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| Local Government Correlated Borrowing and Non-local Enterprise Investment |
| MAO Jie, LIU Yong
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| School of International Trade and Economics,University of International Business and Economics |
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Abstract In the 1990s, the socialist market economy system with Chinese characteristics was gradually established, and reforms in the fiscal and financial sectors continued to deepen, leading to changes in the ways and methods that local governments used to promote economic and social development. A prominent manifestation was that local governments no longer focused solely on developing local state-owned enterprises but instead prioritized in attracting non-local enterprise investment. Development models such as the “Southern Jiangsu Model” emerged, with regions beginning to compete to attract high-quality enterprise resources through infrastructure construction. Since 2008, with the support of proactive fiscal policies and loose monetary policies, local governments have relied on local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) to raise funds for infrastructure construction, providing strong financial support for improving the investment environment and promoting regional economic development. At the same time, local governments' use of LGFVs to incur debt formed a development model different from the past, characterized by the embedding of local government debt into investment attraction competition strategies, making it an important tool for local governments to implement development strategies. As local government debt acquired a competitive attribute, local governments have strong incentives to engage in correlated borrowing, leading to a peer effect in local government borrowing and resulting in disorderly expansion and risk accumulation of local government debt. Moreover, regions with higher debt often transfer debt repayment pressures to market entities through various means, crowding out social investment, which contradicts the original intent of development models like the “Southern Jiangsu Model”. Given this, it is necessary to deeply study the intrinsic relationship between local government correlated borrowing and non-local enterprise investment to provide references for achieving a long-term balance between stable growth and risk prevention.
This paper measures the level of local government correlated borrowing and, based on this, studies its impact on non-local enterprise investment and its mechanisms, while also analyzing the limitations of local government correlated borrowing from multiple dimensions. The research results show that when a region's level of correlated borrowing is higher compared to other regions, it significantly encourages non-local listed companies to invest locally, aiding in local economic growth. However, whether local government correlated borrowing can promote non-local enterprise investment is influenced by factors such as the use of debt funds, borrowing methods, and debt utilization efficiency. Further research indicates that local government correlated borrowing “crowds in” and “crowds out” non-local enterprise investment through local infrastructure and fiscal effort, with the “crowding-in effect” being stronger. The analysis of the limitations of local government correlated borrowing shows that its positive effects on non-local enterprise investment and local economic development have a threshold. Once local government debt exceeds this threshold, the direction of correlated borrowing's impact on non-local enterprise investment and local economic development reverses, turning negative.
The marginal contributions of this paper include: first, from the perspective of investment attraction, it deeply analyzes local government correlated borrowing behavior and finds that such borrowing “crowds in” or “crowds out” non-local capital through infrastructure levels and fiscal effort, with the “crowding-in effect” being stronger. Second, it thoroughly analyzes the limitations of local government correlated borrowing from multiple dimensions. This paper finds that the sustainability of the investment attraction effect of local government correlated borrowing is influenced by factors such as debt scale, use of debt funds, and utilization efficiency, and excessive reliance on local government debt to attract investment will prove counterproductive. Third, drawing on existing literature, this paper scientifically measures the level of local government correlated borrowing, providing a foundation for further in-depth research on local government correlated borrowing behavior. Fourth, from multiple perspectives, this paper examines the heterogeneity of the impact of local government correlated borrowing on non-local enterprise investment, providing evidence and references for scientifically evaluating local government correlated borrowing behavior and promoting continuous improvement of government investment and financing mechanisms.
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Received: 11 December 2023
Published: 01 February 2025
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