remains underexplored. Meanwhile, research on the factors influencing bank lending has largely centered on macroeconomic policies, local government intervention, and bank-specific characteristics, failing to systematically investigate the role of media. In this context, this paper focuses on exploring the impact of negative media coverage on banks' loan growth and credit allocation.
Drawing on the perspectives of information intermediary and external monitoring, this paper constructs an analytical framework to examine how negative media coverage influences bank lending. First, as an information intermediary, negative media coverage discloses unfavorable information about banks. This triggers a crisis of confidence among depositors and participants in interbank and capital markets, increasing financing difficulty and thereby suppressing lending. Second, its external monitoring role amplifies reputational loss and increases the likelihood of regulatory penalties. On the one hand, it forces banks to adopt more prudent operations, thereby reducing banks' loan growth. On the other hand, it intensifies compliance pressures, prompting banks to better align with policies and, consequently, reducing lending to non-real economy sectors.
Empirically, this study uses a sample of A-share listed commercial banks in China from Q1 2010 to Q4 2023. Data on negative media coverage are obtained from the Datago news database, and bank-level financial data from BankFocus and CSMAR. Results indicate that negative coverage reduces banks' total loan growth and restrains lending to non-real economy sectors. Mechanism tests reveal that negative media coverage increases banks' financing difficulties by disclosing adverse information and strengthens prudential operation through external monitoring, thereby constraining overall loan growth. Additionally, its external monitoring role curbs non-real economy lending by intensifying compliance pressures. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that total loan growth is mainly affected by market-oriented media, whereas non-real economy lending is more strongly influenced by policy-oriented media. Original news reports exert a more pronounced impact. With respect to total loan growth, state-owned and rural commercial banks are more responsive to negative coverage, while city commercial banks show the largest decline in non-real economy lending. Further analysis shows that banks' internal governance moderates the impact of negative media coverage. The effect is stronger for banks with higher ownership concentration, larger state-owned shareholding, non-dual leadership structure, a higher proportion of female directors, and lower executive compensation. As an external governance mechanism, media complements external auditors but acts as a substitute for financial regulation.
This study confirms the critical role media plays in banks' external governance systems, particularly in promoting prudent operations and encouraging banks to better serve the real economy. Accordingly, we propose the following policy implications. First, banks should incorporate negative media coverage into risk governance frameworks, strengthening monitoring and ensuring timely response to negative coverage. Second, financial regulators should value and make full use of media information to understand banks' operating conditions more comprehensively. In the event of negative coverage, regulators should respond promptly and guide public opinion rationally. Third, policymakers should improve norms for banking media coverage and encourage independent, original, in-depth reporting to strengthen the media's external governance effectiveness.
The main contributions are threefold. First, by exploring the potential constraining effect of negative media coverage on bank lending, this study expands the literature on both banks' external governance and the determinants of bank lending. Second, it empirically examines the interactive relationships between the media and other internal and external governance mechanisms, providing valuable empirical evidence for constructing more effective and comprehensive bank governance systems. Third, it offers a new perspective on the role of the media as an external governance mechanism, demonstrating that the media can play a positive role in optimizing the allocation of financial resources and improving the quality and efficiency of financial services for the real economy.
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Received: 09 June 2025
Published: 24 April 2026
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