|
|
|
| Can Market Discipline Affect Local Government Bonds' Risk Premium？Evidence from the Chengtou Bond Market |
| ZHU Ying, WANG Jian
|
| School of Economics,Huazhong University of Science and Technology |
|
|
|
|
Abstract This paper explores the role of financial markets and fiscal institution design in controlling the risk of local government debt in perspective of Chengtou bonds' risk premium. By taking the 2014 “self-issuing self-paying” pilot implementation as a natural experiment, we employ a difference-in-differences model to identify if market discipline can lower the risk premium of Chengtou bonds. Furthermore, market discipline is more effective in places where the fiscal transparency is higher, and less effective in presence of fiscal imbalance. We conclude that fiscal imbalance and low fiscal transparency weakens the market discipline efficiency. These results have important implications: only relying on market discipline can not lower the risk of local government debt effectively, the key is to improve the efficiency of fiscal institutional arrangement.
|
|
Received: 19 September 2017
Published: 01 November 2018
|
|
|
|
|
| [1] |
白彦锋和李然,2012,《中国地方政府自主发债历程问题研究》,《中央财经大学学报》第5期,第1～6页。
|
| [2] |
程令国、张晔和刘志彪,2013,《“新农保”改变了中国农村居民的养老模式吗？》,《经济研究》第8期,第42～54页。
|
| [3] |
范子英和田彬彬,2013,《税收竞争、税收执法与企业避税》,《经济研究》第9期,第99～111页。
|
| [4] |
龚强、王俊和贾坤,2011,《财政分权视角下的地方政府债务研究:一个综述》,《经济研究》第7 期,第144～155页。
|
| [5] |
郭玉清、何杨和李龙,2016,《救助预期、公共池激励与地方政府举债融资的大国治理》,《经济研究》第3期,第 81～95页。
|
| [6] |
姜子叶和胡育蓉,2015,《财政分权、预算软约束与地方政府债务》,《金融研究》第2期,第198～206页。
|
| [7] |
匡小平和蔡芳宏,2014,《论地方债的预算约束机制》,《管理世界》第1期,第173～175页。
|
| [8] |
罗党论和佘国满,2015,《地方官员变更与地方债发行》,《经济研究》第6 期,第131～146页。
|
| [9] |
罗荣华和刘劲劲,2016,《地方政府的隐性担保真的有效吗？——基于城投债发行定价的检验》,《金融研究》第4期,第83～98页。
|
| [10] |
牛霖琳、洪智武和陈国进,2016,《地方政府债务隐忧及其风险传导——基于国债收益率与城投债利差的分析》,《经济研究》第11期,第83～95页。
|
| [11] |
潘俊、王亮亮、吴宁和王禹,2016,《财政透明度与城投债信用评级》,《会计研究》第12期,第72～78页。
|
| [12] |
潘俊、王亮亮和沈晓峰,2015,《金融生态环境与地方政府债务融资成本——基于省级城投债数据的实证检验》,《会计研究》第6期,第34～41页。
|
| [13] |
王刚和韩立岩,2003,《我国市政债券管理中的风险防范与控制研究》,《财经研究》第7期,第16～21页。
|
| [14] |
汪莉和陈诗一,2015,《政府隐性担保、债务违约与利率决定》,《金融研究》第9期,第66～81页。
|
| [15] |
王永钦、戴芸和包特,2015,《财政分权下的地方政府债券设计:不同发行方式与最优信息准确度》,《经济研究》第11期,第65～78页。
|
| [16] |
王永钦、陈映辉和杜巨澜,2016,《软预算约束与中国地方政府债务违约风险: 来自金融市场的证据》,《经济研究》第11期,第96～109页。
|
| [17] |
王治国,2015,《隐匿信息下的地方政府自行发债最优监管契约》,《经济学动态》第4期,第51～58页。
|
| [18] |
魏志华,林亚清和周雄,2017,《财政透明度问题研究进展》,《经济学动态》第3期,第136～149页。
|
| [19] |
肖鹏、刘炳辰和王刚,2015,《财政透明度的提升缩小了政府性债务规模吗？——来自中国29 个省份的证据》,《中央财经大学学报》第8期,第18～26页。
|
| [20] |
肖兴志和王伊攀,2014,《政府补贴与企业社会资本投资决策——来自战略性新兴产业的经验证据》,《中国工业经济》第9期,第148～160页。
|
| [21] |
钟辉勇和陆铭,2015,《财政转移支付如何影响了地方政府债务？》,《金融研究》第9期,第1～16页。
|
| [22] |
钟辉勇、钟宁桦和朱小能,2016,《城投债的担保可信吗？——来自债券评级和发行定价的证据》,《金融研究》第4期,第66～82页。
|
| [23] |
Aldasoro, I., and M. Seiferling. 2014. “Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and the Accumulation of Government Debt”, IMF Working Paper, No.14-209.
|
| [24] |
Andersen, A. L., D. D. Lassen, and L. H. W. Nielsen. 2014. “The Impact of Late Budgets on State Government Borrowing Costs”, Journal of Public Economics, 109:27～35.
|
| [25] |
Ang, A., J. Bai, and H. Zhou. 2015. “The Great Wall of Debt: the Cross Section of Chinese Local Government Credit Spreads”, Research Paper, Georgetown McDonough School of Business.
|
| [26] |
Chen, Z., J. Pan, L. Wang, and X. Shen. 2016. “Disclosure of Government Financial Information and the Cost of Local Government's Debt Financing: Empirical Evidence from Provincial Investment Bonds for Urban Construction”, China Journal of Accounting Research, 9(3):191～206.
|
| [27] |
Eyraud, L., and L. Lusinyan. 2013. “Vertical Fiscal Imbalances and Fiscal Performance in Advanced Economies”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(5):571～587.
|
| [28] |
Gao, P., and Y. Qi. 2013. “Political Uncertainty and Public Financing Costs: Evidence from US Gubernatorial Elections and Municipal Bond Market”, Available at SSRN.
|
| [29] |
Jia, J., Q. Guo, and J. Zhang. 2014. “Fiscal Decentralization and Local Expenditure Policy in China”, China Economic Review, 28:107～122.
|
| [30] |
Köppl-Turyna, M., and H. Pitlik. 2017. “Do Equalization Payments Affect Subnational Borrowing？ Evidence from Regression Discontinuity”, European Journal of Political Economy, in press.
|
| [31] |
Levy, N., and A. Pauzner. 2014. “Government's Credit-rating Concerns and the Evaluation of Public Projects”, Journal of Public Economics, 115:117～130.
|
| [32] |
Plekhanov, A., and R. Singh. 2006. “How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated？ Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence”, IMF Staff Paper, 53(3):426～452.
|
| [33] |
Purnanandam, A., and D. Weagley. 2016. “Can Markets Discipline Government Agencies？ Evidence from the Weather Derivatives Market”, Journal of Finance, 71(1):303～334.
|
| [34] |
Sola, S., and G. Palomba. 2016. “Sub-nationals' Risk Premia in Fiscal Federations: Fiscal Performance and Institutional Design”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 63:165～187.
|
| [35] |
Ter-Minassian, T., and J. Craig. 1997. “Control of Subnational Government Borrowing”, Fiscal Federalism in theory and practice, 156～172.
|
|
|
|
