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Expiration of Share Lockups, Capital Operation and Stock Price Crash Risk |
ZHANG Xiaoyu, XU Longbing
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School of Finance, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics |
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Abstract From the perspective of capital operation around the expiration of share lockups, this paper reveals a new mechanism of stock market turbulence. Based on the data of 2007-2014, we first present the capital operation modes initiated by blockholders, and then explore the reason, mechanism and consequences of capital operation. The results show that: (1) there are eight types of capital operation, among which equity transfer, asset acquisition and divestiture are most common. Peer effects exist in the type decision-making. Most of the capital operations are initiated around the expiration of share lockups. (2) blockholders can gain profit through improving stock price and selling it at a relatively high price. (3) the economic consequence of doing so is exacerbating stock price crash risk. These results prove that capital operation combined with expiration of share lockups and reduce is a tunneling way, as well as a factor causing stock price crash risk. In practice, this paper reveals a new way to damage interests of small investors, and an important source of stock market volatility.
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Published: 10 January 2018
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