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| Government Accounting Supervision and Corporate Credit Ratings:Evidence from the Random Inspection of Accounting Information Quality by the Ministry of Finance |
| ZHU Jigao, ZHANG Haoyue
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| Business School, University of International Business and Economics |
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Abstract To strengthen the institutional development of the capital market, it is essential to enhance external supervision mechanisms. In light of persistent accounting irregularities, a thorough investigation into how accounting supervision can be deployed more effectively is warranted. While prior research has largely examined listed firms, focusing on how regulatory scrutiny influences inspected entities and generates corrective spillovers across the market, this study shifts attention to the bond market. Specifically, we explore the impact of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) random inspections of accounting information quality on both listed and non-listed bond-issuing firms.
Credit ratings provided by rating agencies constitute a critical information source in the bond market. Higher-quality accounting information generally leads to more favorable credit ratings, which, in turn, reduces the yield required by bond investors. The MOF random inspections of accounting information quality can thus be regarded as a significant form of external supervision in the bond market. A key question, therefore, is whether this supervision effectively complements the existing regulatory framework of bonds.
This study examines two channels through which MOF random inspections of accounting information quality may affect corporate credit ratings: an information effect and a catering effect. On one hand, the inspection process supplies credible new information to rating agencies, thereby improving assessment accuracy, particularly for firms with higher accounting transparency. On the other hand, rating agencies may engage in rating catering, strategically inflating ratings to accommodate inspected issuers, potentially undermining rating objectivity.
To estimate the effect of MOF random inspections of accounting information quality on bond issuers' credit ratings, we employ a Difference-in-Differences (DID) design, supplemented by a combined Propensity Score Matching and DID (PSM-DID) approach. Our sample covers both listed and non-listed bond-issuing firms from 2008 to 2023. Based on official MOF random inspections announcements of accounting information quality, we identify 80 bond issuers that underwent random inspections, including 46 listed and 34 non-listed firms. Firms selected for inspection constitute the treatment group, whereas those not inspected form the control group.
The results indicate that credit ratings improve significantly following the announcement of MOF random inspections. This effect is stronger among issuers with higher accounting transparency, while we find no statistically significant evidence of rating catering. Moreover, the effect is significant only in the subsamples of firms without tax violations, firms that have completed required rectifications, listed firms, and issuers experiencing financial distress. Furthermore, MOF random inspections of accounting information quality are associated with reduced rating divergence across agencies. Taken together, these findings suggest that MOF random inspections exert a meaningful governance effect on bond-issuing firms. This study offers practical insights for improving both credit rating practices in capital markets and the effectiveness of government accounting supervision.
The policy implications of this study are threefold. First, continue advancing the core tasks of government accounting supervision to mitigate debt risks. Conduct targeted inspections of enterprises in financial distress. Establish threshold-based alert mechanisms within accounting supervision, calibrated according to industry-specific characteristics and credit ratings of bond-issuing firms. Second, a transparent platform should be developed to enhance the market's information environment. The platform would mandatorily disclose corporate remedial actions, with its follow-up mechanisms particularly focused on monitoring non-listed issuers. Third, a horizontally coordinated supervision framework should be established by enhancing information sharing between the MOF and financial intermediaries. This would provide robust support for the accurate identification of credit risks among bond issuers.
This paper highlights the beneficial effects of government accounting supervision on credit rating agencies and illustrates the governance efficacy of this supervision at the bond-issuer level. Future research could examine the synergistic effects and underlying mechanisms of accounting supervision in combination with other regulatory instruments, such as audit supervision.
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Received: 01 June 2025
Published: 27 February 2026
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