|
|
|
| Financial Supervision, Establishment of Wealth Management Subsidiaries and Expansion of Macroprudential Management |
| GAO Jiechao, FAN Conglai, JIA Pengfei, YANG Yuanyuan
|
School of International Business, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics;
Business School, Nanjing University;
School of Finance, Nanjing Audit University |
|
|
|
Abstract The research motivation of this paper initially stems from the literatures' lag in capturing the development of the real world. The latest reality in China is that, with the continuous advancement of strict financial supervision, the rigid redemption of off-balance-sheet wealth management products has been broken. Independently operated wealth management subsidiaries have become the main players in this market. Wealth management is no longer an off-balance-sheet channel for commercial banks to evade regulation. This phenomenon has not yet been captured by existing literatures.
From the perspective of China's macro policy evolution, the expansion of macroprudential management is an important direction. In the past, financial supervision focused on improving microprudential supervision. In the future, how to further improve macroprudential management will be an important task. The 2023 Central Financial Work Conference proposed to comprehensively strengthen financial supervision and legally bring all financial activities under regulation. In 2024, the Macroprudential Management Bureau of the People's Bank of China pointed out that the central bank will further strengthen macroprudential management, and on the basis of taking banking financial institutions as the key objects of macroprudential management, gradually include major financial activities, financial markets, financial infrastructure and non-banking financial institutions into macroprudential management.
The research background of this paper mainly includes two aspects: First, the main investors in the wealth management market are individuals, mostly with low-risk preference, which is very similar to the deposit market. The established wealth management subsidiaries have become the main body of the wealth management market. As deposit interest rates continue to decline, the competition between wealth management products and deposits on the household side has become increasingly fierce. In terms of the use of funds, wealth management products provide a huge amount of funds for the real economy by investing in bonds, non-standardized bonds, unlisted equities and other assets, forming a complement to bank credit. Second, macroprudential management has not yet covered the wealth management market. At present, the supervision of wealth management subsidiaries mainly relies on microprudential documents such as the Measures for the Administration of Wealth Management Subsidiaries of Commercial Banks, lacking specialized macroprudential management.
This paper establishes a parallel financial structure including commercial banks and wealth management subsidiaries within a DSGE model. It uses macroeconomic time series data from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2023 to conduct Bayesian estimation of the structural model, and employs counterfactual simulation methods to analyze the effects after incorporating wealth management subsidiaries into macroprudential management. The research findings show that, when macroprudential management is implemented on wealth management subsidiaries with increasing intensity, the volatilities of all major macroeconomic variables become lower. Under the dual-pillar regulatory framework, the expansion of macroprudential management will not conflict with the monetary policy, and there will be more flexible choices for the coordination between the two policies.
This paper puts forward the following policy implications: First, wealth management subsidiaries should be incorporated into macroprudential management as soon as possible, and the intensity of countercyclical adjustments should be strengthened. This adjustment can significantly reduce macroeconomic fluctuations and expand the policy space of the dual-pillar regulation. Second, an expansion mechanism of macroprudential management can be established to hedge against excessive fluctuations in the local economy, thereby better balancing long term structural adjustments and short-term economic stability, considering the continuous reduction of shadow banking under strict financial supervision and the gradual relaxation of housing financial constraints by the government. Third, further consideration should focus on incorporating non-banking financial institutions into macroprudential management in a larger scope in an orderly and steady manner.
|
|
Received: 21 October 2024
Published: 01 September 2025
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] |
方意、赵胜民和谢晓闻,2012,《货币政策的银行风险承担分析——兼论货币政策与宏观审慎政策协调问题》,《管理世界》第11期,第9～19+56+187页。
|
| [2] |
高然、陈忱、曾辉和龚六堂,2018,《信贷约束、影子银行与货币政策传导》,《经济研究》第12期,第68～82页。
|
| [3] |
郭豫媚、陈伟泽和陈彦斌,2016,《中国货币政策有效性下降与预期管理研究》,《经济研究》第1期,第28～41页。
|
| [4] |
侯成琪和黄彤彤,2020,《影子银行、监管套利与宏观审慎政策》,《经济研究》第7期,第58～75页。
|
| [5] |
侯成琪和龚六堂,2014,《货币政策应该对住房价格波动作出反应吗——基于两部门动态随机一般均衡模型的分析》,《金融研究》第10期,第15～33页。
|
| [6] |
胡志鹏,2016,《影子银行对中国主要经济变量的影响》,《世界经济》第1期,第152～170页。
|
| [7] |
李文喆,2019,《中国影子银行的经济学分析:定义、构成和规模测算》,《金融研究》第3期,第53～73页。
|
| [8] |
李建强、张淑翠、袁佳和魏磊,2019,《影子银行、刚性兑付与宏观审慎政策》,《财贸经济》第1期,第83～97页。
|
| [9] |
李鹏,2019,《中国式影子银行宏观审慎监管:现实挑战与框架改进》,《经济学家》第11期,第93～103页。
|
| [10] |
李雨佳、车明和祝梓翔,2023,《贸易政策不确定性的宏观经济效应研究》,《中国经济问题》第2期,第117～132页。
|
| [11] |
马勇和吕琳,2022,《影子银行、金融监管与宏观稳定》,《管理科学学报》第6期,第1～21页。
|
| [12] |
孟宪春和张屹山,2021,《家庭债务、房地产价格渠道与中国经济波动》,《经济研究》第5期,第75～90页。
|
| [13] |
孟宪春,2023,《房价对家庭债务和财富分布的影响:理论机制与应对策略》,《经济研究》第4期,第171～189页。
|
| [14] |
彭俞超、马思超、王南萱和郑航行,2023,《影子银行监管与银行风险防范》,《经济研究》第8期,第83～99页。
|
| [15] |
裘翔和周强龙,2014,《影子银行与货币政策传导》,《经济研究》第5期,第91～105页。
|
| [16] |
钱雪松、屈伸、康瑾和杜立,2020,《中国影子银行违约风险和防范机制研究——来自上市公司委托贷款数据的经验证据》,《中国管理科学》第7期,第35～44页。
|
| [17] |
孙国峰和贾君怡,2015,《中国影子银行界定及其规模测算——基于信用货币创造的视角》,《中国社会科学》第11期,第92～110+207页。
|
| [18] |
司登奎、葛新宇、曾涛和李小林,2019,《房价波动、金融稳定与最优宏观审慎政策》,《金融研究》第11期,第38～56页。
|
| [19] |
司登奎、李小林和葛新宇,2023,《金融稳定目标下非常规财政政策与宏观审慎政策的协同效应研究》,《统计研究》第6期,第36～48页。
|
| [20] |
中国银保监会课题组,2020,《中国影子银行报告》,《金融监管研究》第11期,第1～23页。
|
| [21] |
赵向琴、杨翱、金昊和陈国进,2022,《商业银行杠杆水平、金融稳定与宏观审慎政策协调》,《财贸经济》第7期,第87～102页。
|
| [22] |
Chen, K. and Y. Wen, 2017, “The Great Housing Boom of China”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 9(2), pp.73～114.
|
| [23] |
Claessens, S., S. R. Ghosh and R. Mihet, 2013, “ Macro-Prudential Policies to Mitigate Financial System Vulnerabilities”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 39, pp. 153～185.
|
| [24] |
Dong, F., Y. Guo, Y. Peng and Z. Xu, 2021, “Economic Slowdown and Housing Dynamics in China: A Tale of Two Investments by Firms”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 54(6), pp.1839～1874.
|
| [25] |
Farhi, E. and J. Tirole, 2021, “Shadow Banking and the Four Pillars of Traditional Financial Intermediation”, The Review of Economic Studies, 88(6), pp.2622～2653.
|
| [26] |
Fernández-Villaverde, J., P. Guerrón-Quintana, K. Kuester and J. Rubio-Ramírez, 2015, “Fiscal Volatility Shocks and Economic Activity”, American Economic Review, 105(11): pp. 3352～3384.
|
| [27] |
Fève, P., A. Moura, O. Pierrard, 2019, “Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation: A Small-scale DSGE Perspective”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 101, pp. 130～144.
|
| [28] |
Gebauer, S. and F. Mazelis, 2023, “Macroprudential Regulation and Leakage to the Shadow Banking Sector”, European Economic Review, 154, pp.1～26.
|
| [29] |
Iacoviello, M., 2005, “House Prices, Borrowing Constraints and Monetary Policy in the Business Cycle”, American Economic Review, 95, pp. 739～764.
|
| [30] |
Iacoviello, M. and S. Neri, 2010, “Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from an Estimated DSGE Model”, American Economic Journal:Macroeconomics, 2, pp.125～164.
|
| [31] |
Liu, Z., P. Wang and T. Zha, 2013, “Land-price Dynamics and Macroeconomic Fluctuations”, Econometrica, 81, pp.1147～1184.
|
| [32] |
Meeks, R., B. Nelson and P. Alessandri, 2017, “Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 49(7), pp.1483～1516.
|
| [33] |
Mazelis, F., 2014, “Monetary Policy Effects on Financial Intermediation via the Regulated and the Shadow Banking Systems”, Sfb Discussion Papers.
|
| [34] |
Tayler, W. J. and R. Zilberman, 2016, “Macroprudential Regulation, Credit Spreads and the Role of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Financial Stability, 26, pp. 144～158.
|
| [35] |
Verona, F., M. Martins and I. Drumond, 2013, “(Un) anticipated Monetary Policy in a DSGE Model with a Shadow Banking System”, International Journal of Central Banking, 9(3), pp. 73～117.
|
| [36] |
Yang, L., S. Van. Wijnbergen, X. Qi and Y. Yi, 2019, “Chinese Shadow Banking, Financial Regulation and Effectiveness of Monetary Policy”, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 57, pp. 1～28.
|
| [37] |
Zhang, J., 2020, “Shadow Banking and Optimal Capital Requirements”, Review of Economic Dynamics, 38, pp. 296～325.
|
|
|
|
