|
|
|
| Large Shareholders' Share Pledging and Capital Operations of Listed Companies |
| LU Rong, LAN Yuan
|
School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics;
Shanghai Institute of International Finance and Economic |
|
|
|
Abstract In recent years, it has become common in China's capital market for large shareholders to use stock pledging for financing purposes.However, due to market turbulence, large shareholders are facing a pledge crisis, which has become a hot topic in the capital market and has raised concerns about systemic risk.Stock pledging seems to be a financing behavior of shareholders that is unrelated to their companies.However, because shareholders occupy a special position, once the risk of the pledged stocks is high, it will have a significant impact on the company's control, stock price, operating performance, and information disclosure, among other effects.Therefore, in the face of risk, large shareholders are strongly motivated to take measures to stabilize the company's stock price.
Some scholars have studied the measures adopted by large shareholders, such as information disclosure manipulation or tax evasion.However, these studies have ignored one important aspect: capital operations.In fact, listed companies have often stabilized their share prices through capital operations.
Capital operation refers to the process of adding value to a company through the use of capital market instruments and financial instruments by skillfully operating capital.Capital operations mainly include asset acquisition, equity transfers, asset divestiture, absorption and mergers, debt restructuring, asset replacement, and tender offers.Capital operations are often used by companies, and may be a way for large shareholders to alleviate equity pledge risk.First, in reality, many listed companies suspend trading for long periods due to capital operation uncertainty in attempts to avoid a further decline in their stock price.Second, some studies have shown that capital operations are an effective method for listed companies to increase their excess return.Therefore, we try to answer the following question: when the proportion of large shareholders pledging stocks is high or when the stock price reaches the closing line, will listed companies use capital operations to survive potential risk？ If the answer is yes, how does this affect their capital operations？ Furthermore, what is the mechanism behind large shareholders' use of capital operations to avoid pledge risk？
Based on these questions, we investigate the relationship between stock pledging by large shareholders and capital operations using Chinese A-share listed companies over the 2007-2018 period.The results show that (1) the higher the proportion of stocks pledged, the greater the possibility of capital operations in companies; this relationship is more significant in margin calls and in private listed companies.(2) The mechanism test shows that when the pledge ratio increases, the suspension time after capital operations increases; from the perspective of the effect of stock price promotion, capital operations can improve the stock price and alleviate pledge risk in the short term, but the effect is not significant in the long term.(3) The main types of capital operations in listed companies are equity transfers, asset acquisition, and asset divestiture.Further analysis shows that large shareholders mainly use asset acquisition and asset divestiture to increase the suspension time and use equity transfers to increase the stock price.
We contribute to the literature in the following ways.(1) From the perspective of capital operations, we find new evidence that large shareholders influence the behavior of companies.In addition, one of the main contributions of this study is to identify the mechanism of capital operations to alleviate equity pledge risk, that is, large shareholders can alleviate the pledge crisis by influencing the market reaction and the suspension time of capital operations.(2) We expand relevant research on the suspension of listed companies.So far, the literature has mainly analyzed the economic consequences of suspension.Based on the motivation for the suspension of listed companies, we find that shareholders may use this suspension to realize their own interests.(3) Previous research has mainly focused on the measures taken by companies when faced with stock pledge risk, but there is little discussion of whether these measures can actually address this risk.We provide an answer to this question and find that improving stock prices through capital operations can resolve stock pledge risk in the short term, but the effect is not significant in the long term.
|
|
Received: 25 March 2019
Published: 02 May 2021
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] |
黄登仕、黄禹舜和周嘉南,2018,《控股股东股权质押影响上市公司“高送转”吗？》,《管理科学学报》第12期,第18～36页转94页。
|
| [2] |
郝项超和梁琪,2009,《最终控制人股权质押损害公司价值么？》,《会计研究》第7期,第57～63页转96页。
|
| [3] |
廖珂、崔宸瑜和谢德仁,2018,《控股股东股权质押与上市公司股利政策选择》,《金融研究》第4期,第172～189页。
|
| [4] |
李常青、李宇坤和李茂良,2018,《控股股东股权质押与企业创新投入》,《金融研究》第7期,第143～157页。
|
| [5] |
李常青和幸伟,2018,《控股股东股权质押影响高管薪酬——业绩敏感性吗？》,《经济管理》第5期,第157～174页。
|
| [6] |
李增泉、余谦和王晓坤,2005,《掏空、支持与并购重组——来自我国上市公司的经验证据》,《经济研究》第1期,第95～105页。
|
| [7] |
石阳、刘瑞明和王满仓,2019,《上市公司随意停牌与投资者利益——来自中国资本市场的证据》,《经济研究》第1期,第36～51页。
|
| [8] |
佟岩和王化成,2007,《关联交易、控制权收益与盈余质量》,《会计研究》第4期,第 75～82页转96页。
|
| [9] |
王雄元、欧阳才越和史震阳,2018,《股权质押、控制权转移风险与税收规避》,《经济研究》第1期,第138～152页。
|
| [10] |
王化成、孙健、邓路和卢闯,2010,《控制权转移中投资者过度乐观了吗？》,《管理世界》第2期,第38～45页转186页。
|
| [11] |
谢德仁、郑登津和崔宸瑜,2016,《控股股东股权质押是潜在的“地雷”吗？——基于股价崩盘风险视角的研究》,《管理世界》第5期,第128～140页转188页。
|
| [12] |
叶康涛,2003,《公司控制权的隐性收益——来自中国非流通股转让市场的研究》,《经济科学》第5期,第61～69页。
|
| [13] |
郑国坚、林东杰和林斌,2014,《大股东股权质押、占款与企业价值》,《管理科学学报》第9期,第72～87页。
|
| [14] |
张晓宇和徐龙炳,2017,《限售股解禁、资本运作与股价崩盘风险》,《金融研究》第11期,第 158～174页。
|
| [15] |
Anderson,R.and M.Puleoa,2015,“Insider Share Pledging and Firm Risk”,SWFA2015 Working Paper 165.
|
| [16] |
Asija,A.,V.B .Marisetty and S.Rangan,2014,“Do Insiders Who Pledge Their Shares Manipulate Reported Earnings？” ,Working Paper.
|
| [17] |
Chan,K.,H.Chen,S.Hu and Y.Liu,2018,“Share Pledges and Margin Call Pressure”,Journal of Corporate Finance,52(2018):96～117.
|
| [18] |
Dou, Y.,R.W.Masulis and J.Zein,2019,“Shareholder Wealth Consequences of Insider Pledging of Company Stock as Collateral for Personal Loans ”,The Review of Financial Studies,32(12): 4810～4854.
|
| [19] |
Moeller,S.,F.Schlingemann and R.Stulz,2004,“Firm Size and The Gain from Acquisitins”,Journal of Financial Economics,73(2):201～228.
|
| [20] |
Zingales,L.,1994,“The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience”,The Review of Financial Studies,7(1):125～148.
|
| [21] |
Zhang,H.,2005,“Share Price Performance Following Actual Share Repurchases”,Journal of Banking & Finance,29(7):1887～1901.
|
|
|
|
