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Credit Constraints and Household Financial Market Participation |
WANG Yake, LIU Dongya
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School of Banking and Finance, University of International Business and Economics; School of Insurance and Economics, University of International Business and Economics |
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Abstract Since China's reform and opening up, the property income of Chinese households has gradually increased, but its proportion of total income has remained low. In 2021, property income in China increased by 10.2% month-on-month, while the proportion of property income in total income was only 8.8%. The asset structure of Chinese households is relatively homogeneous, with assets highly concentrated in real estate. Meanwhile, the degree of participation in various financial markets is low, and risk-free financial assets are valued more than risky financial assets. Many recent studies examine how Chinese households invest their financial assets and the factors that influence those decisions, such as demographic characteristics (e.g., age and education), background risks (e.g., labor income and health risks), family income, and asset scale. To a certain extent, these studies explain the limited participation of households in financial markets, but most studies ignore the credit constraints households face. Credit constraints are the various restrictions creditors impose on borrowers due to information asymmetry and other factors, such as creditworthiness, financial status, and repayment ability. As a developing country, China's financial markets are not yet mature, and there are serious credit constraints on both the supply and demand sides. Households facing credit constraints are unable to borrow funds and must use savings to meet their financial needs, which negatively affects their income and risk, so they reduce their investment in risky financial assets. Thus, credit constraints have a non-negligible impact on households' financial-asset allocations. However, research on this issue is lacking. Using 2018 China Household Income Project Survey (CHIPs) data, this paper examines how credit constraints affect households' participation in financial markets. The results show that credit constraints have a significant negative effect on the probability and degree of financial market participation in general. Moreover, demand-based credit constraints have a stronger negative impact on households' financial market participation than do supply-based credit constraints. Regarding channels, households that face dual institutional and private credit constraints have a lower probability of holding and a lower weight of risky financial assets compared with households that face only a single type of credit constraint. Regarding intensity, the greater the credit constraints, the lower the probability and degree of household financial market participation. In terms of a mechanism, credit constraints affect households' incomes and risk preferences, which in turn negatively affect their financial market participation. Finally, the effect is stronger for households with low wealth, young and old households with high relative wealth, and middle-aged households. This paper's three main contributions to the literature are as follows. First, it comprehensively and accurately defines credit constraints using CHIP survey data, which extends and enriches the related literature. Second, it distinguishes between supply-based and demand-based credit constraints, institutional and private credit constraints, and the strength of credit constraints and examines their effects on households' financial market participation. Finally, a heterogeneity analysis explores the influence of wealth and age in the effect of credit constraints on households' financial-asset allocations. The results can be used to formulate credit support policies differentiated by wealth level and age.
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Received: 02 May 2022
Published: 07 April 2023
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