|
|
|
| Joint Ownership and Investment Behaviors of Mutual Funds and Stock Crash Risk |
| ZENG Wei, XU Zhong, LI Shangchen, SHEN Ji, WANG Chong
|
China Investment Corporation National;
Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors;
Center for Financial Innovation and Development;
The University of Hong Kong Guanghua School of Management, and Key Laboratory of Mathematical
Economics and Quantitative Finance (Peking University);
Peking UniversityGuanghua School of Management, Peking University |
|
|
|
Abstract China's stock market is facing a severe problem of excessive stock price volatility. The mutual fund industry in China has experienced remarkable growth over the past two decades. In April 2022, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued opinions promoting the high-quality development of the mutual fund industry and emphasized the importance of mutual funds in serving the capital market. However, anecdotal reports of panic selling by mutual funds raise concerns about the potential impact of public mutual funds on the stock price crash risk.
Research primarily focuses on the role of information asymmetry in explaining stock price crash risks, suggesting that institutional investors influence this risk through mechanisms such as corporate governance, collusion, or information mining, which affect the transparency of the information environment and the release of negative news (Chen et al., 2001; Jin and Myers, 2006; Callen and Fang, 2013). However, another direct mechanism, namely competitive trading behavior in response to negative news, may be at play.
To illustrate this new perspective, the paper first constructs a continuous-time trading model with multiple institutional investors. The real-time asset price is set to consist of three important components. The first component represents the trading needs of uninformed noise traders and is modeled as white noise with no drift term. The second component captures the permanent price impact, which is related to inventory in the hands of institutional investors. The third component captures the transitory price pressure from instantaneous trading. Each institutional investor with a mean-variance utility function determines their individual trading speed to maximize the expected payoff in a given period of time. The optimal dynamic trading trajectory for each participant is derived, and the asset price dynamics are characterized as a result of aggregation. Given the total position adjustment for the group of institutional investors, the asset price skewness is then easily obtained as an equilibrium outcome. Using the model, we then study a case wherein the optimal liquidation position for each participant can be endogenized and explore whether the stock holdings distributed among institutional investors may affect the stock price crash risk.
We empirically test hypotheses derived from the theoretical model using quarterly data on reported holdings of stock mutual funds in China from 2010 to 2022. The results show a significant positive correlation between the proportion of fund ownership and the stock price crash risk. When negative signals such as downgrades of stock ratings or earnings forecasts by sell-side analysts occur, funds tend to reduce their holdings. Moreover, a higher proportion of joint ownership among funds leads to a stronger negative market reaction and greater stock price crash risk. To further illustrate the competitive selling mechanism among mutual funds, we analyze the impact of the number of funds holding stock and the concentration of their ownership on stock divestments. Our findings reveal that a higher number of funds holding a stock indicates a stronger willingness to sell in response to negative news, while a higher concentration among holding funds is associated with a lower propensity for competitive selling.
Consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model, we examine how fund characteristics and stock features influence the relationship between fund holdings and the stock price crash risk. The results indicate that the impact of fund holdings on stock price crash risk is stronger when a larger number of funds hold the stock and their shares are more evenly distributed. Additionally, a long investment horizon and reduced short-term performance pressure among holding funds help mitigate the impact of fund holdings on the stock price crash risk. Furthermore, we find that stock return volatility dampens the influence of fund holdings on the stock price collapse risk.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides a new perspective on how the competitive selling behavior of mutual funds in response to negative information increases the stock price crash risk, thereby contributing to the academic debate on the role of institutional investors. Second, it develops a competitive selling model for investors to assess the impacts of fund holding concentration and stock volatility on the stock price crash risk. Third, it finds that the investment horizon and short-term performance pressure are important factors influencing the relationship between fund holdings and the stock price crash risk. These findings not only enrich the empirical discussion on whether mutual funds exacerbate or mitigate the stock price crash risk but also provide valuable insights into the regulation of the mutual fund industry.
|
|
Received: 06 September 2022
Published: 17 July 2024
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
