存款保险制度如何影响公众对不同银行的信心？——来自中国的证据

Journal of Financial Research

2018, Vol. 456

Issue (6): 109-122 DOI:

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How does Deposit Insurance System Affect Different Banks？ Evidence from China

WANG Yongqin, CHEN Yinghui, XIONG Yawen

China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University;
School of Accounting, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law;
School of Economics, Fudan University

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Abstract It is still an open question what effects introducing deposit insurance systems (hereafter, “DIS”) have on financial institutions in economies with implicit government guarantees. The paper exploits a quasi-natural experiment and uses event study methodology to estimate the effects. The results show that DIS actually makes smaller banks less trustworthy; DIS had more negative effects on small and local banks than large state-owned and shareholding banks. One explanation is that DIS has made implicit government guarantees explicit, leading to fears that guarantees for smaller banks will only be partial, while state-owned banks are believed to be “too big to fail”.

Key words： Implicit Guarantee Too Big to Fail Deposit Insurance Event Study

Received: 01 July 2016 Published: 01 November 2018

JEL分类号:

G21

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Cite this article:

WANG Yongqin,CHEN Yinghui,XIONG Yawen. How does Deposit Insurance System Affect Different Banks？ Evidence from China[J]. Journal of Financial Research, 2018, 456(6): 109-122.

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http://www.jryj.org.cn/EN/ OR http://www.jryj.org.cn/EN/Y2018/V456/I6/109

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