|
|
|
| Corporate Reputation and Violations: New Findings from the Perspective of the Digital Economy |
| ZHAO Jingmei, HE Baolu
|
| School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics |
|
|
|
Abstract Corporate compliance constitutes a fundamental pillar of high-quality firm development and serves as the microfoundation for stable capital markets and sustainable economic growth. While government regulation remains the primary instrument for deterring corporate misconduct, the digital era has witnessed increasingly sophisticated, diverse, and concealed violations that strain traditional regulatory approaches. This regulatory dilemma underscores the urgency to cultivate firms' intrinsic incentives for compliance.
Reputational mechanisms, as a market-based disciplinary force, theoretically influence corporate behavior through the accumulation and depletion of reputational capital. Yet existing literature presents a paradox: the “maintenance hypothesis” posits that strong reputations deter misconduct, whereas the “opportunism hypothesis” suggests established reputations may instead shield wrongdoing. The effectiveness of reputational governance is closely tied to the external economic conditions—a relationship that remains underexplored. The rise of digital infrastructure offers an ideal setting to re-examine this issue, as in digital contexts, reputational signals are more authentic, widespread and widely applied, better aligning with the ideal conditions assumed by the reputation maintenance theories. Drawing on China's digital transformation as a natural laboratory, this study examines how technological and market evolution shape the efficacy of reputational mechanisms, using corporate misconduct as the empirical lens.
Utilizing a comprehensive dataset of Chinese A-share listed firms from authoritative databases including Datago, CSMAR, and CNRDS, this study documents the limited deterrence effect of reputation in traditional economic settings, where high-and low-reputation firms exhibit statistically indistinguishable violation probabilities, suggesting the ineffectiveness of reputational descipline. However, China's “Broadband China” initiative—a nationwide digital infrastructure rollout—provides a quasi-natural experiment that reveals striking heterogeneity. Employing a triple-difference design spanning 2009-2022, we find that regions with more enhanced digital infrastructure, reputational mechanisms exert greater constraint on corporate misconduct. Firms headquartered in pilot cities with advanced digital networks demonstrate markedly lower violation probabilities conditional on reputation levels. This disciplinary effect intensifies among firms with greater market visibility, those in competitive industries, and those producing goods with low product transparency. Mechanism tests indicate digital development operates through dual channels: (1) amplifying the economic value of reputation by easing financing constraints, and (2) intensifying external monitoring through reputational “spotlight effects” that increase detection risks. Event studies further confirm heightened market penalties for violations in digitalized environments, with reputational damage triggering more severe stock price declines.
Three actionable insights emerge for policymakers and firms: First, regulators should integrate reputational mechanisms with conventional oversight through technology-enabled solutions. Blockchain and big data analytics can optimize the collection and disclosure of reputational information, and explore a reputation-based, tiered regulatory model that embeds reputation assessments into public procurement and credit policies, thereby fostering market-driven compliance incentives. Second, safeguarding the integrity of reputational markets requires coordinated efforts to ensure transparent public oversight channels, combat information manipulation, and establish digital traceability systems with strengthened platform accountability. Third, corporations should prioritize reputation management as a strategic asset. Integrating reputation stewardship into long-term planning through (1) compliance culture building, (2) public opinion monitoring systems, and (3) proactive ESG disclosures enables organizations to systematically mitigate reputational risks while accumulating valuable reputational capital. This holistic approach strengthens competitive positioning in the digital economy where intangible assets increasingly determine market value.
This study advances the literature in three dimensions. Theoretically, it transcends the static “effective-ineffective” dichotomy of reputational discipline by unveiling its dynamic evolution amid technological change, particularly how digitalization recalibrates information efficiency in governance. Practically, this study proposes a novel “digital empowerment+reputational incentives” framework to address the regulatory trilemma of rising enforcement costs, sophisticated violations, and limited resources—a contribution with immediate policy relevance for emerging digital economies. Lastly, as China emerges as a global digital pioneer, this research offers an empirically grounded, institutionally informed analytical framework that enriches cross-border understanding of corporate governance innovation in the digital age. The findings demonstrate how developing economies can leverage technological leapfrogging to build market-disciplined regulatory regimes, providing transferable insights for international governance reform.
|
|
Received: 14 March 2024
Published: 01 August 2025
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] |
陈国进、林辉和王磊,2005,《公司治理、声誉机制和上市公司违法违规行为分析》,《南开管理评论》第6期,第35～40页。
|
| [2] |
陈金、孙晓、刘力钢和邵剑兵,2024,《中国上市旅游企业社会责任对违规行为的影响——不同经济发展阶段的异质性作用》,《南开管理评论》第1期,第106～117页。
|
| [3] |
陈雪、孙慧莹、王雨鹏、杨金娟和陈丹妮,2021,《媒体声誉与企业债务融资——基于媒体文本情绪大数据的证据》,《中央财经大学学报》第1期,第54～69页。
|
| [4] |
高昊宇和温慧愉,2021,《生态法治对债券融资成本的影响——基于我国环保法庭设立的准自然实验》,《金融研究》第12期,第133～151页。
|
| [5] |
顾雷雷、郭建鸾和王鸿宇,2020,《企业社会责任、融资约束与企业金融化》,《金融研究》第2期,第109～127页。
|
| [6] |
管考磊和张蕊,2019,《企业声誉与盈余管理:有效契约观还是寻租观》,《会计研究》第1期,第59～64页。
|
| [7] |
黄益平和邱晗,2021,《大科技信贷:一个新的信用风险管理框架》,《管理世界》第2期,第12～21页。
|
| [8] |
黄卓、陶云清和王帅,2023,《社会信用环境改善降低了企业违规吗？——来自“中国社会信用体系建设”的证据》,《金融研究》第5期,第96～114页。
|
| [9] |
江小涓和黄颖轩,2021,《数字时代的市场秩序、市场监管与平台治理》,《经济研究》第12期,第20～41页。
|
| [10] |
江轩宇、朱琳和伊志宏,2021,《网络舆论关注与企业创新》,《经济学(季刊)》第1期,第113～134页。
|
| [11] |
李从刚和许荣,2020,《保险治理与公司违规——董事高管责任保险的治理效应研究》,《金融研究》第6期,第188～206页。
|
| [12] |
李建军和范源源,2020,《光环之下:纳税声誉能否提升企业税收遵从》,《当代财经》第8期,第28～40页。
|
| [13] |
李焰和王琳,2013,《媒体监督、声誉共同体与投资者保护》,《管理世界》第11期,第130～143页。
|
| [14] |
卢向华和冯越,2009,《网络口碑的价值——基于在线餐馆点评的实证研究》,《管理世界》第7期,第126～132页。
|
| [15] |
孟庆斌、邹洋和侯德帅,2019,《卖空机制能抑制上市公司违规吗？》,《经济研究》第6期,第89～105页。
|
| [16] |
田鸽和张勋,2022,《数字经济、非农就业与社会分工》,《管理世界》第5期,第72～84页。
|
| [17] |
王俊和龙小宁,2020,《驰名商标认定机制对企业经营与创新绩效的影响》,《经济科学》第2期,第61～73页。
|
| [18] |
吴元元,2012,《信息基础、声誉机制与执法优化——食品安全治理的新视野》,《中国社会科学》第6期,第115～133页。
|
| [19] |
Benabou, R., and Laroque, G., 1992. “Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 921～958.
|
| [20] |
Deephouse, D. L., 2000. “Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: an Integration of Mass Communication and Resource-based Theories”, Journal of Management, 26(6), 1091～1112.
|
| [21] |
Fama, E. F., 1980. “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288～307.
|
| [22] |
Gambacorta, L., Huang, Y., Li, Z., Qiu, H., and Chen, S., 2023. “Data Versus Collateral”, Review of Finance, 27(2), 369～398.
|
| [23] |
Goldfarb, A., and Tucker, C., 2019. “Digital Economics”, Journal of Economic Literature, 57(1), 3～43.
|
| [24] |
Hörner, J., 2002. “Reputation and Competition”, American Economic Review, 92(3), 644～663.
|
| [25] |
Khanna, V., Kim, E. H., and Lu, Y., 2015. “CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud”, Journal of Finance, 70(3), 1203～1252.
|
| [26] |
Kreps, D. M., and Wilson, R., 1982. “Reputation and Imperfect iInformation”, Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253～279.
|
| [27] |
La Ferrara, E., Chong, A., and Duryea, S., 2012. “Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence From Brazil”, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 4(4), 1～31.
|
| [28] |
Mailath, G. J., and Samuelson, L., 2001. “Who Wants a Good Reputation？”, Review of Economic Studies, 68(2), 415～441.
|
| [29] |
Mathis, J., Mcandrews, J., and Rochet, J., 2009. “Rating the Raters: are Reputation Concerns Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies？”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(5), 657～674.
|
| [30] |
Mishina, Y., Block, E. S., and Mannor, M. J., 2012. “The Path Dependence of Organizational Reputation: How Social Jjudgment Influences Assessments of Capability and Character”, Strategic Management Journal, 33(5), 459～477.
|
| [31] |
Nelson, P., 1974. “Advertising as Information”, Journal of Political Economy, 82(4), 729～754.
|
| [32] |
Tadelis, S., 1999. “What's in a Name？ Reputation as a tradeable asset”, American Economic Review, 89(3), 548～563.
|
| [33] |
Wei, J., Ouyang, Z., and Chen, H. A., 2017. “Well Known or Well liked？ The Effects of Corporate Reputation on Firm Value at the Onset of a Corporate Crisis”, Strategic Management Journal, 38(10), 2103～2120.
|
|
|
|
