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| Can the Participation of State-owned Directors in Governance Alleviate Information Asymmetry in Private Enterprises？ |
| QIAN Aimin, XIAO Yichen, WU Chuntian
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Business School, University of International Business and Economics;
Business School, Renmin University of China |
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Abstract Improving the information disclosure environment and enhancing the quality of information disclosure are the core of registration system reform and crucial to the capital market's healthy development. Despite this reform emphasizes high-quality information disclosure, issues of information falsification still exist. Thus, alongside external regulation, strengthening internal corporate governance is also essential. The Party and the state attach great importance to the high-quality development of private enterprises, which often exhibit lower disclosure quality and greater information asymmetry. Research suggests that introducing state-owned capital can promote private enterprises' high-quality development. As minority shareholders, state-owned capital provides resource advantages while allowing private sector decision-making to remain intact. State-owned shareholders will also actively perform supervisory and governance responsibilities to protect their interests. However, corporate information disclosure decisions are primarily overseen by the board of directors, and the exact impact of state-owned shareholders' involvement in private enterprise boards has rarely been studied. Whether state-owned shareholders can effectively alleviate information asymmetry through high-level governance is crucial to the effectiveness of reverse mixed-ownership reform in improving the quality of information disclosure in listed companies.
According to relevant provisions in the Company Law, state-owned shareholders have the right to board seats proportional to their shareholding. By appointing directors to participate in corporate decision-making and supervising management's actions, state-owned shareholders can mitigate potential misconduct by major shareholders, enhance board efficiency and regulatory compliance, and reduce opportunistic information disclosure by major shareholders and management, thus improving the quality of information disclosure and alleviates information asymmetry.
In the financing market, state-owned capital participation and board appointments signal the strong company credentials, offering robust credit endorsement and easing financing for private enterprises. State-appointed executives protect the interests of minority state-owned shareholders by opposing unfavorable proposals, addressing concerns about resource control due to dispersed shareholding. Stable capital flow enhances private enterprises' resilience against external uncertainties and boosts their growth potential. During this process, private enterprises improve information disclosure to convey positive operational signals, further enhancing their market competitiveness.
This study uses A-share private listed companies from 2008 to 2020 as research samples, performing propensity score matching between samples with and without state-appointed directors to eliminate the impact of differences in state-owned shareholder ownership. The study finds that the involvement of state-owned shareholders in private enterprises' boards effectively alleviates information asymmetry, with more significant effects observed in private enterprises with low minority shareholder governance participation, weak media supervision, and less intense market competition. Further analysis reveals that state-appointed directors contribute to information governance through supervisory and resource effects, with those having financial or legal backgrounds and relatively younger state-appointed directors having a more pronounced impact. The economic consequence analysis shows that after state-appointed directors participate in governance, information asymmetry in private enterprises has been alleviated, which helps enhance the accuracy of analysts' forecasts and the efficiency of corporate investments.
Compared to previous literature, this study offers several potential academic contributions. First, it shifts from the perspective of ownership-level diversity to board-level diversity, supplementing the literature on reverse mixed-ownership reform and state-appointed directors governance. Second, it adds to research on impact of mixed ownership in private enterprises on information asymmetry, focusing on the influence of state-owned shareholders' participation in board governance on information disclosure. Third, it further explores the economic consequences of state-owned shareholders' participation in board governance from the perspectives of capital market information intermediation and corporate capital allocation efficiency, enhancing the practical explanatory power of the results.
The conclusions of this study provide insights for policymakers, participants in mixed-ownership reform, and capital market investors. First, integrating these two ownership forms stimulates the institutional complementarity potential to alleviate both types of agency conflicts, and decision-makers should steadfastly advance mixed-ownership reform in private enterprises. Second, mixed ownership reform needs to be substantively implemented at a deeper level, ensuring that state-owned shareholders can appoint directors to participate in high-level decision-making and governance in private enterprises and gain access to necessary internal information. Additionally, actively involving state-appointed directors in corporate governance offers investors a new source of reference information for assessing company quality.
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Published: 01 September 2024
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